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CHAPTER I 
THE "CHANGE THE WORLOi' CONVERSATION 
Sociology originated in the "change the world" conversation of 
Comte (1842) and Marx (1848). Comte (1842, 1848), concerned with the 
abuses of the French Revolution, was interested in finding more stable 
ways of making social change. He sought the formation of an enlightened 
body of knowledge that would discover the true laws of society and then 
institute government that would rule according to such dynamics. 
Marx (1846, 1848) approached social change directly. He is one of 
the few sociologists who repeatedly uses the word ''love" in his writings 
(1844). His quest was to make a world in keeping with a vision of love: 
to somehow bring this love out into the world, and to have it make a 
difference to everyday life. We may not agree with his specific 
approaches and their application, but we cannot ignore the importance of 
his views: how to "change the world?" -- how to bring love into it in 
more ways. 
The "behavioral" disciplines emerged at a time when a long line of 
philosophers, culminating in Hegel, reached precisely the same conclu-
sion: that we needed to climb out of the armchair of social philosophy 
and into action. The conclusion was that even scientists were not 
merely describing the world, they were creating it. Therefore, we must 
move past philosophy and into making the world as it ought to be. As 
Marx has summarized, the philosophers have described the world; it is 
now up to us to transform it. 
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Weber (1946) also acknowledged the "change the world" focus of the 
discipline. In his "On Science as a Vocation," he contended that the 
question of "who am I?" always takes place in the context of the ques-
tion "what do I want to do?" Description and exploration of identity 
are tied to and initiated by the question of action. The conversation 
itself was one from which individual actors would come and go: develop 
strategies, experience ''eurekas," and return to pool their wisdom. 
Conversations on strategies for living are always highly personal, but 
the broader context for any such conversation is: how do we change the 
world? Sociology is born in such a quest. 
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However, while holding out the "promise of sociology," twentieth 
century sociologists have shied away from such an awesome responsibil-
ity. Historically, sociology has used the umbrella of science to help 
shoulder the burden and has claimed the legitimacy of scientific status. 
A direct moral intervention into the world seemed too all encompassing. 
Yet, somehow the focus of the old "change the world" conversation 
never quite dies. From time to time, cries and challenges emerge. They 
appear in the promise of sociology: among the young, entering the field 
eager for the quest, and with the old upon retirement, pointing to the 
vision once again. Research from the 1960's showed that the counter-
culture movement on college campuses was largely a movement of aspiring 
sociology students (Lipset, 1965). The number of professors who have 
kept the dream alive as they approached retirement is perhaps too great 
to mention. From time to time, the torch has not just passed from old 
to young with mainstream Sociology circumvented: sometimes, the idea 
has re-surfaced in the normal mid-life business of sociology: Lynd 
(1939), after doing what might be regarded as the classic participant-
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observation study, found himself asking, but Knowledge for What? After 
collecting voluminous amounts of data and information, Lynd returned to 
ask: but what are we doing? 
Mills (1959) challenged sociology to imagine an action-oriented 
sociology. He invited us past a control-happy sociology into the hard 
work of envisioning a society based on freedom. Becker (1968) has asked 
pointedly: Whose side are we on? Gouldner (1970} viewed the crisis of 
sociology as a question of whom sociology serves: do sociologists 
really want to be the hand-maidens of government? Most recently, we 
found Sanford (1981), who worked on the classic Adorno studies of 
authoritarianism, posing the same questions to the field. 
The historical occurrence of the popularity of Goffman's dramaturgy 
(Brissett and Edgley, 1974) might well has been linked to the abuses of 
sociology under Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society." Sociology had been 
granted a free hand in re-designing society. It responded with the 
functionalism of Parsons {1951) and the abstracted empiricism of the 
Lazarsfelds {1955), or worse. Dramaturgy represented a retreat from 
both scientific legitimacy an~ the responsibility for changing the 
world, to a stance of just describing. It desired to formulate a slow-
motion journalism which would be content with just "watching.'' While 
correcting the abuses of scientific sociology, dramaturgy retreated from 
the traditional sociological quest of action. 
While some sociologists may be content to merely observe, it is 
doubtful that this will be a popular approach that will rally many to 
the field. There is a latent hope that caused people to gravitate to 
sociology in the first place. There will always be people asking the 
questions and involved in the movement to create a better world. 
Classically, this conversation has always been the proper domain of 
sociology. It is this conversation that I have followed others in 
terming "humanistic sociology." 
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A few sociologists have spoken formally of the possibility of a 
"humanistic sociology" that would depart from existing theoretical 
approaches. Berger and Luckman (1966) in The Social Construction of 
Reality, proposed a humanistic approach which would stress "man as man." 
Glass and Staude (1972} compiled the theoretical ground which might pro-
vide the starting point for a humanistic sociology. Lee (1973) argued 
that the best sociology has a·lways been humanistic and that the paradigm 
included the works of Cooley, Thomas, Sorokin, and Mills. 
In many ways, the promise of sociology and the "change the world" 
conversation is a dream. But it is a dream that constantly penetrates 
the field and its very effort. This theme can be found as an unaccen-
tuated thread connecting seemingly diverse perspectives. Time and time 
again, while not actually formalized, the dream and the "change the 
world" conversation are repeated. 
Becker (1971, p. x), after a thorough review of the literature in 
the social disciplines, summarized: "The science of man is, histori-
cally and by its very nature, a utopian science." 
Humanistic sociology returns to the "change the world" conversation 
and questions of "the Good," love, values, and shaping the world. One 
is not far afield to conceive of sociology humanistically -- in fact, it 
has always been a latent undertone of the field. 
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The Beginnings of Humanistic Sociology 
Historically, there are two basic foundations for humanistic 
sociology: the reaction within sociology against a value-free, scienti-
fic sociology, and the counterculture movement to create alternative 
social forms. 
The formal development of a humanistic approach to sociology cen-
tered on a reaction against value-free, scientific sociology. Many 
sociologists (Mills, 1959; Horowitz, 1964; Phillips, 1971; Lee, 1973) 
had problems with neutral methods and the very idea of a classified 
expertise on living. At the same time, the credibility of the scienti-
fic bandwagon under which sociology had originally sought indulgence had 
developed clear philosophical problems. People had begun to ask if we 
really wanted to model sociology after physics. 
Remember that Comte had even wanted at one time to call the field 
"social physics." But now even physics was developing epistemological 
problems. As Carpenter (1970) noted, modern physics reads like native 
myths, where each experience defines its own time and space. 
The work of Meyerson (1902), Poincare (~952), Kuhn (1964), and 
Heisenberg (1977), among others, has shown that scientific laws are leg-
islated like any other laws. Modern physics no longer appears to know 
what is going on. The world no longer confirms their theories; what 
they had thought was happening, was not. Newtonian physics is used when 
it works. Einstein•s physics is used when it works, but neither para-
digm can be used to account for much of what the other predicts 
(Hampden-Turner, 1970). 
The physicist was not discovering a world, but selectively shaping 
a world to a certain image. This was the conclusion which shocked 
Galileo centuries earlier. Galilee's work on primary and secondary 
properties of matter reads strangely like Goffman's (1974) Frame 
Analysis. Primary properties show us where to focus: the height and 
depth, i.e., what the frame looks like. Secondary properties discuss 
what we see within the frame. This carries over into Einstein's phys-
ics: the clear implication is that we are making choices, not just 
discovering what is there. 
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The work of Butterfield (1957), Polanyi (1958), Kuhn (1964), and 
Feyerbend (1970) showed that the intuitive has played a far greater role 
in science than has been previously recognized. At its best, science 
has always included art and exploration. 
All of this has served to collapse the scientific canopy for doing 
sociology. However, this does not mean that we are forced back into 
social philosophy. What it does mean is that we are in a totally new 
dimension. We are back with the question of creating the world -- the 
old "change the world'' conversation with all its subtle nuances, poten-
tial abuses, and complexities. 
Curiously, at the same time that science as a system of meaning was 
being criticized, it had become firmly established in the world at 
large. Other ways of life were being dissipated. Anthropologists said 
that primitive cultures were rapidly being wiped from the face of the 
earth. By the end of the twentieth century, it was predicted that they 
would be gone. Within cultures, and between countries, differences 
crumbled under a scientific world view. Science had become reality. 
Yet, it was at this time that the idea of a counterculture emerged. 
This was to become the second foundation of the movement toward a human-
istic sociology. As cultural diversity becomes flattened into one 
culture under a scientific-technological imperative, the idea of a 
counterculture becomes imperative. The visible counterculture movement 
may have gone the way of a fad, but the very real structural problems 
which fostered it remain. 
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In part, the counterculture movement in America in the late sixties 
and early seventies was a movement 11 sponsored" for and by sociology. 
Studies reveal that large percentages of those involved were in the 
field of sociology (Hampton-Turner, 1970). There were very real insti-
tutional connections between the counterculture and sociology, and with 
the newly developing humanistic psychology. It was an effort to 
envision a new world. It was a challenge to create new social forms and 
alternatives: an effort to move past growing up absurd in the lonely 
crowd and deal with the real alienating structural problems of 
technological society. 
We had become estranged from community and from self. Psychology 
from Horney {1937) on had come to recognize that mental health depended 
upon the social context. The society which we had created on the basis 
of science had somehow deserted the needs of the person. Alienation and 
anomie had become commonplace in the modern world. New sources and ways 
of society seemed paramount if the human was to develop and grow. The 
movement to create alternative cultural forms -- to build a countercul-
ture within the vast scientific culture -- became the task of humanistic 
sociology. 
In many ways, it must be recognized that science is Western cul-
ture. It is the decision-making processes: the systems of rational 
rules which we term bureaucracy and our whole way of thinking about the 
world. The counterculture revealed, and perhaps telegraphed, a 
potential major paradigm shift. 
While the reaction to value-free science developed a suitable 
epistemology for humanistic sociology and a departure from science, the 
counterculture sought to explore and develop new possibilities much as 
the artist might. 
This movement to treating life as art is not new, but it has typi-
cally been encased within the scientific canopy. The idea that 
sociology is an art is not new to sociological literature, either. 
Probably the traditional statement of such a conception is Nesbit•s 
(1962) article "Sociology as an Art Form." However, what Nesbit is 
really talking about is not so much sociology as art, but the role of 
the intuitive in hypothesis formation. Otherwise, his is a traditional 
scientific process. 
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We will, perhaps, have to return all the way to Comte (1842) to 
gain a view of Art framing Science instead of the other way around. It 
is only recently that a contemporary option has emerged. For a full-
blown version of sociology as art, we must turn to the work of an 
anthropologist, Carpenter (1970). Carpenter did not really state his 
thesis in tight structural forms. Instead he strung lines through time 
and space much as an artist might do, but within his work can be found 
the beginnings of a humanistic sociology. 
Originally trained as an anthropologist in such diverse settings as 
the South Pacific, South America, and Alaska of the American Eskimo, 
Carpenter has emerged on the contemporary scene to lend a fresh eye to 
our changing patterns. The vision he has woven is a golden bough for 
the sociologist wishing to conceive of sociology as an art. 
Technology, Carpenter claimed, has circumscribed both culture and 
science rendering their original purposes obsolete. From this junkyard 
of resources, every person is forced to create their own world. All 
cultures have bended to the technological imperative. However, we have 
not been left with just the directionlessness of anomie, but an oppor-
tunity to create our own lives and environments. Personhood, and the 
wane of cultural systems of meaning, demands that we all function as 
artists. 
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Roszak {1969) originally coined the term "counterculture" in a book 
entitled The Makings of a Counterculture: Technological Society and 
Its Youthful Opposition. Much of the work concerned the inadequacy of 
science as a basis for culture. Yet in this formal treatment is found a 
direction and a suggestion: the person as artist must find and develop 
new forms which enhance and further personal enrichment. 
Carpenter•s monumental work appeared about the same time, but it 
moves past a critique of science into an exploration of doing the art; 
of framing a conversation which moves past technological society and 
develops countercultural forms. Carpenter•s {1970) book, They Became 
What They Beheld, may well be a summary of the crucial sociological 
insight. We become what we behold: we shape our environments and, 
thereafter, they shape us. If we wish to shape the world as artists, 
then we must become literate with our media, for these are our 
resources. 
Media the Mcluhan (1960) term-- refers not just to the popular 
conception of technological media, but to the social constructions of 
man. Media are .. extensions of man 11 -- the attempt to enlarge upon the 
world of the senses. Mcluhan originally co-authored an earlier version 
of They Became What They Beheld and compiled a reader with Carpenter on 
communications. However, it was Carpenter who brought the full 
implications of the Mcluhan view to sociology. It is a framework for 
doing sociology as art. 
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The similarity between the idea of "media" and Simmel•s (1950) con-
ception of "social forms" must be recognized. Carpenter•s work is a 
continuation of formalism which places it directly in the sociological 
tradition. Media are social forms. For Simmel, sociology was the study 
of social forms. For Carpenter, it is the understanding of the grammar 
and application of media. It is in this consciousness that we must 
construct our lives. As cultural traditions become de-classified and 
secularized, they become available to the artist as resources for con-
structing a new mythos. This is the task that both Becker (1971) and 
Jung (1964) saw as the new work of the behavioral disciplines. Such is 
the work of the sociologist as artist. 
Perhaps, the artistic vision cannot be articulated in scientific 
terms. Love and the magical may be academically illegitimate precisely 
because they do not lend themselves to scientific analysis. Columbus• 
maps were vague and sketchy, stated Carpenter (1970, n.p.), but they 
showed the right continent. If we opt for the wrong kind of conversa-
tion we may never get to the New World. 
We must ask what kinds of conceptions are the most useful for the 
sociologist as artist. An artistic theory does not need to fulfill the 
criteria of science because it is designed for a different purpose. An 
artistic conception may require a different type of conversation than 
the clear and full statement of science. As Carpenter (1970, n.p.) 
noted: "Clear speaking is generally obsolete thinking • The 
problem with full statement is that it does not involve: it is addres-
sed to the consumer, not the co-producer." 
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Simmel's formalism was so radical because it retreated from an epi-
stemological base. No longer seeking the source of life, it dealt with 
the resources that we use in shaping life. Such a strategy is by no 
means unheard of in sociology. It is similar to the tack taken by 
Parsons (1951) in formulating an ideal functionalism. It represents a 
utopian split with philosophy into the business of shaping the world. 
When Roszak (1979, 1980) was asked what became of the countercul-
ture movement, he claimed that it succeeded: that it became enfran-
chised in a historically new normative ethic of personhood. For the 
first time, self-exploration became a legitimate rhetoric of motive 
(Yankelovich, 1981). 
Roszak was both right and wrong. The counterculture was routinized 
into American society by emphasizing the psychological and neglecting 
the sociological. The psychological focus on personal fulfillment 
became a part of American cultural mythos, but the movement to find 
alternative forms of society was negated. Perhaps it was a large chunk 
of the problem to bite off at one time. Yet, the structural problems 
which foster individual discontent remain. By institutionalizing only 
the psychological aspects, the routinized counterculture led to abuses 
of self-indulgence and the over-concern with self that led to a char-
acterization as narcissism (Lasch, 1978). 
Yet, psychology seems from time to time to recognize the need 
for a companion humanistic sociology. Several recent Humanistic Psych-
ology conventions have focused upon the issue of community. Even 
Jungian psychologists (Hillman, 1975) --whose emphasis on dreams would 
apparently be the farthest from a sociological connection -- have talked 
about the need for meaningful rituals. A leading social researcher has 
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predicted that the self-fulfillment movement will give rise to the quest 
for community (Yankelovich, 1981). An old question emerges: How do we 
re-vision society? 
In psychology, a 11 humanistic psychology .. has been institutionalized 
following the work of Fromm (1947, 1956), Maslow (1954, 1966, 1968), 
Rogers (1961, 1977), and May (1969, 1975). Their work would suggest the 
possibility of a companion humanistic sociology focusing on the social 
context and interaction of persons. The writings of historian Roszak 
(1969, 1972) provided an insightful departure from scientific sociology. 
Becker•s (1964, 1968) review of sociology, .anthropology, and psychology 
also formed a basis for humanistic sociology. 
Through the counterculture movement, sociology once again returned 
to the 11 Change the world 11 conversation and questions of 11 The Good, 11 
love, values, and the shaping of the world. The quest for alternative 
social forms was a natural bridge between sociology and the world --
although one that traditional sociology had not prepared itself to meet. 
Perhaps the counterculture offered a preview and a re-ordering of the 
directions that sociology might take. The questions for a humanistic 
sociology and sociology as art seem to have been pinpointed by the 
counterculture: How do we create social forms which enpower people? 
How do we create society for people instead of people for society? Our 
social constructions should function for the human -- not mold the human 
to some other purpose. This is the meaning of humanism as applied to 
sociology. 
Social reality is quite different from physical reality. The task 
of the social disciplines is quite different from the scientific fact-
finding mission. The social disciplines seek to create a new world: 
entering the realm of value and what 11 0ught to be. 11 
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The Social Creation of Reality 
Social reality is organized along the lines of the self-fulfilling 
prophecy and the definition of the situation (Thomas and Thomas, 1928; 
Merton, 1948). As Berger and Luckman (1966) have shown, social reality 
is constructed. Knowledge and belief are thus intimately connected with 
the actual construction of a reality. We create a world which mirrors 
our definitions of the situation. Society tends to be almost a "mass 
hypnosis" enacting those definitions as self-fulfilling prophecies. 
The extent of this process must not be underestimated because it is 
the key sociological and anthropological insight. As Krishna (1971) 
argued, this is the central difference between social and physical real-
ities: belief, values, and wishes are fundamental components of social 
reality. If the world could be reduced to objective consciousness, then 
there would be no need for psychology or sociology. If the world could 
be reduced to wishes, then all would be mind and the territory of psych-
ology. The fact that the world is both necessitates a sociological 
approach to understanding it. Culture itself is a description which we 
learn to see: a self-fulfilling prophecy which becomes reality. 
Science functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy which has become 
the basis of our culture. It has been an overwhelming success: scien-
tific definitions of the situation and humanity have been implemented. 
Humanistic sociology would seek another definition of the situation and 
propose the accumulation of knowledge of a different type of self-
fulfilling prophecy. 
Defining Human Nature: The human form seems to be almost infin-
itely variable. Humanistic psychology has sought to treat human nature 
as a self-fulfilling prophecy and visualize toward the human potential. 
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Ortega y Gassett (1941) wrote that science could do no other than 
search for man's nature: treating man as a thing like other scientific 
things. Yet, "Man is no thing, but a drama •••• Man, in a word, has 
no nature; what he has is ••• history" (p. 200). [Italics Original] 
Humanistic psychology seeks to move beyond the past and into the 
present. From the present, it visualizes new possiblities for the human 
future. It attempts to create a new self-fulfilling prophecy embracing 
"the Good" and other humanistic values. 
Humanistic psychology is an exercise in personal power: the self-
creation of one's own life, reality, and meaning. In such can be found 
both its beauty and its naivety: reality is not created merely by indi-
vidual charisma, but is socially created by the interaction of actors. 
A humanistic sociology is thus needed to further articulate and 
implement the work begun by humanistic psychology. 
The Limits of Self-fulfilling Prophecies 
To create a self-fulfilling prophecy is by nature a heroic strat-
egy. Efforts to make the "Good" will always be interfaced with the 
problems of the Jungian "shadow" (Jung, 1964} and the critique of 
humanism which Becker (1975} characterized as "the escape from evil." 
The romantic quest must adequately deal with the full implications of 
these theorists if it is not merely to foster the seeds of its own 
undoing. 
In many ways, the "change the world" conversation approaches absur-
absurdity. If we interface psychology with sociology, we encounter the 
psychological concept of "projection." The concept of projection (Jung, 
1964) maintains that in order to escape from personal problems, a person 
15 
11 projects 11 these problems onto the world. Instead of changing one's 
self, a person distances his/her defects onto other people and,attempts 
to change them accordingly. Under such a conception, the "change the 
world 11 conversation could be seen as a neurotic attempt not to deal with 
self. 
It is no doubt true that many of even the greatest social theorists 
were guilty of such a ploy. It is said that Marx's wife and children 
were starving while he sat in an ivory tower writing of love for the 
masses. Sadly, such examples have often been the rule rather than the 
exception. 
At the same time, we cannot discount the "change the world" con-
versation as merely psychological projection. Psychology cannot be 
reduced to sociology, nor can sociology be reduced to psychology. Each 
discipline in its very approach obscures part of what the other is try-
ing to say. What we have is a double-bind with which the .. change the 
world 11 conversation will be forever interlaced. 
Evil in the world has been generated by the very attempt to do 
good. People have sought the good by escaping from evil: we define the 
evildoers and seek to eliminate them. Unfortunately, we do not have to 
return in history as far as the Crusades to find pientiful examples of 
such efforts. 
Jungian psychologists refer to such phenomena as the "shadow side .. 
of personality (Jung, 1964). There will always be some evil cast by the 
shadows of any good light that we may shine. Sociologists have dealt 
with this under the conception of 11 manifest 11 and "latent" functions. 
However, the notion of the 11 Shadow11 probably has more profound 
implications. 
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The "shadow side" of our personalities tends to be hidden from our-
selves. We do not see our most drastic faults, but instead project them 
onto others. Although such is a fool's game, given our inability to 
achieve total psychological insight, it is a fool's game to which we all 
are heir. 
Even though they have often been translated to such a conclusion, 
Becker's "escape from evil'' thesis and Jung's idea of the "shadow~ do 
not mean that we need to abandon all efforts at social change. What 
they do mean is that we need to be more aware of the consequences of our 
social change strategies and less naive about our motives in formulating 
them. 
Our motive in formulating a "change the world" conversation is 
often heroic. It is an effort to which we return, despite its ambigui-
ties and despite what is often the feebleness of our effort. We must 
realize that we cannot change the world once and for all. We cannot 
save people. But we can make the world better. We can help people. 
If we seek to become literate with what is possible, we can strive to 
make the world better-- to see our lives clearly and apply our effort 
where it will help. This is the task to which sociology since its ini-
tial conception has aspired to. Humanistic sociology returns directly 
to this focus. 
Yet in reformulating the old "change the world" effort, perhaps, we 
need to recognize the problems which are inherent in heroism itself. 
Perhaps we need a different paradigm (than that of the hero) for viewing 
social change. Perhaps heroism as a strategy has led us into science 
and the search for scientific techniques in a sort of "back door" 
fashion. 
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Another possibility emerges for organizing our conceptions of 
social change. The old conception of the magician as opposed to the 
hero offers us another way of approaching the problem. The ancient con-
ception of magic emphasizes "relatedness" (Roszak, 1975). This is simi-
lar to Fromm's (1956) and others' (Tillich, Jourard) conception of love 
as "overcoming separateness." Perhaps, the magician and the 1 over offer 
a very real strategy for doing sociology and re-entering the 11 Change the 
world" conversation. And although this paradigm may not be fully arti-
culated in our lifetime, it offers a very real possibility for our 
lives. If we were to reduce humanism to a few words, those words could 
easily be the recovery of love and the magical. 
The Humanistic Vision 
Humanistic sociology would strive to bring values right through the 
1'front door" of the discipline and envision society in such a way as to 
make a better self-fulfilling prophecy. 
This brings us to the question sociologists and psychologists alike 
have habitually tried to avoid: What is human nature? It is here that 
humanists have usually been undone by the shadow side. However, we can-
not avoid the question and must give at least a tentative orientation. 
I would suggest that we could do a lot worse than follow the work 
of Fromm (1947, 1968). Fromm {1968, p. 96) suggested we begin our 
"science" with the value "that it is desirable that a living system 
should grow and produce the maximum of virtue and intrinsic harmony." 
The central value of humans would be "to become what we potentially are" 
(1947, p. 163). 
Humanistic psychology following the direction of Fromm, Maslow 
(1954, 1962), Rogers (1961, 1977), and others sought to explore the 
human potential. Human nature may not be any more than a matter of 
potential: not a matter of "being", but a process that is 11 becoming." 
It is a departure from "what is" to what 11 might be." 
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Human nature seems to be extremely variable if we view the various 
forms and expressions that human experience has taken. Indeed, we may 
concur with Fromm (1968) who follows Walt Whitman in saying that ''I con-
tain multitudes." Or Goethe's comment that I can "conceive of no act so 
horrible that I cannot imagine myself to be the author." 
Self is not contained, but has many faces. Human experience may 
vary, but we see a thread of possibilities from the best to the worse. 
Indeed, we recognize a familiarity in all the experiences. Once we 
understand the situation, we may see how we might have behaved similarly 
in the same situation. 
This imagining and understanding of the other is perhaps a natural 
bridge between the disciplines of psychology and sociology. Cooley 
(1909) called the "imagining of the other" sympathic introspection and 
recommended it as the proper method for sociology. Mills (1959) in the 
Sociological Imagination asked us to see the common threads that connect 
the problems in our lives. Laing (1964) addressed the extent to which, 
as the song says, "there but for fortune go I." The human pass i bil ity 
seems exceedingly variable. We can cross and connect with other lives, 
seeing how we might be living those lives. 
Humanistic psychology expands upon this idea to ask us to envision 
what we might become: the self-actualized self of Maslow; the self-
realization of Rogers; the alive person of Fromm. These are ideal 
types. They set the direction that this truely variable form --
humanity -~ could possibly take. They are not so much realities that 
can be grasped as they are potent1a11ties that are possible. 
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All of this has lent an air of "make-believe" and unreality to 
humanistic psychology: an aura of illegitimacy which does not seem 
quite credible in traditional academic circles. But as the philosopher 
and author Hesse (1969) noted: 
••• although in a certain sense and for light-minded persons, 
non-existent things can be more easily and irresponsibly 
represented in words than existing things, for the serious and 
conscientious historian, it is just the reverse. Nothing is 
harder, yet nothing is more necessary than to speak of certain 
things whose existence is neither demonstrable nor probable. 
The very fact that serious and conscientious men treat them as 
existing things brings them a step closer to existence and the 
possibility of being born (Foreword). 
Truly credible scholarship keeps the human possibility alive and 
furthers its direction. To record "what is" is not enough. We must 
report that "what is" suggests alternatives and possibilities that could 
be followed. In some ways, the "change the world" conversation will 
always be a dream. But it can also be a real movement in that direc-
tion. How we propose to move in this direction (towards "the Good," 
love, and the magical) is crucial, for it determines all that follows. 
We must become literate with the grammar of social change strategies, 
avoid the pitfalls that have traditionally befallen such efforts, and 
develop viable new alternatives and social forms that enhance the 
humanistic vision. 
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Key Concepts in Humanistic Sociology 
Love 
If we are going to conceive of sociology humanistically, then we 
must focus upon life-enhancing social processes rather than reduction-
istic ones. The foundation of the humanistic vision is the experience 
and the power that has been called love. Indeed, love is the core 
humanistic value. If we follow love seriously, a different con-ception 
of sociology emerges. 
Love provides a dialectic paradigm to the scientific paradigm and 
contains the basis for a different conceptualization of knowledge. A 
love paradigm could provide the basis for a new self-fulfilling prophecy 
and cultural system. Love is not objective but involved. It is not 
detached, but empha~izes respect and honesty. Love is not premised on 
doubt and testing, but is based on belief, trust, and faith: love is 
always a risk. Love is not a product of science, but is by invitation 
only: while science is based on prediction and control, love courts, 
invites, and influences, but does not force. Where science is experi-
mental, love is an exploration in reality. It does not flourish in mock 
or artificial settings, but only when one opens with full commitment. 
Finally, while science seeks a value-free approach, love is the very 
heart of meaning. Love is the active component in the creation of 
meaning. 
A love paradigm gives us a reasonable basis for a departure from 
the scientific paradigm. In addition to a different epistemology, the 
two paradigms involve different conceptions of power. The scientific 
power emphasizes force, prediction, and control; it is analogous to 
social power which forces one to do something against one•s will. The 
humanistic version of power derives from Nietzsche•s 11 Will to power. 11 
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It is the actualizing power of being. It invites, courts, influences, 
but does not control. This idea of 11 power as bei ng 11 has been used by 
Maslow, Fromm, Rogers, and Roszak and predicates the basis of humanistic 
psychology. 
Vet sociology has neglected the subject of love. Sociology makes 
an introductory case for love but only to prove the need for social con-
tact and community (i.e., society). It then moves off without ever 
returning to understand the process. 
Love and human contact are shown to be essential for nurturing and 
even longevity; but all of this is used merely to make an argument for 
11 proving .. the need for society. Studies of attic children and hospita 1-
ism show that children either do not grow properly or die without human 
intimacy. Other studies show that significant relationships and 
involvement with others actually influence how long a person will live. 
The key element in these studies is not socialization and social inter-
action (as might be assumed from an examination of how these studies are 
used in introductory books). The key element is love and human 
intimacy. 
Strangely, love itself remains still largely illegitimate as a 
topic for serious consideration in the traditional academic circles of 
sociology. Yet, it might be argued that love is the fundamental reason 
people desire social interaction in the first place: that love is the 
key sociological term, and that the quest for love is the fundamental 
human motivation (Bergson, 1935; Fromm, 1956). Love is .. messy... It 
does not neatly fit our pre-arranged methods borrowed from science and 
classical philosophy. Yet if we are truly interested in human proces-
ses, we cannot afford to quickly forget love after the first chapter 
never to return. 
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It appears that every major sociological perspective has a dialec-
tic within the field (e.g., functionalism-conflict theory, symbolic 
interactionism-formalism). The exception is exchange theory. I believe 
that the development of an intimacy perspective would provide for the 
appropriate counterbalancing of the exchange metaphor. An intimacy per-
spective might well serve to integrate our insights on community, 
primary groups, love, and the whole nature of intimacy. 
What should be obvious about the exchange metaphor has been 
obscured by its very transparency: it premises separate individuals. 
We have never explored clearly what the "we" dimensions are. What 
occurs in the process we call "sharing?" What happens when the defini-
tion of the situation moves past one of scarcity to a feeling of 
abundance? 
In exchange theory, we have followed Gouldner (1973) in maintaining 
the universalness of the "norm of reciprocity." However, what of the 
idea of a "free gift?" Classical exchange theory would deny the possi-
bility of a free gift, while an intimacy perspective would maintain that 
love is a free gift. Gouldner (1973) has modified his perspective to 
include a "norm of benevolence". How do reciprocity and charity 
interact? 
Trust is also a phenomenon which collapses self-interest into "we" 
definitions. Recent research has shown its application into even insti-
tutional settings (Gibb, 1978). Sociology may have barely scratched the 
surface in examining the ability of trust to "transcend the very nature 
of what is. 11 
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Homans• exchange theory contained a "liking" postulate which may 
correspond to trust. Homans (1974) maintained that positive interaction 
creates liking and friendships. Such liking facilitates further inter-
action and institutional dynamics. Drucker (1974) defined profit not as 
money but as the "lubricant" which makes an organization maintain 
itself. Friendships, liking, and trust represent not luxuries, but 
essential components of'organizational interaction. These dimensions 
are an exception to strict exchange theory and contain the possibility 
of moving away and weaving an intimacy perspective. 
Exchange theory stems from the application of economic metaphors to 
social life. An intimacy perspective would investigate different modes 
of survival. Artists, for example, have always survived with a differ-
ent manner of commitment than advised by the traditional economy. Per-
haps, in the past, it has been mainly artists who have created their own 
lives. With personhood becoming a norm, the artist offers clues not 
only to our own personal fulfillment, but for the conceptualization of 
society. 
Certainly, one of the reasons why an intimacy perspective has not 
been articulated, aside from the fact that it forces us to deal with 
values and emotions, is that it places us squarely in the realm of hav-
ing to deal with religion as social theory. It forces us to confront 
Jesus as social theorist. It makes us face Buddha as psychologist. 
Sociologists have not wanted to have their religions evaluated as pol-
icy. An intimacy perspective causes us to de-secularize the world and 
bring the things which matter most into our theories and work as 
sociologists. 
An intimacy perspective also invites us to explore the difference 
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between 11 Self 11 and 11 0ther 11 which we have used so precariously to seek a 
truce with psychology over discipline boundaries. Intimacy means not 
only intimacy with others, but ultimately, intimacy with self and with 
environment. 
Intimacy is a way of knowing. It represents a different approach 
than the autopsy table of science. Instead of analysis and dissection, 
love is 11 knowing something in its integrity" (Fromm, 1956, pp. 24-26). 
This respectful way of knowledge may be the very essence of what a 
humanistic effort means. 
Synergy 
If we are going to conceive of sociology humanistically, then we 
must focus upon social processes which are life-enhancing rather than 
reductionistic. In what types of social arrangements are persons ful-
ler; in what types of relationships are humans reduced to something 
smaller? Synergy is the idea that the whole is somehow greater than the 
sum of its parts: that combined action is greater than the run of 
individual actions. 
In some types of relationships, combined action actually produces a 
sum which is less than individual actions: manipulation, power-
dominated relationships, relationships of role-like efficiency. In such 
cases one might well argue that the person would be better off left 
alone by society. Yet, there is another possibility: a person being 
promoted by combined action: of coming to society by synergy. 
Synergy means that 1 + 1 = more than 2. Despite the fact that we 
have not used the term "synergy, .. we have always "advertised" the 
necessity of "society" by this concept. We have argued as sociologists 
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that society cannot be reduced to individual actors. Psychological 
reductionism does not explain the ''magic" which can occur from inter-
action and literally produce something that is more than the sum of its 
parts. Indeed, we have defined society as "more than the sum of its 
parts" (Parsos, 1951; Weber, 1946; Durkheim, 1950; Comte, 1907). Yet 
we do not understand this process by which the person is made more by 
society. This process is synergy. 
Sociologists have staked their claim to a discipline upon synergy 
without ever marveling about how the process occurs in the first place. 
The study of synergy should be a central focus for a humanistic sociol-
ogy. It is in such a process that we find social forms which create 
society for people rather than reducing people to social forms. 
The term synergy was originally introduced to the behavioral disci-
plines by Benedict (1970; Mead, 1959). At the time of her writing, she 
was greatly concerned that her examination of synergy might be seen as 
undennining the core anthropological stance of cultural relativity 
(Maslow, 1971). Still, she could not avoid reaching the conclusion that 
some cultures produced paranoid individuals who might well be better 
left alone by society; while in other cultures, life was found to be 
abundant and individuals seemed to be promoted to synergy. Some social 
arrangements appeared to be "factually" better when viewed from any 
human standpoint. 
Ruth Benedict's concern with cultural relativity is understandable. 
She had stumbled upon the first concept which emerges when we move past 
value neutrality and relativity as the supreme goal. She termed the 
magical process synergy. 
It is interesting to note that a young graduate student of 
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Benedict•s named Maslow (1971} was so impressed with her insights on 
synergy that he made a career out of identifying and studying people who 
reminded him of Ruth Benedict -- whose interaction with other people 
encouraged and created a synergistic involvement. He called such people 
"self-actualized." Synergy thus got smuggled into psychology through 
the back door as it were and sociology has still not gotten around to 
exploring the implications of Benedict•s argument: the creation of 
social arrangements and forms which encourage synergy as a societal pro-
cess. The self-actualization of a psychological viewpoint is incomplete 
without a companion sociology which focuses upon synergy. 
Re-visioning Society 
Sociology is precisely in the business of re-visioning society 
(Hillman, 1975). Whorf (1956) concluded his study of the nature of 
language by saying that if science is going to survive the impending 
darkness, we must find new ways of talking about the world a new 
language. The way we envision the world tends then to become the world. 
Humanistic sociology must find new ways of talking about the world which 
do not reduce human beings to lesser, impersonal versions. This was 
Mills• {1959) concern in the Sociological Imagination. He spoke of 
developing theories which do not whittle us into smaller "cheerful 
robot" versions. 
How do we create a society which allows and enhances freedom and 
exploration those values which have been called personhood. Mills 
foresaw the very difficult problem of democracy in all its precarious-
ness: the idea of freedom within society. How do we create a society 
which is capable of providing individual freedom, not reducing the 
27 
individual to societal demands, and still have society? Again, we con-
front the idea of synergy. Synergy is not an avant-garde idea or a 
luxury. It is crucial to the institutional fabric of a society which 
values democracy. Sociology must work to re-vision society in new ways. 
Humanistic sociology takes a value stance. It strives for the 
sociologist to bring his/her values to work through the front door. As 
Boulding (1977) stated, the question for the behavioral disciplines is 
simply what is better, and how do we get there? Asking the right 
question is crucial. If we neglect to properly frame our exploration, 
we will not move in the direction of discovering an answer; nor will we 
recognize the answer should we stumble upon it. Our first step is cru-
cial: it frames our task and predicts all that is to come. If we begin 
with the fact-finding mission of science and truth, we may never get 
around to "better" and questions of values. What is important? How do 
we create meaning? 
Our beginning steps towards a humanistic sociology can be outlined 
now. The first concept which emerges after we leave behind the relative 
perspectivism of a neutral science is the idea of synergy -- that there 
is such a thing as a "good" culture (Benedict, 1970). Next, we find the 
myth-making function: Becker (1971) re-visions toward a culture which 
is an effective hero system and Jung (1964) sought the re-vitalization 
and creation of meaningful rituals. Subsequently, we may turn to 
Fromm•s (1947, 1956, 1968) idea of embracing values which are life-
enhancing. As Becker noted (1971, p. 152): " the brilliant work 
of Erich Fromm is the best synthesis ••• to emerge in our epoch, and 
it is this we shall have to build." 
Finally, in our haste to develop a science, we have abandoned our 
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folklore, etiquette, and ethical traditions. We must now search them 
for clues for envisioning society while retaining the mystical view of 
humanity. We have abandoned values and approaches which explore mean-
ing. We need now to traverse such sacred ground. Sociology -- human-
istic sociology --must bring the whole of our knowledge of life to bear 
upon the task of living. To do such we must explore the limits that 
science has imposed on our thinking: the nature of our socially created 
reality and the human possibilities; and follow the efforts of the 
lovers, magicians, artists, and mystics to create a better world. 
It is an old quest. Starry-eyed youths enter the field eager for 
the romance of changing the world. As we grow to maturity, we put aside 
the grandeur and begin the day-to-day task of living. But some of the 
old dreams remain. The questions and the desire will not go away. We 
can put the dream to sleep, but we cannot close its eyes. As people 
retire, we find them once again challenging youth with the same old 
hope. We cannot hold out the promise of sociology just at the beginning 
and the end of careers. The real mid-life crisis that nags us in our 
sleep and comes bursting through as we turn back to the world from peak 
experience is: how do we return the old question to the mainstream of 
the field? How do we build upon meaning, values, and the quest for 
better -- the "change the world" conversation -- and make it the work of 
sociology? 
No generation will "solve" the questions of the "change the world" 
conversation. We are far too mortal for that. Most of the truths we 
know are actually rather existential in nature. We live with our con-
fusing realities and frailties. Yet we strive to make life somehow 
better: somehow more happy. We stand on the earth. We know that we 
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are living and dying. Our imaginations reach to the stars. It is here 
that we must build with the dream in mind. 
CHAPTER II 
SCIENCE -- THE REO HERRING 
Questions of aesthetics and how to build a social world around 
humanistic values are, by no means, new. The quest to love and create a 
social world in the light of that vision is perhaps as old as conscious-
ness itself. Throughout the ages, people have testified to love as the 
crux of experience, and what is important in life. Yet, a practical 
theory of love has not been mapped into reality. Indeed, questions of 
the 11 Good 11 have often been abandoned in favor of more realistic pur-
suits. At the same time, here we are entertaining the possibility of a 
humanistic sociology, and embracing Ruth Benedict's idea of synergy --
that there is such a thing as the 11 Good 11 culture. 
Bateson (1979), in discussing similar questions, said 
There has to be a reason why these questions have never been 
answered •••• We might take that as our first clue to the 
answer -- the historical fact that so many ••• have tried 
and not succeeded. The answer must be somehow hidden. It 
must be so: That the very posing of these questions always 
gives off a false scent, leading the questioner off on a wild 
goose chase. A red herring (p. 234). 
I would suggest that the red herring is none other than science. 
It will be remembered that at the time that science was succeeding 
with technological breakthroughs and was enjoying new-found credibility 
with the public, the romantic poets warned against the abuses of its 
vision. Romantic poets openly declared war on "Newton's sleep" (Roszak, 
1969). Having conceived of Christ as the Imagination, William Blake 
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maintained that Science was the Anti-Christ and that only 11 dark Satanic 
mills" could come from it (Rateson, 1979, p. 241). In all, the romantic 
poets saw Science as destroying all that was holy and magical in life: 
they saw it negating the humanistic vision. 
This division between the religious view and the scientific view of 
man had not always been the case. The fact that early scientific issues 
were also church issues illustrates that they were both operated in the 
same theater. Often the theologian was also the scientist. Science had 
begun as a quest to find the laws of God: since God had designed the 
universe according to laws, the early scientist sought to find a law so 
obvious that the heretic would be forced to admit that God did exist 
(Bosworth, 1977). 
Science would thus find God's rulebook and prove His existence. It 
was conceived of as a Golden Ladder of Progress which would take us to 
knowledge and to God. Ego's quest for God's rulebook might be seen as 
already providing the basis for a formidable 11 red herring." 
Science was thus conceived of as a Tower of Babel which would lead 
to heaven. It was Spinoza (1951) who first realized that something 
quite different was happening. His conclusion was gradually whispered 
all over Europe: 11 God or Nature... It did not make any difference 
whether the word God was used in scientific theories or whether the word 
Nature was used. 
The ancients had sought to find the fundamental building blocks of 
the universe: what they termed "corpuscles... With the 11 finding 11 of 
atoms and the ordering of the physical world by atornic weight, it 
appeared that the fundamental building blocks had been found (Meyerson, 
1930). However, Einstein's theory and its application in splitting the 
-----
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atom did more than just produce the nuclear age -- it destroyed the 
philosophical bas1s of science. The atom was supposedly the fundamental 
building block and~ therefore~ unsplitable. It became apparent that 
atoms were not really there: they had been constructed by the mind. 
The weight definition which was an agreement to operate towards the 
world in a certain manner had proved to have practical applications. It 
had been shown that we can analyze the world by comparing the weights of 
various items, but we are constructing those items -- not finding the 
truth. The agreement to accept the weight definition for physical 
science was an agreement to operate by a chosen metaphor. 
As Burke (1945) summarized, 
Those who have criticized the use of metaphor have for the 
most part not realized how little removed such description is 
from the ordinary intellectual method of analysis •••• 
When we describe in abstract terms, we are not sticking to the 
facts at all, we are substituting something else for them just 
as much as if we were using out and out metaphor •••. 
Indeed, are we not coming to see that the whole works of 
scientific research, even entire schools, are hardly more than 
the patient repetition, in all its ramifications, of a fertile 
metaphor (p. 126)? 
The Truth appeared not to be what we had thought. It suddenly 
began to look like we were not going to find an Absolute Truth. The 
Logical Positivists were mistaken: the Universe was not going to tell 
us how to act. It looked like Science was closer to art than had been 
suspected. Life could not be solved first on paper. 
Before we live-- before we act-- we cannot fully know the plot. 
Science will not free us from the responsibility of acting. The 11 Change 
the world 11 conversation cannot be solved on paper. We cannot wait to 
find the truth before we get around to acting toward the good. If we 
wait, we will never be finished in time. 
It is strange that at the same time that Science was being 
33 
criticized for serious epistemological problems, it had become the pre-
dominant metaphor in society. In fact, currently, Science~ Western 
culture. It is the judicial decision-making processes, the extension of 
science into rational rules and role descriptions which is bureaucracy, 
and the very method of running government and business alike. 
Primitive world views are being erased from the face of the earth. 
The scientific world view has won out through technological magic. The 
technology of cameras, television, automobiles, and even ''Coca-Cola .. 
was no match for the primitive methods (Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1955; 
Carpenter, 1970; Mcluhan, 1971). We live in a world of technological 
magic. The assumption is that surely the world view which gave us this 
magic must be superior. 
Cultural diversity is being flattened into one scientific-
technological culture. Primitive world views remain only as curiosi-
ties. The rational-scientific banner has become the official version 
of rea 1 ity. 
It is at this point that a counterculture becomes imperative. It 
was Jung who first sought to recover the irrational component from prim-
itive cultures (Jung, 1964). He saw the need to preserve the ancient 
understandings of man's drama. It was meaning and relatedness which the 
primitive world view expressed. It is alienation and separateness which 
the scientific world view emphasizes (Fromm, 1968). 
Perhaps, we do not see the significance of Benedict's idea of syn-
ergy and the choice between cultural arrangements because we see only 
one culture. The scientific imperative has obscured choices between 
cultures -- between the "good 11 culture and the unsatisfying. Culture 
limits and structures the options which can occur to us. We see no 
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possibility except the scientific realism. 
At the same time that science is being popularized as it colonizes 
culture, it is in trouble philosophically. Ancient philosophers had a 
debate over whether the first step should be to "find the truth" or to 
"make the good." The search for truth emerged victorious and the 2,000 
year journey to science was launched. But now, even the physicists 
our most reified version of science -- do not know what is going on 
{Needleman, 1979; Hampden-Turner, 1970). Perhaps, it was not possible 
to depart from the diffi cu1ty of the "making the good 11 argument so 
easily. 
In our search for the truth, it has been shown that all knowledge 
is "personal knowledge" (Polanyi, 1958); that major scientific "truths" 
were serendipitous discoveries (Butterfield, 1957); and that all major 
scientific discoveries occurred because somebody (either consciously or 
unconsciously) violated established methods and truths (Feyerbend, 
1970). The truth appears not to be what we had thought it was at all. 
The conclusion is slowly being reached that science is subject to 
the same dynamics as other human systems. The great success of the 
physical sciences occurred when the decision was made to ignore the fact 
that science is a human act. The physical scientist decided to ignore 
questions of human consciousness: to pretend that they weren•t looking, 
that they were just seeing. The human act of looking became unavailable 
for inspection (Bosworth, 1977). This is precisely where the physical 
sciences separated from philosophy and made their great progress. 
Later, we have the development of something called the "social" 
sciences taking place. This is a slippery maneuver, at best. The 
assumption is made that there are "mature" and "immature" sciences and 
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eventually the social sciences will "grow up." However, this obscures 
the basic epistemological problem. Having decided to ignore human 
action, we are now going to use the procedure we developed to sidestep 
human dynamics and consciousness to study human dynamics and conscious-
ness. Science then could move merrily on its way up the ladder of its 
tower of Babel to God. It is such expedience which is immature. 
Science as a Human Process 
If we view science as a human process, some odd things begin to 
happen. We reach some interesting understandings. 
Science is a Club 
It is a group of "certified experts" who agree to play by the 
rules. The "weight definition" of material reality by which physical 
science staked its identity is an example of a prerequisite for club 
membership. 
Poincare (1952), in his famous Phosphorus example, showed that even 
material elements must gain admission to such a club. He noted that we 
are only allowed to use "laboratory-certified" phosphorus in our experi-
ments. Even though we may have a mountain of what in every manner 
appears to be phosphorus standing outside the laboratory, we are not 
allowed to call it phosphorus because we cannot be sure that it will 
react in the way that we have previously determined that phosphorus 
behaves. Therefore, we can call the mountain of apparent "phosphorus" 
absolutely nothing. We only include items in our "scientific" process 
which we have determined will obey our rules. 
Similar procedures are used for weeding out uncooperative people 
who would be scientists. Not only does the world view of each science 
make it difficult for people who do not share club views of reality to 
obtain membership, but graduate schools and professional associations 
are maintained to eliminate those who do not follow club policy.l 
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A personal anecdote might further illustrate the gate-keeping func-
tion of the scientific club. A friend of mine who was a graduate 
student in chemistry informed his advisor, while he was doing research 
on phosphates, that he thought that phosphates were mental constructs 
and that they did not really exist. The reply was: "If you cannot 
believe in phosphates, what can you believe in? 11 My friend was 
violating a domain assumption for club membership. 
Science is a Method of Agreement 
It is a group of people who agree on a certain version of the world 
and agree to act in a certain manner towards it. It is almost a con-
tractual arrangement.2 Kuhn (1964} showed that the scientific method 
is a way of agreement and settling arguments. It is not a matter of 
"truth", but of popularity and one side winning an argument. Paradigm 
shifts have not been made because one argument is necessarily better, 
but because one side has succeeded in obtaining the necessary power to 
enforce its agreement. Kuhn noted that the slow, orderly progress 
depicted in science textbooks was a myth: each generation rewrote its 
history much as a political party might. 
lrt is true that professional associations do not usually ban or 
censor members, but they do reduce certain views (and people) to 
irrelevance. 
2rf masters• theses, Ph.D. dissertations, and professional journals 
are any proof, it is a contractual agreement. 
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Scientific Laws are Legislated 
Scientific laws are not found, they are subject to a process of 
legislation just like any other law (Bosworth; 1977). They rely on the 
methods of argument and politics for endorsement. As Kuhn (1964) showed, 
often the change takes place by the old guard dying off, and with it the 
opposition to a new paradigm and laws. 
Science is Involved in Actively Shaping/Making 
The Universe 
Science is not finding the truth, but is shaping to an image. The 
idea that scientific methods can be neutral is becoming increasingly 
suspect. The Heisenberg (1977) principle of indeterminancy~ in physics, 
says that some particles in space cannot be seen without shining a light 
upon them. The act of shining a light on them then forever changes 
their velocity and direction. The act of seeing thus changes what we 
see, and we will never be able to know the truth (of what happened 
before we shined the light). The process of looking cannot be ignored. 
This is the conclusion which bothered Galilee centuries earlier. 
Galilee said that all matter has two types of.properties: primary prop-
erties and secondary properties. However, the primary properties are 
really not 11 properties 11 at all. The secondary properties tell us what 
we see, but the primary properties tell us where to look in the first 
place. They are the arbitrary descriptions, definitions, and focuses 
without which we see nothing. Galileo realized that by telling us where 
to look, the physical sciences were not finding the truth, but making 
the world. Not only must the amateur looking through his telescope know 
where to look in the first place, he must know what to expect to see. 
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This is all very similar to the recent work of Piaget (1954) in 
psychology. In discussing the role of seeing and vision in the child's 
conception of reality, Piaget noted that a child must learn what is in an 
environment in order to see it. Children must learn where and on what to 
focus: this is why we wave objects in front of them. Parents show them 
the environment. Cultural anthropology abounds with examples of how par-
ents in different cultures have delineated the environment in different 
ways and socialized their children to see different realities (Benedict, 
1934; Hoebel, 1949). Culture is a description which we learn to see. 
Goffman's (1974) frame analysis in sociology, made a similar point 
in saying that how we frame something determines what we see. Goffman's 
phenomelogical approach also parallels Bateson's (1979) argument that a 
question frames the answer to it, and we must ask on what "surface" the 
answer to a particular question might be mapped. Science is not able to 
avoid the human component and attain objective truths. Our decisions on 
how and where to look, no matter how "objectively" we design our method 
of looking, will influence-- and to a large extent determine-- what we 
see. The question that science must now be asked is whether it has 
extracted virtually all that can be obtained or whether new methods can 
be incorporated for some new purpose other than the traditional scienti-
fie quest for truth, or whether we need to turn to new approaches. 
Eddington said it quite nicely: 
We have found that where science has progressed the farthest, 
the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind has 
put into nature. We have found a strange footprint on the 
shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one 
after another, to account for its origin. At last we have 
succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the 
footprint. And lo! it is our own (Matson, 1964, p. 125). 
Our premises become our conclusions. Our domain assumptions 
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(Gouldner, 1970) become our structure. Where we start is where we end 
up. 
Even Descartes (1912), who recommended a method of doubt, could not 
avoid such circularity. He began by thinking and doubting and he con-
eluded with 11 1 think, therefore I am." He started believing in the 
truth but chose the method of doubting all things and forcing the truth 
to reveal itself. Several times during his discourse, when he had 
worked his way into a philosophical corner, the "Angel of Truth" showed 
up to direct him on his way. If Descartes had not a priori subscribed 
to the theory of truth, we might expect him to be suspicious of the 
11 Angel of Truth. 11 His circular method of doubting proves only that he 
is doubting. 
If where we start is where we end up and determines what we shall 
see on the journey, then where we start is of paramount importance. 
~1ce reified, perspectives tend to become self-perpetuating and very 
difficult to disengage. Perspectives can easily degenerate into name-
calling where it is felt that simply because we have labeled a phenome-
non, we have understood it. Even if refutations to a theory are 
found, this does not disprove the theory. The exceptions are noted, 
cast as 11 anomalies", and the theory then proceeds much as it did before. 
An example of an anomaly would be the 11 black hole 11 of physics. Black 
holes are defined as points in space where the "normal laws of physics 
are suspended... The points are then labeled as black holes and the nor-
mal mode of physics once again proceeds just as if black holes had never 
been discovered. It is only when the number of anomalies is too great, 
and a new theory is formed which incorporates more of them, that the 
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reigning theory is displaced. In modern physics, some of the anomalies 
of Newtonian physics can be explained by Einsteinian physics, but some 
of the things which must be treated as anomalies under the Einsteinian 
system were explainable through the Newtonian system (Hampden-Turner, 
1970). We have not generated a new "truth,'' we have merely incorpor-
ated a new metaphor for organizing our information. 
40 
We do not switch perspectives for strictly logical reasons or 
replace the old with the new because it is closer to the truth. We 
develop a new perspective because the area it synthesizes is deemed to be 
more important-- i.e., valuable. One simply chooses to look in a dif-
ferent way because one is more interested in the focus that this view 
affords. We switch paradigms because of values, not because of reason 
(Kuhn, 1964). 
Love and magic cannot be treated as anomalies to science, but 
require an entirely different method than traditional scholarship and 
analysis. They defy the normal categorization of thought and discipline 
boundaries. To understand them, we require an approach which is more 
ecological. If we are to explore the humanistic concerns, we must not 
start with the methods and values of science, but with our humanistic 
values themselves. They demand a different manner of movement. In 
thought, it appears that there is no difference between ends and means: 
that how we start is where we will end up. If we are to study love and 
magic, we must allow our understanding of them to dictate our method of 
exploration. 
The Scientific World View 
I would contend that the very premises of the scientific method 
become the scientific world view. The reason humanistic concerns, and 
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love and magic, have not been studied is that they do not fit the scien-
\ tific world view. If we are going to understand why this is so, we must 
understand the scientific world view. To do this, it is necessary to 
study the method of science. 
Maslow (1966), in the Psychology of Science said that the one over-
whelming finding of experiments in behavioral science was that subjects 
resent being experimented upon: that they felt that something crucial 
was being lost. If we were going to be truly empirical, then we must 
have taken such humanistic findings into account. 
That the methods of scientific experimentation do not lend them-
selves to humanistic efforts should be made obvious from a list of 
scientific methods: 
1. Cbjectivity and Detachment 
2. Doubt, Null Hypothesis, Testing 
3. Prediction and Control 
4. Experiment, Artifi cia 1 Settings 
5. Va 1 ue Free 
Objectivity and Detachment 
With objectivity and detachment, the purpose is to not contaminate 
our "data." A distinction is made between the knower and the known 
along the lines of a mind-body split. The objective scientist is not 
allowed to "take the role of the other" (Mead, 1934) or experience "sym-
pathic introspection" (Cooley, 1902). People are reduced to objects for 
our inquiry. The observer must refrain from being a part of the process 
being studied. 
Objectivity would have us pretend that we are not doing the looking: 
it thus avoids problems of human consciousness. It demands an aliena-
tion between the "In-Here" and the "Out-There": between the self and 
its object of study. 
Objective consciousness is alienated life promoted to its most 
honorific status as scientific method. Under its auspices, we 
subordinate nature of our command only by estranging ourselves 
from more and more of what we experience • (Roszak, 1969, 
p. 232) • 
• • • whatever its epistemological status ••• objectivity as 
a state of being fills the very air we breathe in a scientific 
culture ••• the mentality of the ideal scientist becomes the 
very soul of the society (Roszak, 1969, p. 216). 
Roszak (1969) continued: 
When we challenge the finality of objective consciousness as a 
basis for culture, what is at issue is the size of man•s life. 
We must insist that a culture which negates or subordinates or 
degrades visionary experience commits the sin of diminishing 
our existence. Which is precisely what happens when we insist 
that reality is limited to what objective consciousness can 
turn into the stuff of science ••• (p. 234). 
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Objectivity would alienate us from the very concerns which a human-
istic sociology would wish to study. "The essence of magic," noted 
Roszak (1969, p. 245), "lies in the sense that man and not-man stand on 
communicable terms with one another. The relationship is not that of 
In-Here impassively observing Out-There • II 
Love is an active entering into another person, moving past bound-
aries of In-Here and Out-There (Fromm, 1956). It appears problematical 
to know love from an objective standpoint. Humanistic pursuits all 
emphasize involvement. It seems impossible to attain understanding of 
them from a method of objectivity and detachment. It is the caring for 
the not-I that is the very basis for the humanistic ethic. 
Doubt, Null Hypothesis, Testing 
Humanistic enterprises might well follow Coleridge•s method of the 
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"willing suspension of disbelief. 11 The emphasis might be placed upon 
trust rather than making things "prove" their existence. It is very 
possible that some things only exist if one is willing to participate 
and entertain their existence. By accepting at the outset a method of 
null hypothesis and doubt, we exclude such phenomena from study. 
Love and magic& as well as other humanistic visions, may well be 
such phenomena. Doubt and testing causes us to treat the magician as a 
charlatan and the lover as a con artist. Repeated testing may drive 
love and magic from our view. Because "they" won•t adhere to our stan-
dards of testing, the scientist is apt to conclude that they don•t 
exist. Love gets relegated to the realm of reciprocity and fair 
exchange, and magic gets routinized as hypnosis or mood. 
The "Reality" of the scientific world view treats as real only such 
phenomena as can be presented publically for inspection. The "knowledge" 
gained from intimate spaces is not subject to the scrutiny of such test-
ing and is thus suspect or totally disregarded. 
The experiment of the laboratory is the ideal model for scientific 
truth. Syncronicity, for example, by its very nature is not tailored to 
artificial, mock settings. Contriving conditions for its occurrence 
greatly reduces it as a phenomenon. Love cannot be adequately opera-
tionalized by role-playing. If we want to get to the core of meaning, 
then an artificial setting is not the place. 
The stance of the scientist is that of skeptic. Humanistic values 
emphasize an involvement, a trust-- a commitment. The scientific 
method of doubt is the anti-thesis of the humanistic ethic of love. The 
scientific world view produces the rational man who seeks to have real-
ity prove itself. The humanistic vision produces the artist who creates 
and participates in a vision which he/she feels is real. 
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Prediction and Control 
The scientific view assumes a mechanistic universe which can be 
reduced to cause and effect phenomena. The emphasis is upon power: 
obtaining predictable relationships which can then be controlled. Phen-
omena which "cannot be foreseen or reproduced at will are 
essentially beyond the control of science" (Meyerson, 1930, p. 28). 
Science demands manipulable knowledge. It seeks reduction of the world 
into variables which can then be controlled. It follows Bacon in 
conceiving of knowledge as power. 
The emphasis upon power is quite different from a humanistic epis-
temology. Humanism would treat life more as a miraculous occurrence 
than as a machine which is reducable to cause and effect parts. It is 
not power, but knowledge which is central to the humanistic perspective. 
It 1s only the "black magician" who would force knowledge into power 
(Roszak, 1969, p. 261). The humanistic conception resembles more the 
intimacy of love (Fromm, 1956). 
If knowledge is but manipulatable information for power, then we 
have replaced understanding with explanation. Explanatory theories, the 
crux of science, require only that we map one variable to another for 
purposes of control; not that we appreciate the interrelationship. The 
effort of explanatory theory is to "explain away" the variance in a sys-
tem: the analysis of variance would reduce all variance to identity 
(Meyerson, 1930). The unacknowledged assumption is that variance is 
deviance, and must be accounted for: reduced to identity. 
The cause and effect model of the mechanistic metaphor stands in 
flagrant contrast to the humanistic view of the world and its beauty. 
The implications of such a metaphor for ecology and for human beings in 
general (Merchant, 1980) call into question how far we can push the 
mechanical metaphor and still retain both the person and the planet 
(Roszak, 1979). The humanistic consciousness desires a different kind 
of relationship with life. Love may be the choice to forego power for 
higher motivations. A method which premises prediction and control 
violates the very spirit of an exploration into humanism. 
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The cause and effect metaphor also has another consequence: in 
order to manipulate a subject, we must first have that subject in a 
manipulatable environment, i.e., under our control (Carpenter, 1970). 
This poses severe problems for freedom as well as for our conception of a 
fuller vision of humanity (Mills, 1959). 
With the mechanistic model, it is presumed that the universe is 
11 made 11 according to laws and science will find those laws. The status 
of laws in physics is under great debate (Polanyi, 1958; Kuhn, 1964). 
It has been noted earlier that scientific laws are not discovered, but 
are legislated. For the human "sciences, .. the question might be asked: 
if laws of human behavior were 11 discovered," would they still work after 
they were made public or would people learn to 11 Work the system?" Or if 
these laws were kept secret and available only for government use, would 
they not be the basis for the classified expertise which Mills (1959) 
and Gouldner (1970) so feared? And, if they did not work, would there 
not be a tendency to enforce them? 
The mechanistic metaphor, thus, poses severe problems for freedom 
and is political in nature. Humanism would seek a different model of 
knowledge. 
Va 1 ue Free 
Science claims value neutrality. It has been argued previously 
that such neutrality is impossible: that the very act of framing a 
question and a method of inquiry is a value stance. What is critical 
here, though, is the fact that the Scientific world view would desire 
the pretense of ethical neutrality. 
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The implication is that values are somehow illegitimate; that they 
will taint the work of building a secular science. Humanism underscores 
the point that values are the very basis of meaning and that if we must 
shape our work, we should do so in directions we intend -- not by un-
spoken and unconscious assumptions from unexamined metaphors. Humanism 
seeks a sacred enactment of values held to be the most important for 
living, not a secular alienation from all systems of meaning. 
The essence of a humanistic epistemology is that over the ages, 
people have testified that there are better ways to live. These testi-
monials over experience must then be regarded as knowledge claims and 
examined as strategies. Benedict•s (1970) idea of synergy re-
introduced the idea of the 11 good 11 to the behavioral disciplines. It 
implied that there were choices over systems of meaning and that our 
choice of cultural arrangements had directional consequences. 
The classified expertise claim of the scientific world view does 
not eliminate the need for choices and values, but it does limit the 
number of people involved in the decision-making process. It must be 
asked if any human being can be trusted with the type of knowledge that 
science aspires to: even if it were attainable, would it not be too 
great a temptation? We must structure our knowledge-finding process to 
the types of knowledge we wish to attain. 
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To study human processes, we cannot afford to neglect values. If 
we seek a humanistic sociology, we must formulate methods of movement 
and exploration which address the values we wish to promote. This 
requires leaving the scientific culture with all its subtle nuances and 
seeking methods which are congruent with our subject matter. We must 
return to the ancient problem of the Good and seek to build toward our 
values. 
A Humanistic Epistemology 
Fromm {1968) made the critical distinction between "living" human 
beings and "dead" ones: between life-enhancing social processes and 
life-strangling processes. The value which he embraced was productive-
ness of the human capacity (1947}: the growth and the unfolding of the 
individual through love (1956) --all that contributes to the unfolding 
of life (1968). 
Fromm maintained that there are two ways of knowing. The first is 
the autopsy table of science with its method of dissection and analysis. 
In children we often see this path to knowledge quite overtly. 
The child takes something apart, breaks it up in order to know 
it; or it takes an animal apart; cruelly tears off the wings 
of a butterfly in order to know it, to force its secret. The 
cruelty itself is motivated by something deeper: the wish to 
know the secret of things and of life (Fromm, 1956, p. 25). 
This is the normal scientific mode of analysis: we take something 
apart to know its secret. We dissect the whole and then seek according 
to our mechanistic model to put it back together. Our cruelty is masked 
by the fact that we are using laboratory animals, but our method is 
clear: we must render things dead to know their secret. Even in biol-
ogy, we know more of cadavers than we know of living bodies. Science by 
its method does not allow for change, or growth. It prefers the 
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immobile: the fixed moment in time: the dead. 
That the reader may be shocked by the extremity of such an argument 
and this portrayal of science does not mute its logical consequences. 
Even the experiments in the Nazi concentration camps can be seen as an 
extension of the power to know (Griffin, 1981) -- to reduce life and 
find its pulse and soul. 
"The other path to knowing 'the secret,'" said Fromm (1956, p. 25), 
11 is love ... 11 Love is ••• knowledge ••• under the condition of the 
preservation of ••• integrity 11 (Fromm, 1947, p. 116). It is an enter-
ing into. It is an active participation and understanding. This is 
similar to Cooley's idea of 11 Sympathic introspection .. and has links with 
Weber's verstheen approach (Matson, 1964). 
The philosopher Bergson (1949, p. 21) said, 11 there are two profoundly 
different ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round 
the object; the second, that we enter into it ... The first, Bergson 
called analysis; the second he called intuition. Intuition is a 11 kind 
of intellectual sympathy... It is an attempt to grasp the whole. 
Bergson maintained that it is only by intuition that we grasp the whole; 
it is never understandable only by the elements of analysis. This leap 
of faith is necessary for our understanding. 
Hocking (1959) in Types of Philosophy concurred: 
••• our experience of love and beauty have a decisive word 
to say. We speak of them as 'feelings'; what if they are also 
knowings? I suggest that they are such .•• they are. 
not only emotions, but moments of metaphysical insight 
p. 309). 
This method of intuition is very similar to Fromm's "knowing some-
thing under conditions of its integrity .. which he called love. Analysis 
does not seem to fit our understanding of love. As the poet Wordsworth 
said, 
Sweet is the lore that Nature brings; 
Our meddling instinct 
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things 
We murder to dissect 
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The artist and the poet seek a different form of understanding 
which preserves and respects life and growth. The intuitive role of the 
artist and the analytical role of the scientist have been often 
recognized, but the artist is usually subjugated in the scientific 
purpose and economic 11 reality... Intuition is 11 credited 11 as the source 
of ideas/hypotheses, but must then be translated into knowledge by the 
process of science and its methods. 
As Roszak (1969) argued, 
One cliched argument suggests that the work of the scientist 
begins with the poet's sense of wonder (a dubious hypothesis 
at best) but then goes beyond it armed with spectroscope and 
light meter. The argument m1sses the key point: the poet's 
experience is defined precisely by the fact that the poet does 
not go beyond it •••• Or are we to believe it was by fail-
ure of intelligence that Wordsworth never graduated into the 
status of weatherman (p. 253)? 
C. P. Snow spoke of two cultures, one scientific and one human-
istic, but "scarcely grasped the terrible pathos that divides these two 
cultures" (Roszak, 1969, p. 232). We cannot rely on science for methods 
of running the world and criteria for reality without becoming a scien-
tific culture and subverting the humanistic vision. It is Roszak (1969) 
who concluded: 
We must be prepared to entertain the astonishing claim men 
like Blake lay before us: that here are eyes which see the 
world not as a commonplace sight or as scientific scrutiny 
sees it, but see it transformed, made lustrous beyond measure, 
and in seeing the world so, see it as it really is (p. 240). 
[Italics Mine] 
11 The legitimate use of images is to express the truth, not to possess 
it," wrote Watts (1951, p. 26). 
••. you cannot understand life and its mysteries as long as 
you try to grasp it. You cannot grasp it just as you cannot 
walk off with a river in a bucket. If you try to capture 
running water in a bucket, it is clear that you do not 
understand it and that you will always be disappointed, for in 
the bucket the water does not run (Watts, 1951, p. 24). 
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We find that Blake was right: The Scientific culture is in danger 
of torturing the insight out of life; it is the 11 Anti-Christ .. of the 
imagination and fundamentally antagonistic to the humanistic vision. 
Science would take the beauty and grandeur out of life and reduce us to 
a lesser version of humanity --the 11 Cheerful robot .. of Mills (1959, 
p. 175). Science means the submission of awe and wonder, of imagination 
and reverence for life to a secondary status. 
It was Blake who wrote: 
To see eternity in a grain of sand 
To hold infinity in your hand 
This is hardly the scientific method. Blake and the romantic poets 
saw science destroying religion: the mystical view of human nature. 
And ultimately, unless we are willing to believe in a Procrustean bed 
where our legs are stretched if we are too short and our head cut off if 
we are too tall, science renders us into something less than fully 
human. It means death. 
We are a long way from the original scientific Tower of Babel which 
would take us to God. Science has gotten all of life on its table, but 
at a terrible cost. 
Knowledge is power, wrote Francis Bacon. Science has followed 
Bacon in concluding that power is manipulatable knowledge. Humanism 
would recommend a different epistemology. As cmar Khayyam said: 11 To 
each must come the time to decide between truth and wisdom." It is wis-
dom for living which humanistic efforts seek, not information for 
manipulation (Merchant, 1980). 
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It is not the focus of this paper to develop a new epistemology: 
only to argue that such an epistemology exists, and to suggest its out-
line. The actual articulation of such an epistemology may well be the 
critical philosophical issue of our times. The general outline of this 
humanistic epistemology can be found developing throughout the culture. 
The scientific assumptions for knowledge revolve around the idea of 
territorializing the unknown. This is the frontier version of the 
explorer searching enchanted lands and bringing back riches for the 
king's table. Nature is gradually tamed and her resources made avail-
able for the building blocks of society. The wild becomes charted, 
homesteaded, and gradually made "civilized." It is the idea of Manifest 
Destiny which would march us across the frontier sure of our purpose --
and its path to knowledge. 
If we were to illustrate this epistemology, we would have an end-
less series of lines as the boundaries of knowledge gradually were 
stretched and the area of the unknown became colored in by the known. 
The Frontiers Of Knowledge 
~own j JJJJunknown 
~ 
Figure 1. The Scientific Epistemology 
This is also the strategy of Freud's famous dictum for psychology: 
"where id was, let ego be. 11 The unconscious becomes conscious; the 
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unknown, known. It is both the tactic of our science and the history of 
Western culture. It is our ground-rule assumption to the irrational and 
mystery. 
The limits of such an epistemology have been amply challenged in 
the twentieth century. Jung (1964) noted that the rational, "masculine" 
elements of culture have been over-emphasized and the irrational "femi-
nine" aspects now need to be recovered and developed before we can fur-
ther progress as a culture. The recovery and articulation of primitive 
mythology is an important task which holds continued relevance for the 
psyche if we are going to build a culture which is in tune with the 
needs of the person. Jungian psychology permits the irrational free 
space to play between the lines of thought. 
Ernest Becker, working out of the rational Western tradition, 
evolved two themes -- the denial of death {1973) and cultures as hero 
systems (1962) -- which present limits -- propositions to such rational-
ity. Hero systems are methods of denying and transcending death while 
questing for a solution to life's problem of meaning. Given our human 
frailty, our hero systems remain imperfect --admitting to something less 
than a total map of reality. Fromm (1956), among other humanists, 
suggested an alternative epistemology which strives not to grasp life and 
analyze it in strict Aristotlean terms, but to allow it to flow and know 
it through love. The ecology movement has presented us with an accumu-
lated wisdom that perhaps the mechanistic metaphor of our science has run 
its course, and that we cannot press the metaphor farther without endan-
gering the very existence of life (Merchant, 1980; Commoner, 1971; 
Roszak, 1979). 
The eminent domain/manifest destiny of the scientific-technological 
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imperative appear daunted by an ecological perspective which emphasizes 
balance as opposed to final solutions or methods toward progress. The 
sanity of mining and abstracting all of the world•s resources is being 
reviewed in balance against the natural beauty and our conception of what 
is contained in a "better" world. From the ecology movement may emerge a 
new epistemology which redefines the whole relationship between man and 
environment, between the knower and the known. 
Merchant (1980) documented how our whole conception of nature 
and of women (and the intuitive) stems from the scientific revolution and 
its metaphors on nature and mechanism. Griffin (1978) showed how the 
metaphors which we have used to obtain control and certainty over nature 
are the same metaphors which we have used to tame and still our very 
conception of human nature. 
The way that we have explored and territorialized the earth; mined 
its resources and laid bare its timber; carved its mountains and built 
blocks for houses according to our geometrical designs -- this is the 
same way that we have approached and shaped knowledge under our scienti-
fic world view. The frontier is gradually colonized, known, and made 
tame. The scientific scrutiny misses the fact that we may be missing the 
opportunity to know beauty as we push the boundaries of our civilization 
to their limits. 
It is said that Francis Bacon, as attorney general of England, 
modeled his scientific method much after a witch-hunt (Merchant, 1980). 
The method of truth was the method of the Inquisition. Nature must be 
forced to reveal her secrets. Bacon says that science should "hound 
nature in her wandering" and "make no scruple of entering and penetrating 
into these holes and corners, when the inquisition of truth is the whole 
54 
object .. (Merchant, 1980, p. 165). Morality and values must take a secon-
dary place to the pursuit of truth. Such an approach shows no concern 
for the subject under study, but only seeks to extract the truth by what-
ever means necessary and then use such 11 knowledge" for manipulation and 
power. Even if the witch is to die in the process or end up seriously 
deformed, this is of no consequence. Such a metaphor can only leave us 
with a terrible latent cost when we apply it to nature. It takes on even 
more graphic proportions when human nature is studied by the methods of 
such an epistemological inquisition. 
The language of the historical scientist is only slightly removed 
from its actual historical impact. Its metaphors have tended to become 
our common-sense assumptions for our methods and our epistemology 
(Merchant, 1980). We must carve back the great wilderness. We must 
territorialize the unknown. We must cage and domesticate the wild beast. 
We must mine the earth. We must explore uncharted lands and bring back 
riches for the king•s table. We must cut back the frontier and erect 
civilization upon the wilderness. 
Order has prevailed in this twentieth century. The frontier has 
been pushed back and civilization erected so .. completely" that the ecolo-
gist and the humanist now must question the wisdom of the scientific-
technological imperative which brought us this world view and this world. 
We appear no closer to capturing the truth. We are left to wonder if we 
should await the next scientific-technological breakthrough patiently~ 
whether it is now time to question its very assumptions and limits. Is 
the epistemology of science bringing us closer to "knowing," or are we 
in danger of limiting, deforming, and ultimately destroying the very life 
which we would study? 
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It must be recognized that the core assumption of a scientific epi-
stemology revolves around the idea of power. "Knowledge is power"; 
"human knowledge and power meet as one" (Merchant, 1980, p. 247). Know-
ledge becomes explanatory theories which can be used for prediction and 
contra 1. Power becomes the key e 1 ement. 
"Bacon transformed the magical tradition by calling upon the need to 
dominate nature not for the sole benefit of the individual magician but 
for the good of the entire human race 11 (Merchant, 1980, p. 169). This is 
in direct contradiction to the earlier folklore of the Western tradition 
which held that the truth could not be captured --and to place the life 
force upon the rack and seek to torture its secrets from it was not only 
foolhardy, but imminently dangerous and always self-destructive. 
Two examples of such folklore might suffice for illustration here. 
The first is the legend fo the Holy Grail and the "Rhine Gold." Whoever 
may after endless ques~s eventually find the Grail and the Rhine Gold 
must immediately ask two questions ("What is the purpose of the Grail?" 
and 11 Who does it serve? 11 ) or forever perish. The power of the Grail can 
only be attained without perishing by asking those essential questions of 
life and value; the power can only be dealt with by understanding ques-
tions of knowledge and the implications of such power. The Grail is not 
captured; it is part of a larger quest. This is not the value-free power 
and knowledge of science, but the power born from the understanding of 
the knowledge and meaning of a deeper secret. This is the knowledge to 
which the magician alludes. While science offers a secular, technique 
for power, the epistemology of the magician maintains a sacred version of 
knowledge which involves the whole self. 
The second folklore example of an alternative epistemology is the 
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first great novel to emerge from the ~nerican frontier: Moby Dick. 
Although Ahab seemed in some ways to have a humanistic consciousness (he 
stared into Starbuck's eye and said that "there is nothing finer than to 
look into a human eye"; that this was as far as infinity went), he could 
not give up the quest for his power -- he could not let go of his other 
desire (science?) to "know" what is greater than he, to have his power 
know no bounds, and capture and conquer that force. His vengence was 
not upon the past but upon not knowing thoroughly; of having vast power 
and finding an exception to it. When Starbuck tried to dissuade him 
from his path, Ahab noted that "we have been having this conversation 
before the oceans rolled and we will be having it after they cease:" 
that eventually man must seize the veil and grasp its secrets. In the 
end, Ahab's inability to live without this final information led him to 
his destruction. Again, the theme: power only goes so far, it must be 
tempered with knowledge. 
Both the Holy Grail legend and Melville's (1981) Moby Dick suggest 
a different epistemology from the scientific "knowledge is power" 
rendition. The creative power which is the center of the life force is 
treated as irreducible -- uncapturable. 
The unreducibleness of the life force is dealt with scientifically 
through the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and his distinction between nou-
menon and phenomenon. · Noumena are the metaphysical underpinnings which 
cannot be known by the "sense." Phenomena are the real of appearances. 
Science is thus the study of phenomena and not metaphysical intuitions. 
The world of science is thereafter "rescued" from philosophical criti-
cisms and can advance without further protest. However, what such a 
_-"rescue operation" does is equate the world with phenomena. Noumena 
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become virtually "unknowable" and the world is built around the appear-
ances that are phenomena. Soon, the analysis of phenomena is treated as 
11 approximating" the world of noumena (Homans, 1977) and we abuse our 
method to the point of claiming the whole world as phenomena and forget-
ting the world of noumena except as a first-principle concession for the 
beginning of our analysis. 
Kant's distinction between noumena and phenomena was to have saved 
western thought from the crisis spawned by the philosophy of David Hume. 
While Hume is normally interpreted as meaning the death of thought, he 
he actually had provided the basis for a humanistic epistemology and the 
very beginning of a relevant dialog. Hume's idea of the "secret 
springs"3 is the basis of this humanistic epistemology. The life force 
cannot be grasped and placed upon the table of analysis. It cannot be 
known through our methods of science. Instead, we must accept the 
11 Secretness 11 of the core. We must find methods of moving "around" it 
given the nature of its being secret. Epistemology is, then, not a 
straight-line journey to truth and the shading in of unknown areas until 
we achieve total knowledge, but a journey of wisdom where we achieve 
more and more understanding without ever exhausting and reducing the 
core. (See Figure 2 on the following page.) 
The phrase "the secret springs" can be translated as several other 
conceptions without losing its meaning: the life force, the spring of 
creativity, the "muse", the creative power which generates the evolution-
ary time bomb, and so forth It is comparable, of course, to 
Kant's noumena but makes an opposite contention. The "secret springs" 
3rhe idea of the "secret springs" and not necessarily the edifice 
which is often constructed upon this idea. 
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may be the Rhine Gold or the Holy Grail or the illusive white whale 
The secret springs are magic. 
Movement of Philosophy 
Oi a 1 og/Knowi ng 
Figure 2. The Humanistic Epistemology 
Castenacta•s4 attribution to Don Juan of the "tonal 11 and the 11 nagual 11 
serves to further illuminate the idea of the secret springs and of the 
distinction between noumena and phenomena. The tonal is everything 
11 Which can be placed upon the table ... The nagual is everything else. 
The ton a 1 is, then, prop·ertly, phenomena -- the world of appearances, 
what can be named, and the process of talking (philosophizing) about what 
is named, in short --analysis. The nagual is noumena. Don Juan adds 
that it is where 11 power hovers ... This is quite the same, then, as the 
"secret springs ... 
4The authent i cness of Ca stenada • s work is i rre 1 evant. I personally 
might contend that the first two hooks are historical, the third 
Castenada•s dissertation, the fourth Garfinkel•s disguised lecture notes (and the fifth masculine-intuitive karma, with the sixth being only pure 
insanity). 
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However, Don Juan's discussion makes clear that the nagual is not an 
irrelevant-premised first principle of philosophy (ala Kant), but an 
intimate part of life. It can be experienced and witnessed. Don Juan 
also makes a clear distinction between knowledge and power. A "man of 
knowledge" is one who has traveled and traversed the paths of power 
who knows how far power goes. The trap of knowledge is old age and it is 
an old man's question whether a "path has heart?" The only question that 
matters to a man of kn?wledge who knows that all paths lead no-where is 
whether a path has heart: will it make you strong, productive, happy? 
The question of knowledge is one of value. Having experienced power, 
what is left now is wisdom, beauty, and happiness: following the path of 
the heart where one can relax. 
If the secret springs can be experienced and witnessed, then they 
can also be testified to. It is indeed the testimony of people across 
their lives which might be worthy of being called knowledge claims. And 
throughout the ages, we have had people testifying that there are 11 bet-
ter" ways to live. We have had people talking about and testifying to an 
experience which they termed love and held to be the core of meaning: 
talking of a magic as an experience which transforms their vision. While 
this experience is not dissectable on the analytic table, it can be 
experienced, it can be testified to, and we can return to visit such an 
experience. It is this experience to which the humanist would wish to 
talk and testify. 
Life is not explainable. Explanatory theories do not fit the exper-
ience. It is unreducible. Life is closer to a miracle. We can know it 
only through intuition -- a leap of vision. As Bergson (1949) argued, 
even the duration and experience of our own lives is only known by 
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intuition. This is the only way that we "sense .. the whole: by the leap 
of intuition. Kantian theory leaves intuition as the troubled source of 
first principles. Hume's idea of "secret springs" provides the perfect 
canopy for encompassing a different view! 
We might desire still another metaphor to illustrate the humanistic 
conception of knowledge. 
They flee from our grasp. 
We can compare love and magic to unicorns. 
But beckon to be allowed free play in our 
lives. Such a metaphor may seem like sheer fantasy. But it is far from 
fantasy. 
In The Last Unicorn, Beagle (1968) wove a tale which in many ways is 
the "sequel .. to the "Don Juan 11 books and the bottom line on magic. The 
would-be magician follows the unicorn seeking to know her magic and 
mystery. But unicorns have become rare in a world of science. We see 
few wonders. Beauty no longer mystifies us as much now that things are 
explainable. Yet, love and the magical still appear in our lives much as 
unicorns. We cannot capture them. We cannot own them. We can only know 
them and come to follow them. 
Love and magic cannot be harnessed. They can only be followed. One 
does not chain magic to their efforts, but one can take steps to follow. 
Science reduces the world to neutrality. Love and magic are steps we 
make to willingly follow something that we value. Humanistic epistemol-
ogy begins with values, with choice. It is the step to following this 
illusive unicorn of love and magic. 01e recognizes fully well that sjhe 
will not own or capture it. But one delights in coming to know it and 
learn its secrets. 
Knowledge, then, becomes wisdom -- knowing life; having walked the 
paths of power. Knowledge becomes a discussion of value; what is better, 
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and how do we take the wisdom that we have learned from the "secret .. and 
construct from it? 
The experience of such wisdom most have called love. A humanistic 
epistemology would, I believe, contain this assumption: that knowledge 
is love. Love is the ability to move past power --to share it: to take 
the risk of allowing someone else enough respect to let them be and grow. 
It is moving past individual ego-stakes, collapsing the walls of self 
and other, and taking the time to know another self, environment, and 
others. It is declassifying power -- no longer keeping it as an obses-
sion for personal victory. Love is the ability to know someone else. 
It is the step to knowledge. 
The truth of which we have always spoken is an experience to which 
we wish to testify. It is the experience which we have called love and 
magic. The wisdom that we seek is that we know knowledge (love) --
having come through power we move back down to play, to share, and to 
know. 
We can only know the center with our heart. We can only know the 
secret springs through love. The reducible truth of science will forever 
be beyond our grasp. But we can talk and testify, and experience what we 
know: the light that is within us. This is the humanistic epistemology. 
The center may be a "secret," but this does not mean the death of 
philosophy (and talking), nor does it mean the death of movement or life. 
It means recognizing our condition. We know little of final truths: 
what we can claim is by nature existential. We are living. We are 
dying. We stand on the earth. Our imagination reaches to the stars. 
The secret springs do not prevent us from moving. They merely 
recommend a different method and purpose for talking and philosophizing. 
62 
As Watts {1951, p. 23) said, "The common error ••• is to mistake the 
symbol for the reality, to look at the finger pointing the way and then 
suck it for comfort rather than follow it." We must leave behind the 
desired easy road maps of science. We are left with questions of values: 
what matters? -- this is the guest of our knowledge • 
• • • the only way we shall ever recapture the sort of know-
ledge Lao-tzu referred to in his dictum 'those who know do not 
speak,' is by subordinating the question 'how shall we know?' 
to the more existentially vital question 'how shall we live' 
(Roszak, 1969, p. 233)? 
To ask this question is to insist that the primary purpose of 
human existence is not to devise ways of piling up ever greater 
heaps of knowledge, but to discover ways to live from day to 
day that integrate the whole of our nature by way of yielding 
nobility of conduct, honest fellowship, and joy •••• 
Were we prepared to accept the beauty of the fully illuminated 
personality as our standard of truth -- or of ultimate meaning-
fulness -- then we should be done with the idiocy of making 
fractional evaluations of men and ourselves (Roszak, 1969, 
p. 237). 
As Whithead noted, "The function of reason is to promote the art of 
living," Hume concurred years earlier: "Be a philosopher, but above all, 
be a man." Our philosophical maps will not replace living, nor should it 
be desired that they do. We are left with knowledge as an experience and 
theory: as a way of talking about that experience, of re-creating them, 
and of seeking to construct a world around those experiences which we 
have deemed to be meaningful and better. 
If we follow sociologist Simmel's (1950) work on secrets and dyad-
striads, some interesting things begin to emerge. Science has always 
desired public truths. But Simmel's work maintained that intimacy takes 
place in secret spaces away from public scrutiny. It is the dyadic unit 
closing itself off from the public that is the basis of our intimacy. 
Those experiences which we value most take place 11 behind closed doors" 
-- away from the larger social context. 
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If our most meaningful experiences occur in "secret, .. then we cannot 
present them for public inspection in front of an open forum. We can 
testify to such experiences publically, but the experience itself belongs 
to a more pr·ivate sector. It is a tapping of the 11 secret springs" -- a 
collapsing of the boundaries between self and other that the larger com-
mon denominator reality of the group does not allow. The humanistic 
11 truths"jva1ues do not lend themselves to public enactments. They 
require space away ft~orn the 1 arger conceptua 1 rea 1 ity. We may testify to 
them, bringing our knowledge of them to the conference table, and legis-
late from their values, but the experiences themselves belong to a 
"secret," ·j nt irnate sphere. The humanistic epi stemo1 ogy demands that we 
operate with a philosophical basis that can be known, but not reduced and 
dissected. 
The question we are asking is how to find a way of moving which does 
not dissect life to science. However, if we are going to develop an 
epistemology which is humanistic and is also successful~ we must be wary 
of two of the more popular current retreats from this question. 
The first is anti .. i nte 11 ectua 1 ism. This is the command to "get out 
of your head and into your feelings." It is the trap that humanistic 
psychology often embraces. Rat·ionalism has skewed the world to an extent 
where feeling and intuitions have been treated as illegitimate sources of 
knowledge. The entire humanistic effort is to correct this. However, 
abandoning the intellectual mode-- thinking and talking --is an over-
compensation. There is a very real sense in which something does not 
exist unless we are able to talk about it. The feeling goes unrecognized 
or is irrelevant unless we can verbalize it. Finding a way of talking 
about the intuitive/feeling sphere is essential if we are not going to 
neglect it. 
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The Gestalt approach of trusting the process -- 11 getting into the 
moment 11 --is incomplete without a way of visualizing the future and 
understanding the past. If we merely reify feelings and the moment with-
out also utilizing intellectual constructs, we may be in the moment while 
others who are not in the moment may be manipulating us. 
The second popular retreat, relativism-perspectivism, is more char-
acteristic of the field of sociology. Humanistic efforts seek not value-
free, relative knowledge but value-full perspective on humanity. If all 
knowledge claims are treated merely as a perspective (or 11 just your opin-
ion''), it becomes impossible to talk except as an amusement-- we become 
lncapable of agreements and participation. Perspectivism allows us to 
have only viewpoints and not a vision. We are undergoing the 11 Common" 
experience of being human and from this experience humanism would seek 
common knowledge of what we know: from this dialog, we agree upon the 
direction of our world and our commitments. 
The Lessons of Science 
For science to have remained for over 2,000 years, we must assume 
that it had much going for it. The anthropological-sociological school 
of functionalism (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952; Malinowski, 1945; Parsons, 1951) 
has taught us that we must understand how a component functions within a 
social system. Science has certainly demonstrated a remarkable survival 
value. We must become aware of how science has actually been function-
ing. Its longevity certainly must be due to underscoring some crucial 
components of decision making and social functioning. If we are going to 
depart froma scientific vision, then we must seriously ask: 11 What if the 
original scientific action was valuable? 11 and 11 What aspects do we need to 
retain?" 
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Carpenter (1970) taught us that much of the scientific, rational 
world view has been rendered obsolete. It no longer fulfills its origi-
nal purpose. Science was formulated as an effort to find the truth -- an 
effort which the emerging paradigm has clearly declassified: 
Everytime you put a new technology around a society, the old 
technology becomes a junkyard. But from junkyards come new 
art. New art can be made by retrieving and reshaping junk. It 
is from the trash heap that you can see true forms because 
everything there is declassified (n.p.). 
It is clear that we must de-classify and de-mystify science, but 
what aspects should be salvaged and what aspects should be allowed merely 
to decompose? If truth is not the key, then what parts of the scientific 
method actually are functioning in a different manner to enhance the 
human process? 
Objectivity--Honesty/Respect 
The scientific value of objectivity might readily be translated to 
read honesty and respect. It represents an important technique for open-
ing up a dialog and discussion. At times, one must get away from the 
process in order to see it. Sociologically, one must 11 take the role of 
the other... ClJjectivity stresses an effort to see what would happen if 
one did not assert his will. 
Fromm (1947) wrote that objectivity really means respect. 
Objectivity is not, as it is often implied in a false idea of 
•scientific' objectivity, synonymous with detachment, with the 
absence of interest and care. Objectivity does not mean 
detachment, it means respect: that is, the ability not to 
distort and falsify th1ngs, persons, and oneself (p. 111). 
Objectivity is a distancing that allows one to 11 look at 11 (the 
literal meaning of the word 11 respect 11 ). It means to respect the inte-
grity and dynamics of what one is looking at. Objectivity, thus, does 
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not mean to do away with values; but rather, not be trapped by biases 
that prevents one from seeing "other" as it really is. 
Objectivity is a distancing to obtain dialog and perspective. It is 
part of a process to open honest communication which respects and allows 
the articulation of each integrity. 
The scientific objectivity asks: what would the world be like with-
out our involvement? Yet, we know on another level that such a perspec-
tive doesn't exist. The world does not exist separate from the human. 
Human purpose and consciousness are intertwined with everything. 
Objectivity is a distancing mechanism to understand the not-! and 
the non-human. We abstract --pull away ~-to gain new perspective and 
understanding. 
But in "truth," the abstracting is part of the process that then 
must be re-united in dialog. 
Sometimes one must get away --become uninvolved --to see. Culkin 
(Carpenter, 1970, n.p.), wrote, "We don•t know who discovered water, 
but it certainly wasn't a fish." We become immersed in our environment 
and can see only by abstracting. But we can no more live in our abstrac-
ted, objective world than a fish can live out of water. We abstract to 
see, gain new perspective, and re-enter the conversation. 
It is a twofold process. Buber (1957) wrote: 
The principle of human life is not simple, but twofold, being 
built up in a twofold movement which is of such a kind that the 
one movement is the presupposition of the other. I propose to 
call the first movement 'the primal setting at a distance• and 
the second •entering into relation • • • • It must be firmly 
maintained that the first creates the presupposition for the 
second -- not its source, but its presupposition. With the 
appearance of the first, therefore, nothing more than room for 
the second is given. It is only at this point that the real 
history of the spirit begins (p. 97). 
Objectivity is dialectic. If we do not realize that objectivity is 
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a prelude to re-entering dialog, then we reify one pole of a twin-
process. Objectivity is but a step to re-entering the process. We can-
not live in our objectified world. Objectivity does not mean this any 
more than respect means leaving a person alone forever. It is the abil-
ity to subordinate biases to the perspective of ~from where I stand ••• 
I see--. 11 It is the honest testimony to our perspective, and the ability 
to entertain and understand the other perspective which is valued. It is 
this honesty which allows for dialog and the reaching of mutual 
conclusions. 
This is akin to Aristole•s idea of friendship: that scholarship was 
a way of functioning as friends when ordinary circumstances of time and 
space might have prevented it. Aristotle saw scholarship as a way of 
approximating the honest dialog of friendship: of seeing how the Other 
felt and perceived, and how indeed one might have functioned in the same 
way given a similar perspective. Aristotle maintained that this way of 
knowing together {Aristotlean friendship) was the core and that the 
scientific effort must always take a back-seat. 
This is also similar to Jourard•s (1971) notion of The Transparent 
Self which he saw as a precondition to intimacy. It is the ability to 
reveal which is important. This is what is really valued by the so-
called objectivity: the willingness to disclose and allow that dis-
closure to enter into process with another human being. 11 0bjectivity11 
allows us to take off our values for a moment. However, it is not so it 
is not so much an attempt to remove ourselves from values as it is an 
attempt to see past them. 
It is not value-relativity which is desired, but an ability to look 
at our own values (i.e., an attempt to be 11 0bjective 11 about our own 
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values/perspectives) -- put them in a larger perspective. "Objectivity" 
represents a step towards trust --and a willingness to open up the pro-
cess of our own conclusion-formation. 
Cultural relativity does not mean objectivity as is so often trans-
lated. It does not mean that one should function without values. 
Instead, it is the insight that our own perspectives arise from our (cul-
tural) values, and the invitation to see past them: a call to an aware-
ness and an honesty about our own perspective. Cultural relativity might 
be interpreted to mean not the value-neutrality of science, but a commit-
ment to understand and appreciate, i.e., to suspend judgement long enough 
to see. Such cultural relativity frees us from socialized cultural 
biases and allows us to see what is occurring. It need not be a 
prohibition from making decisions and forming opinions after one has 
understood the situation. 
Honesty is the key here. It allows us to retain the crucial aspects 
of the value of objectivity without forcing us into a prison of neutral-
ity. It allows us to make our value perspectives transparent and enter 
into dialog without hedging our ability to make fully human decisions. 
Agreement, Argument 
Science and its method have proven to be an effective way of set-
tling arguments: of foregoing the sword in favor of the pen. What 
is at work here is the trusting and commitment to a process of negotia-
tion. It is the decision to commit disputes to arbitration and the 
agreement to follow a particular method that is critical, not that the 
particular arbitrator has been the scientific method. A commitment to 
arbitration and an agreement of a different nature (e.g., humanistic) 
would be just as effective. 
69 
Becker (1968} summarized the problem of the social disciplines quite 
nicely: 
The founding of a science is never a cognitive problem alone: 
it is always inseparably a moral problem, a problem of gaining 
broad agreement to act on the basis of a theory • 
In the human sciences the problem of gaining wide loyalty 
to a paradigm is no different than in any other science ••.• 
Only, a subtle new factor magnifies the problem immensely, and 
gives it entirely new proportions: in the human sciences it is 
sharpened to an extreme degree, because the agreement cannot 
be disgu1sed as an objective scienlific problem ••• in the 
natural aiid[5hysical sciences, paradigm agreement looks like a 
matter of option for an objectively compelling theory •••• 
In the human sciences, the same kind of option for a compelling 
theory looks unashamedly like a wholly moral option, because of 
the frankly moral-nature of its subject matter •••• 
Paradigm choice, in sum, in the human sciences, differs in 
no way from that of the other sciences except that the willful, 
moral nature of the option cannot be disguised •.• (p. 362). 
[Italics Original] 
It is here that the work of Erich Fromm is crucial. Fromm squarely 
addresses the question of where to begin our agreements. What is so 
remarkable about his thesis is that he brings the moral question of 
values to center stage. In a time when most in the social "sciences" 
were treating values as somehow illegitimate and striving to keep them 
closeted, Fromm comes right through the front door asking where we want 
to rally our values and choices. 
Throughout Fromm•s career, the exact wording of his recommended 
value options change from individual productiveness (1947) to aliveness 
(1957) to the unfolding of potentials (1968), but there is always the 
same basic theme: the emphasis that since our initial values determine 
our future steps, we should begin by embracing those components which 
make man human. Perhaps, Fromm•s work was premature for the age in which 
he lived, but it is a mark of his sophistication and genius that he asks 
us directly: where do we wish to begin our agreement? and then proceeds 
to address the answer. 
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The commitment to begin our agreements is critical. Becker (1968, 
p. 361), in summarizing the work of Thomas Kuhn, stated that 11 the theory 
that finally wins support is the one that is most compelling. In other 
words, a theory is a persuasive, propagandistic symbolic device that wins 
loyalty in the field. 11 Yet, with the social disciplines, 
••• laws of human nature can never be complete • • • • The 
problem for morality is always this: how much of the picture 
is necessary to command agreed action? • • • Sociologists 
should no longer imagine that it suffices •to do' science; that 
in order to have a science of man, they need only work piling 
up data, and trying to 'tease out' social laws for eventual 
use. They may turn their backs on a paradigm ••• but they 
cannot shun an active option for man as an end. If they con-
tinue to do so, they will not have any science. The reason is 
simply that the science of man is an ideal-typical science, or 
--there is no science of man (Becker, 1968, p. 361). 
Fromm enters the picture by asking us to address ourselves to the 
question of ideals and which values we hold central to our agreement. 
Physical science has merely masked the problem and smuggled in values 
under the rhetoric of a method while pretending value neutrality. Yet 
their method of agreement, and accountable arbitration to that agreement, 
has proven to be a powerful tool which we can readily recycle from the 
scientific wasteland. 
(At a later point in this work, I will argue that the concept of 
synergy provides an ideal framework for the basis of such an agreement 
within the social disciplines • and that Ruth Benedict was right in 
intuitively choosing synergy as the first concept to emerge after 
cultural relativity.) 
Practical-Survival 
Above all, the scientific world view and method have proven to have 
practical applications. Unrelated to questions of their legitimacy or 
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accuracy, the technology which has been produced has proven powerful in 
its scope and effect. The method of agreement within science and the 
meanings generated from such an attempt gave us a range of technologies 
which did not find the truth but actually altered the nature of the world 
that science proposed to study. 
The "weight definition•• (Poincare) under which science first split 
with philosophy and generated techniques, proved to have far reaching 
practical implications. By agreeing to all operate toward the world 
according to weight definitions (i.e., the 11 atomiC 11 weight of 11 atoms") 
scientists were able to accomplish practical tasks. As Wittgenstein has 
said, this in no way says that the world is really such and such a way, 
but 11 0nly that it can be described in a certain way... That this strategy 
would actually prove to have practical applications was a boon that the 
early scientists had not anticipated. 
There is, however, no reason why the technology gained from science 
cannot be incorporated into a humanistic vision. Indeed, this was 
Comte•s (Becker, 1968) vision: that art would reign over science. 
Scientific metaphors need not be taken as truth any more than any other 
mnemonic device for remembering. They are no more intrinsic to the 
nature of reality than 11 every good boy does fine" is intrinsic to music 
(e.g., the mnemonic device for the lines of the musical staff: E-G-8-
D-F). They are tools, but they are no more all-purpose tools than any 
other tool. To use them outside very limited frames of reference would 
be like using a chain saw to carve a turkey ••• or fix the plumbing. 
Scientific assumptions do not need to be mass reality. Techniques 
can be used for information and starting points as opposed to knowledge 
and finale. To deal with the world mechanistically has practical advan-
tage at times. This need not then become world view. 
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We must be aware of the grammar and consequences of our techniques. 
The techniques of science should be applied appropriately. The mecha-
nistic metaphor has proven its worth, but we are undoubtedly living in an 
age where it has run its course. There is no need to crush any more 
areas down its jaws. Human beings are not machines, and to further 
expand the scientific vision endangers life itself. 
Even in areas of medicine and chemistry, the human elements are 
beginning to be recognized as categorically different from the scientific 
apparatus. Holistic medicine and the role of circumstance and the mind 
in illness are being recognized. The chemist is also reconsidering the 
human import of research and asking if perhaps some 11 discoveries 11 should 
not be pursued. 
There is no reason we cannot retain the practical advantage given to 
us from the past centuries of scientific research. The development of 
techniques in itself is perfectly appropriate but a humanistic 
approach would seek to place these techniques in perspective. 
The perspective is simply that material techniques are a means 
rather than ends. They are resources which can be used to create the 
better life. But we must not lose sight of the ends. 
Doubt-Testing 
Viewed at its most fundamental level, the criteria of doubt and 
testing are simply a call for awareness, or if you will, a mandate that 
the scientist be 11 Street-wise... It is a response to the problem of the 
"con-artist" or the "trickster." It is an effort to make our theories 
"non-naive." However, the invitation to such honest suspicion need not 
destroy our ability to trust. 
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There are always two possible uses of language. The first is to say 
something. The second is symbolic manipulation for control --i.e., 
ideology. As Simmel has taught us, with the invention of language it is 
possible to make a statement, but it also becomes possible to lie (i.e., 
a misstatement). To admit the possibility of the second need not destroy 
the possibility of the former. 
If we only construct our methods to detect the lie, we drastically 
alter the possibility of sincerity~ Where are we capable of then letting 
our guard down? In social relations, we often make the distinction 
between enemies and friends for such purposes. Despite the advantages of 
knowledge that comes from guardedly competing with enemies, there is also 
a type of knowledge which comes through intimacy and friendship. If we 
construct our methods only with the image of the insincere stranger in 
mind, we destroy our ability to understand and experience the knowledge 
and insights of intimacy. Modern science finds itself in a corollary 
situation. Doubt and testing might easily be changed to read criteria of 
non-naive awareness and periodic accounting. Continual doubt and testing 
is in itself paranoid and represents an inability to trust. It also 
eliminates much of what is important in a humanistic perspective from our 
view. 
Experiment--Exploration 
The scientific method of experimentation might be more aptly 
recycled as exploration. The alienation of artificialness is useful as a 
means of 11 play11 -- the creation of mock settings, free from more serious 
consequences, where we can discover. 
The exploration of such safe places where we can call 11 time-out 11 
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from the world are essential for creativity. They allow us to try out 
new things, replay particularly interesting phenomena, and further 
develop our ideas. It is the artificial, playful nature of the experi-
ment as exploration which is its most important feature. 
The carefully controlled experiment where we rigorously manipulate 
one variable and then another, is not the only type of experiment. The 
call to "experiment with out lives" is a challenge ••• to explore. The 
so-called human experiment is not an attempt to resign ourselves to 
carefully trying out every conceivable Skinner Box for the rest of our 
duration. It is a commitment to support exploration. 
The most significant experiments of mankind were by no means the 
contrived carefully controlled variety that we read about in reasearch 
design textbooks. They were filled with intuition and playfulness. 
There is doubtlessly a place for the rigorously controlled experiment, 
but it is not the pinnacle at the end of the line of research as is so 
often claimed. This is the stuff of routine science (Kuhn, 1964) where 
wonder has been replaced by drugery. The most significant "experiments" 
will always take place simply from a commitment of the society to support 
exploration and play. 
Common Purpose 
The banner of science has allowed us to form agreements about what 
the world was like and then enact that vision. The commitment to an idea 
was always rapidly converted into a commitment to an ideal. Our assump-
tions about the nature of truth have then been followed in such a way 
that we have envisioned a society and world in keeping with those agree-
ments. The banner of "finding the truth .. gave us a common direction. 
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What if instead of choosing the value of ''the truth," we had chosen to 
build upon the value of "the good?" What would the world have looked 
like 2,000 years later if we had chosen a banner of agreement which 
focused upon synergy, love and magic --the humanistic ethos? Two thou-
sand years ago, it was deemed that questions of how to "make the good'' 
were too sticky. However, the pursuit of "the truth'' has not only proven 
sticky --when finally pinned down 2,000 years later --but also a dead 
end. Synergy perhaps forms an ideal way to talk about the idea of the 
good and bring it to the pinnacle of our twentieth century conversations. 
The decision of our commitment and our shared vision revolves around 
where we start. This is what the journey to find the truth has revealed 
to us. The premise becomes the conclusion. What would happen if we 
started with love and magic and what we know of them? 
We Shape The World 
You become what you behold, penned William Blake. Centuries 
later, the anthropologist Edmund Carpenter summarized the power of cul-
ture they became what they beheld. Science tells us that we shape the 
world: that the truth depends upon where we look. 
To opt for a theory of human ills is not only to opt for the 
kind of person one is going to have to pay deference to profes-
sionally; it is also to opt potentially for the kind of world 
one is going to wake up in, the kinds of human beings that one 
will have to come across in the street. To opt for a particu-
lar theory of human ills is very much like falling in love in 
the strictest sense: it is to opt for the presence of a cer-
tain kind of being in the world, and hence for a certain kind 
of world (Becker, 1968, p. 364). [Italics Original] 
It is our choice, as Fromm so repeatedly told us. There are limits 
to our power, but we choose our directions. Do we choose limited, fixed, 
"dead" version of humanity contained by science or do we choose the 
alive, active, productive version of humanism? 
Perhaps the following story illustrates the point and the differ-
ences between science and humanism: 
This old man was very wise, and he could answer questions which 
were almost impossible for people to answer, so some people 
went to him one day, two young people, and said, •we•re going 
to trick this guy today. We're going to catch a bird, and 
we're going to carry it to this old man. And we're going to 
ask him 'This that we hold in our hands today, is it alive or 
is it dead?' If he says 'dead,' we're going to turn it loose 
and let it fly away. But if he says 'Alive,' we're going to 
crush it.' So they walked up to the old man, and they said 
'This that we hold in our hands today, is it alive or is it 
dead?' He looked at the young people and smiled. And he said, 
'It's in your hands' {Hammer, 1971, n.p.). 
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Humanism seeks to find a framework in which life can move. Science 
merely constructs a framework irrespective of the human. 
CHAPTER III 
DEFINITION OF THE SITUATION, SELF.FULFILLING 
PROPHECIES, THE HERO, AND THE liCHANGE 
THE WORLD" CONVERSATION 
From the review of science in the previous chapter, the following 
conclusions become apparent: 
1. Where we focus, determines what we see. 
2. What we have assumed a priori to exist and to be important 
determines our methods of study. 
3. The domain assumptions which are inherent in our premises 
organize, and often become, our conclusions. 
If we move to the social realm, we find Thomas' (1928, p. 572) famous 
dictum for definition of the situation immediately echoing in our ear: 
"If men define a situation as real, it is real in its consequences" We 
will immediately be corrected by the social scientist who reminds us that 
when Merton (1968, p. 195) termed Thomas' theorem the "self-fulfilling 
prophecy," he was referring to a definition which is "in the beginning, a 
false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the 
originally false conception come true." [Italics Original] The examples 
Merton cited include a bank being defined as insolvent and its customers 
demanding their money back which in turn forces its closure. Various 
cases of people being defined as racially inferior and ••• such preju-
dice normatively translated into actuality. 
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Even Thomas and Thomas' (1928, p. 572) original mention of the 
statement related to a false definition: a man who killed several 
people who had the habit of talking to themselves because he ''imagined 
that they were calling him vile names." 
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The idea of the self-fulfilling prophecy probably stems from the 
work of Moll (1898). In writing Hypnotism, he noted that subjects often 
enacted the •ishes and preconceptions of the hypnotist and referred to 
the phenomenon as "the prophecy which causes its own fulfillment" 
(p. 244). 
Se lf-ful fi 11 i ng prophecy has 1 ong been a favorite of those who 
would discount research findings on the basis of experimenter bias 
Recently, even the famous Milgram experiments on conformity have been 
challenged on the basis that subjects were merely fulfilling the experi-
menters' expectations. 
And yet, we must not discount the "self-fulfilling prophecy" as 
merely concerning issues that are true or false. The Indian sociologist 
Krishna {1971) argued that by reducing the self-fulfilling prophecy 
to a false definition of the situation, we have relegated it into the 
realm of name-calling and missed something quite crucial. 
Although Thomas' original formulation of the self-fulfilling 
prophecy concerns a false definition of the situation, he uses both 
definition of the situation and self-fulfilling prophecy in a much 
broader scope. It is a theme which runs throughout The Polish Peasant 
in Europe and America (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918), The Unadjusted Girl 
(Thomas, 1967), and The Child in America (Thomas and Thomas, 1928}. 
To limit the self-fulfilling prophecy to truth or falsehood is to 
considerably narrow its scope and relevance. In the social world, many 
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definitions are not subject to the determination or the arbitration of 
such "objectivity." Social "truth" is often much more precarious and 
situational than the "truth" of science. Expectations and their fulfill-
ment are the very fabric of social structure itself (Berger and Luckman. 
1966). 
Thomas (1967) wrote that 
Preliminary to any self-determined act of behavior there is 
always a stage of examination and deliberation which we may 
call the definition of the situation. And actually not only 
concrete acts are dependent on the definition of the situa-
tion. but gradually a whole life-policy and the personality of 
the individual himself follow from a series of such defini-
tions (p. 42). [Italics Original] 
The relationship between what is "real 11 and "not real" in a life 
policy is often somewhat fragile. Thomas is writing, here, of the 
"regulation of wishes" -- the four wishes he sees as essential to humans 
are: security, response, recognition, and new experience. The defini-
tion of the situation is the crucial mitigation between the 
individual and the social. Our expectations become self-fulfilling 
prophecies that we then act upon. This is the normal course of social 
process. 
Allport (1950) went so far as to study how nations which expect to 
go to war, do go to war. Zimbardo, in a mock prison experiment, found 
subjects acting the "pretended" roles of prisoners and guards with such 
intensity that he was forced to call off the experiment. 
In the Asch and Sheriff studies, people expected the larger group 
to accurately report their cognitions to such extent that the subjects 
actually altered their own perceptions. This may indicate the pervasive-
ness of conformity and group pressure ~ it may point to something more 
subtle. 
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Experimental work with "shils" {experimental confederates) shows 
more than just experimenters lying to their subjects. People respond to 
feinted activity in much the same way they would respond to activity 
that is not feinted. It is only the outside observer and the "shil" who 
·know that the activity is not authentic. Individuals operate by 
expectations and beliefs normally. 
Rosenthal and Jacobson {1968) have illustrated the extent teacher 
expectations influence and actually shape student performance. The 
expectation -- the belief -- becomes actuality. It is almost as if our 
expectations had a life of their own; that by believing, we create a 
different reality. 
Of course, our common sense argument is these examples were false 
renditions while our actual conception of reality is based upon our 
knowledge. But this is precisely the problem. Berger and Luckman 
(1966, p. 1) defined "reality" as "a quality appertaining to phenomena 
that we recognize as having a being independent of our own volition" (we 
cannot •wish them away•). They defined knowledge as "the certainty that 
phenomena are real and that they possess specific characteristics." 
Reality, then, is intimately rel.ated to knowledge. Berger and Luckman 
argued that reality is "socially constructed." ~owledge is a series of 
social agreements; i.e., definitions of the situation. 
Gould and Kolb (1964) in their Dictionary of the Social Sciences 
understood the phrase "definition of the situation" to mean 
••• {a) the individual agent•s or actor•s perception and 
interpretation of any situation in which he may find himself 
{the actor•s definition of the situation) or (b) culturally 
formulated, embodied, and shared perceptions ••• {cultural or 
social definitions of the situation) (p. 182). 
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What is often neglected is that the formulation works just as well 
to explain the new appropriate behavior as it did to explain the prev-
ious inappropriate (non-real) behavior. It may be a true definition 
becoming true as well as false definition becoming true. 
The self-fulfilling prophecy is a part of the normal construction 
of reality. It is quite literally how we 11 Spin the lines 11 of the world. 
Anthropologists have long defined culture as 11 a description of the 
world which we learn tri see. Culture is a series of resources which we 
bring to the situation. 
If we examine any sociology book, we find that all definitions of 
society revolve around action. Society is something that you do. It is 
re-created daily by action. In the theater of life our participation 
1iterally creates the world. 
11 If men believe a situation is real ...... The type of belief 
Thomas was referring to was not the idle armchair variety, nor was it 
the mind construct which we refer to as attitude. This type of belief 
might be closer to what others have characterized as 11 faith 11 (Fromm, 
1956). It is a 11 belief 11 that one 11 believes 11 so much that they place 
themself on their feet in the world-- into action. It is a construct 
by which people operate and enact society. 
The relation between belief, self-fulfilling prophecy, expectation 
and society is much more subtle than previously anticipated. Perhaps, 
society itself is mass hypnosis and we have glossed over the power of 
suggestion and belief by rendering it to a word --hypnosis --and then 
moved on without understanding the process. 
Black (1977) wrote in a popular account that 
Hypnosis is the unconscious agreement to share the assumptions 
about the world that underlie any society. It is also the 
ability to break through those assumptions. MYpnosis 
forget that word. There is no hypnosis. Hypnosis is 
concentration, imagination and suggestion can create. 
is reality (n.p.). 
. . . 
whatever 
Hypnosis 
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Perhaps such a characterization is too severe. But it does suggest 
interesting possibilities. Our inclination to discount hypnosis as 
illusion and embrace reality as "real" may have been too expedient. It 
is only when we examine other cultures that behavior appears "as if" it 
were hypnotic. If we must also perceive our own culture as a self-
fulfilling prophecy, then the relation between expectation and behavior 
must be cast in a new light. And if our own knowledge too is a self-
fulfilling prophecy, we must carefully re-examine the basis we have used 
for categorizing the "real" and the "non-real." If reality is "socially 
constructed," what implications does this hold? This is the problem 
which Berger and Luckman's work presents. 
The Physical Sciences and the Social Disciplines 
The "reality11 of the physical sciences is quite different from the 
"reality" of the social disciplines; it is as if each has thrown a dif-
ferent "net" over the world. Each net is designed to catch certain 
things. Things that are not relevant for its purposes simply disappear 
through the holes (Van Den Berg, 1961). The nets of the physical 
sciences and the social disciplines are intrinsically different. Per-
haps, they even reflect the mind-body distinction which gave rise to the 
birth of physical 11 Science." At the very least, their processes of 
understanding are inherently different. 
In the physical sciences, the world is much more solid and unsubject 
to change by our will. However, even the philosophy of the physical 
sciences must conclude they are subject to such 11 social" considerations 
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as framing, domain assumption, and the phenomenology of focus. The 
"knowledge" of the physical sciences also takes shape by the process of 
social agreement as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Both the physical sciences and the social disciplines frame a ques-
tion with a given purpose in mind. They reflect our values (i.e., 
what is important) and our valuing processes. Each is constructed with 
a purpose in mind. Yet questions of the nature of matter are much dif-
ferent from questions of the nature of man (Warmoth~ 1982). 
Physical science would prefer to deal with mind and belief as some-
thing "tacked on" or extra to the system. However, if we have even the 
crudest idea of psychology as "the study of mind," then we should be 
aware that something quite different is going on between the physical 
sciences and the social disciplines. 
Bateson (1979) noted that a system (any system) can never adequately 
understand itself. Thus, understanding of a system must always be 
something added to that system. Consciousness confronts us with an 
added dimension. The understanding of reality is a much different pro-
cess for the social disciplines than for the physical sciences. For 
the social disciplines, reality is an inherently more creative process. 
The closer we approach social reality, the more we are forced to create 
and improvise (Warmoth, 1982). 
Berger and Luckman (1966) concluded their work on the Social 
Construction of Reality with the following statement: 
In sum, our conception of the sociology of knowledge implies a 
specific conception of sociology in general ••• that 
sociology ••• deal with man as man; that it is, in that 
specific sense, a humanistic dTScipline •••• its proper 
object of inquiry is society as a part of a human world, made 
by men, inhabited by men, and in turn, making men, in an 
ongoing historical process. It is not the least the fruit of 
humanistic sociology that it reawakens our wonder at this 
astonishing phenomenon (p. 189). 
It is precisely the nature of the physical sciences that they 
84 
ignore quesions of consciousness, belief, and {if you will) the social 
construction of reality. Mind and man are the added elements to their 
system. They ignore the human. The focus of the net of physical 
science is upon matter not upon mind or upon the human. It is small 
wonder that they do not neatly fit the study of man. Ortega y Gasset 
(1941) illuminated this discussion with an interesting conclusion: 
Today we know that all the marvels of the natural sciences, 
inexhaustible though they be in principle, must always come to 
a full stop before the strange reality of human life. Why? 
If all things have given up a large part of their secret to 
physical science, why does this alone hold out so stoutly? 
The explanation must go deep, down to the roots. Perchance it 
is no less than this: that man is not a thing, that man has 
no nature (p. 185). 
He continued 
••• human life, it would appear then, is not a thing, has 
not a nature, and in consequence we must make up our minds to 
think of it in terms of categories and concepts that will be 
radically different from such as shed light on the phenomenon 
or matter (Ortega y Gasset, 1941, p. 186). [Italics Original] 
Reality is not just "in our minds": that would be a projection and 
a discounting of the physical world. However, there is an overlapping 
between the physical and the social. Berger and Luckman argued that 
reality (that which we can not wish away) is social constructed. It is 
here that the challenge of the social disciplines begins. A self-
fulfilling prophecy in the physical realm of matter operates with differ-
ent limiting parameters than a self-fulfilling prophecy in the 
theater of the social. They are different orders of reality. There is 
a difference in kind between "making a chair fly" and "creating a 
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friendly neighborhood. 11 The world is not entirely in our minds and not 
everything bends to our expectation. Yet, for the most part, we do not 
normally live in the 11 World 11 of the physical sciences. The world we 
experience is usually quite different from the physicist•s description. 
We may never know the exact line between the reality of matter and the 
reality of the mind, but suffice to say there is a social reality which 
is more changeable than the 11 Stable 11 world of physical matter. 
The hard 11 realist 11 may wish to write most of this off as only 
belief, or hypnosis, or mood. But the student of the social disciplines 
must dwell upon the profound interplay between belief and the 11 World. 11 
As Van Den Berg (1961) wrote, 
The shape in which things appear to us is remarkably variable. 
Not only do things have a tendency to meet us half way as far 
as our changing moods are concerned, but we can influence 
them, too; we are able, to a certain extent, to change things just by observing them differently ••• This ability to change 
the appearance of things is certainly not possible under all 
conditions. There is a mood which soaks everything in a som-
ber gloom, when the flowers have less color, and the light 
from the sun is nothing more than the extrapolation of a 
lightbulb. I cannot succeed in changing this state of affairs 
very much. This is a bad day ••• but there are also days 
when everything appears to be possessed of a new persisting 
light. The sun is brilliant, the colors of the flowers are 
unexpectedly deep, and even the smallest thing gives me its own 
bit of happiness ••• I cannot change this state of affairs, 
either •••• But as a rule, things wait for our intention; 
they are willing. We have the freedom to make them what we 
wish, even if we do not often use this freedom (pp. 191-192). 
lt is this power of perspective -- this uniquely human power --which 
forms a crucial difference between the physical and the social realms 
and invites our participation. It is consciousness and our awareness of 
consciousness that implies the possibility of choice. 
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Defining the Situation: Human Nature 
It is this possibility of choice that has prompted some of the more 
recent humanists to seek to define human nature and envision a world in 
that image. Simpson (1977, p. 75} in "Humanistic Psychology: An 
Attempt to Define Human Nature," quoted Nietzsche as saying that: "Value 
is creating •••• Without valuation the nut of existence is hollow." 
This valuing process creates our desire for something "better" and 
enters us into the ''change the world" conversation. It is the desire 
for a "Good" that transcends the "good" of the "good" or "evil'' debate 
of classical philosophy {Nietzsche}. Valuing and meaning are inherent 
in the nature of the human process. The task is seen as an attempt to 
create a direction of valuation that is not subject to the zero-sum game 
of projection in which every "good" must be immediately canceled out by 
the shadow-side equivalent of "evil" (Jung, 1964). This represents an 
attempt to create values that do not represent a flight from evil, but 
begin with a realism which is not immediately subject to the traps which 
Becker {1975} outlined as The Escape From Evil. "The Escape From Evil" 
strategy and the strategy of projection repress what we do not like and 
wills the world to be in a certain way. However, what we would escape 
from "creeps back" to us through our very strategies of negating them. 
By failing to take into consideration the"evil" as well as the "good" 
potentialities of human nature, we perpetuate a dynamic between the two. 
Fromm {1968) argued that human nature may be more of a potentiality 
than an actuality; an issue of becoming rather than a matter of being. 
ter of being. He quoted Goethe: "I can conceive of no act so horrible 
that I cannot imagine myself to be the author; ••• I am human and 
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nothing that is human is foreign to me" (p. 58). Fromm concurred with 
the poet Walt Whitman that 11 ! contain multitudes ... 
It is Fromm's ( 1947) work on The Fear of Freedom and Escape From 
Freedom (1941) that Becker (1975) used to develop his 11 escape from evil .. 
critique. Fromm's crucial argument is that with consciousness and our 
recognition of the need for valuation and meaning in human affairs, we 
have generated a dialog with history in which the need for a potentiality 
of choice is clear. The awesomeness of such choice can send us running. 
Often we prefer to buy into the readily available cultural prescriptions 
rather than attempt to transcend cultural directives and enter the 
theater of choice. 
According to Fromm, human nature is something we create. The 
essence of his perspective on the human potential focus on what we might 
become; it is more of a creative vision of humanity than it is a philos-
ophy lesson: more of a challenge than a doctrine. We cannot get a fix 
on human nature and declare for all time that man is either basically 
good or basically evil. What we have is a social process which is 
ongoing. 
Identity and social life are created as well as found. Ortega y 
--
Gasset {1941) furthered the argument. He stated that the reason we have 
not been able to settle upon the nature of man is that there is no such 
thing as human nature: 
Physico-mathematical reason ••• was in no state to confront 
human problems. By its very constitution it could do no other 
than search for man's nature. And naturally, it did not find 
it. For man has no nature. Man is not his body, which is a 
thing, nor his soul, psyche, conscience, or spirit which are 
also things. Man is no thing, but a drama -- his life, a pure 
and universal happening which each one in his turn is nothing 
but happening (pp. 199-200). 
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We go astray if we search for man's human nature, for it cannot be 
found. "Man, in a vwr:_~~-~o na!_ur:_e; what he ha~-~s ___ ._hi story" 
(Ortega y Gasset, 1~41, p. 217). [Italics Original] 
Humans have no human nature. Instead, what we have is a past. 
Personal Power: Humanistic Psychology 
The merit of humanistic psychology is that it moves us away from 
the past and invites us into the present. While traditional psychology 
has sought to explain the present in terms of the past, humanistic 
psychology seeks to bring the person into the present: it is in the 
"now" at transformation is possible. The past cannot be unwoven. Rut 
today is a different day. And it is from the present that we can 
visualize a new future. 
Humanistic psychology has followed a strategy of trying to find and 
develop ways of highlighting and facilitating the "positive" aspects of 
humanity. Strategies of individual psychologies have ranged from the 
"un<lun1ified positive regard" of Rogers (1977) to the "self-
actualization" of Maslow (1<)62). The emphasis has been upon the power 
of the individual to create and transform both environment and self. 
Fromm (1947) argued for the unfolding of man's specific capacities and 
productiveness. He stated that we should strive for structures and 
values which enhance our "aliveness" (Fromm, 1968). 
Fritz Pearls offers us a clue to the strategy of much of humanistic 
psychology. The "trick" of humanistic psychology is to hold expecta-
tions lightly. Since expectations are the first step in the formation 
of social structure (i.e., expectations, norms, values), this increases 
the importance of personal factors such as personal power and charisma 
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to define and influence the situation. It is an attempt to prevent the 
crystalization of social processes such as institution alization and 
reification. The dynamic of personal influence and the relevance of 
situations to the 11 feelings .. of actors is thus kept open. 
Institutionalization is the step between expectations and norms. 
It is the addition of sanctions and social control to expectations. 
Reification represents the step between norms and values, while the pro-
cess of expectation itself represents what might be termed generaliza-
tion and stereotyping. The sociologist will readily recognize that 
without generalization and expectation, we are left with 11 random, blun-
dering acts 11 characterized by Sumner and can never move to social 
arrangements with enough predictability to act. Nevertheless, the 
11 trick 11 of holding expectations lightly is a novel approach because it 
emphasizes the creative act and seeks a way out of the 11 binding" nature 
of social structure. Its naivete lies in its failure to recognize that 
values represent expectations which are important (i.e., valuable). 
The emphasis of humanistic psychology is exploring and enhancing 
the personal: the power of intuitive recognitions of the situation 
( 11 feeling••) and the personal power of individuals to construct the 
situation. Personal power is the "ability to define the situation... It 
is perhaps what Maslow referred to as 11 self-actualization 11 --the 
creation/construction of self and influencing reality construction. It 
resembles that sociological term which we have so lightly glossed over: 
charisma. 
Max Weber had characterized the formation of modern society as the 
flight from the frivolity and possible abuses of personal power. He 
saw the formation of bureaucracy in the ••routinization of charisma 11 --
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the attempt to normalize the transference of authority and power. Iron-
ically, in modern society, it has been the creativeness of personal 
power and charisma that humanistic psychologists have returned in an 
attempt to compensate for the abuses of bureaucracy. The power of the 
individual is the 11 power to believe ... But as with the "self-fulfilling 
prophecy," this is not the idle armchair-type of belief. It is a 
"belief" that is acted upon. At its best it is contagious ·- the actor 
by his "charisma" carries people with him (i.e., defines the 
situation}. 
Humanistic psychology is a romantic venture to actualize a 
definition of the situation. It challenges us away from our previous 
understandings of reality to a new adventure. As such, its methods and 
credo's have been suspect in more 11 realistic 11 circles. The challenge is 
to switch perspectives: to recognize our power of intention and the 
11 Willingness" of things to change with our 11 attitude 11 and use this power 
of consciousness to transform our vision and ultimately re-define the 
world. Its strategies and formularizations have resembled more an 
attempt to change the "mood" more than they resemble traditional 
academic scholarship. 
This accounts for the seeming triviality of humanistic formular-
izations. They invite us to switch perspectives, but they do not pro-
ceed in a step-by-step rational tradition. The serious realism of 
Freudian psychology may well be countered by a 11 Catch phrase," or worse, 
an anecdote or song or even nonsense ploy, such as a Zen koan. For 
example, Becker (1975) in Escape From Evil wrote: 
At its most elemental level the human organism, like crawling 
life, has a mouth, digestive tract, and anus, a skin to keep it 
intact, and appendages with which to acquire food. Existence, 
for all organismic life, is a constant struggle to feed --a 
struggle to incorporate whatever other organisms they can fit 
into their mouths and press down their gullets without choking 
• • • • If at the end of each person's life he were presented 
with the living spectacle of all that he had organismically 
incorporated in order to stay alive, he might well be horri-
fied by the living energy he had ingested. The horizon of a 
gourmet, or even the average person, would be taken up with 
hundreds of chickens, flocks of lambs and sheep, a small herd 
of steers, sties of pigs, and rivers of fish. The din alone 
would be deafening. To paraphrase Elisas Canetti, each organ-
ism raises its head over a field of corpses, smiles into the 
sun, and declares life good (pp. 1-2). 
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It may indeed seem frivolous to counter this "argument" with Paul 
Williams' phrase: Vote with your life. Vote yes. But, this is pre-
cisely what the humanistic psychologist does. We are invited to switch 
our attention. All the wages of war, poverty, crime, and depression may 
be countered by: "Yes, but isn't the sky pretty." The strategy is not 
to be "defeated" by life, and that it is only from another "mood" that 
we will be able to obtain an "answer." The humanistic approaches invite 
us to switch our mood immediately and then return with a new perspective 
on what troubled us. Then we can develop a strategy for dealing with 
it. 
Again, as Van Den Berg (1961, pp. 191-192) noted: the "ability to 
change the appearance of things is certainly not possible under all con-
ditions." Sometimes, we must conclude that "I cannot succeed in chang-
ing this state of affairs very much •••• This is a bad day • II . . . 
But often "things wait for our intention; they are willing. We have the 
freedom to make of them what we wish •••• " 
This ability to switch our attention must be balanced by a thorough 
understanding of the "shadow side" or we are merely spinning ourselves 
in circles tangled by the "tentacles of projection" (Van Den Berg, 1961, 
p. 191). We must not ignore the "evil" of the world, but neither must 
we cancel out or ignore the human ability to re-define the situation: 
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to change the "mood." This ability to change the mood may sometimes be 
only projection or inept "wishing"; it may at times be the product of 
real delusion. But there is also an ability to change the mood and 
"car~" others with us: actualizing human capacities we have left 
unexplored. 
This approach is by no means new to the human disciplines. In the 
realm of "pop" psychology, each generation has had its renditions: the 
Dale Carnegie program of "influence"; the "positive thinking•• of Norman 
Vincent Peale; and lately, an approach of humanistic psychology 
popularly characterized as creative visualization (Gawair, 1978). 
The notion of personal power is indeed circular: if a person 
succeeds in influencing a situation, it is because of "personal power"; 
a person•s inability to influence a situation is treated as evidence of 
a lack of personal power. Lasch (1978) in The Culture of Narcissism, 
noted how much of the "human potential movement" camouflaged the 
traditional American ethic of 11 pulling yourself up by your own 
bootstraps ... There is a tendency for it to take on an elitism of the 
11 haves 11 toward the 11 have-nots... Yet, the 11 personal power 11 renditions of 
the humanistic movement underlie something more than just the trimings 
of an affluent ethos. They speak to the power of the individual, but 
they also speak to the power of belief, of mind, and the power to create 
our own realities. 
Roszak (1979} noted that something very drastic has occurred in the 
.. pursuit of happiness .. ethic. We have historically moved from a focus 
upon individual freedom to a focus upon the right to personal 
fulfillment. This new focus transforms the nature of traditional ethics 
and calls into question issues of consciousness, human fulfillment, and 
desire (even the right) to create a better life-- and by implication 
a better world. 
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The new quest for personhood is not limited to only the affluent, 
but permeates the culture: the factory worker who is no longer satis-
fied with just a job, but says "take this job and shove it, I want to be 
treated as a person"; or the grandparents who are no longer satisfied 
with just being "grandma and grandpa" anymore but want to be treated as 
persons too, not just roles (Roszak, 1980). 
Ferguson (1981) outlined how the quest for personal meaning and 
influence is leading to a personal and social transformation. We are 
beginning to recognize in almost all fields the great extent to which 
outcomes are influenced by those things which we group together as 
"personal power" or "mind/emotions." This influence extends from the 
physicist's experiments to holistic medicine to the realm of intuitive/ 
right brain training for local businessmen. The frontiers of conscious-
ness seem to be brought into play as part of an ethic emphasizing 
personal fulfillment. 
What is central to all of this is the human ability to transform 
the nature of a situation despite the possibility of manipulation and 
false consciousness. There remains an underlying conviction that we are 
referring to a real ability: an ability to define the situation. 
To say that personal power is the ability to believe, might be too 
much a shorthand version of a deeper and more subtle process. Yet, 
personal power does seem to be tied to this ability to believe and 
create on the basis of that belief. 
Physics and the other sciences posited laws of a world which was 
dependent upon non-human involvement. The observer was outside an 
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otherwise closed system. And yet we do not live in such a world which 
is devoid of our participation. Belief and the other human ••variables" 
make up a substantial part of our lives, perceptions and actions. The 
"personal power" and humanisti~ movements provide testimony to the 
reaches and frontiers of human experience. They seek to heal the mind-
body split on which science predicated its very base: 
There can hardly be any social situation where belief does not 
play a significant role in constituting it to some extent or 
other. If it were· not so, the situation, by definition, would 
collapse into the sort of situation studied in the natural 
sciences. This may be welcome to those who do not want to 
accept any basic distinction between the natural and the social 
sciences. But then they would also not accept the sort of 
phenomena described by Merton as 'self-fulfilling' prophecies 
•••• On the other hand, if belief or consciousness were to 
play such a role as to completely constitute the situation, we 
could not in any significant sense study them either. Between 
these two poles, then, would lie the world studied by the social 
sciences either. Between these two poles, then, would lie the 
world studied by the social sciences (Krishna, 1971, pp. 
1105-1106). 
The power of ••faith to move mountains" certainly upsets the physi-
cist•s view of reality. And yet are not total findings of the research 
in sociology, anthropology, and psychology an overwhelming and 
compelling body of evidence concurring in the truth of that ancient 
adage? However, at the same time, there seems to be a limit to the 
"personal" power of faith-- of the ability to believe. But that limit 
is certainly far different than the science-constructed ••reality" of 
human non-involvement. 
Historically, science supplanted religion and the world of belief/ 
faith. Psychology and sociology are now calling that world of belief 
back into existence and questioning where indeed do we draw the line. 
And that line changes daily. 
Much of the earlier work on "positive thinking•• and belief came 
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from a religious framework that emphasized the "power of love." Hesi-
tantly, a few sociologists and psychologists also had begun an moving 
into this area. The work of Erich Fromm has already been mentioned. 
However, it was Pitrium Sorokin who systematically began an exploration 
of the power of love. 
To many, Sorokin's later work on love was the mark of an old man 
preparing to die; it was "hopelessly" contaminated by religious 
"leanings," and represented an embarrassment to scientific sociology 
distracting from what was otherwise a brilliant career. But this 
entirely misses the point. Those who would negate this work fail to see 
that it is a logical outgrowth of Sorokin's previous sociology, as much 
as those who would delete Comte•s later work on love in favor of 
positivism failed to understand that the earlier work was merely a 
meticulous foundation. 
Sorokin had been one of the leading rural sociologists. In an age 
when the organic bond~gameinscaft community was rapidly being destroyed 
by the secular city, what was more natural than for him to approach a 
study of the very nature of this organic solidarity? It is natural that 
his work moves from the study of community to the study of love. He 
spent the last portion of his career founding the "Harvard Center for 
the Study of Creative Altruism." During this period, he wrote several 
major volumes and conducted intensive surveys on the subject. So 
exhaustive were his efforts that he predated and anticipated much of 
what would later be called "humanistic psychology." 
In a lengthy essay entitled, "The Power of Creative Love," Sorokin 
and Hanson (1953) dealt extensively with the "power of love" to define 
the situation. In cas~ history after case history, and anecdote after 
anecdote, they showed how previous definitions are supplanted and 
changed to "love." The following example is representative of their 
research: 
In the 1905 Russian Revolution in Southern Russia, a small 
Mennonite community was threatened by the rebels, who were 
destroying everything in their path. One family met the 
situation by preparing a good rich supper the day of the 
expected raid. The husband asked his wife to set the table 
for the guests and sent the children to bed. When the band 
appeared and asked the father to surrender, he invited them in 
to the prepared dinner, saying that anything of his was theirs, 
but that they must want refreshment first. They hesitated, then 
sat down to eat. After the supper the father showed them beds 
he had prepared in the next room. After their sleep the leader 
appeared again, this time smiling and said: 'We have to go. We 
came to kill you, but we can't' (Sorokin and Hanson, 1953, 
pp. 117-118). 
The researchers summarized their findings by saying that "love 
begets love; hate begets hate ••• unselfish love is at least as 
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'contagious' as hate, and influences human behavior as tangibly as hate 
does" (Sorokin and Hanson, 1953, p. 119). 
The religious literature abounds with examples of love, enthusiasm 
and faith re-defining situations into "love." It is only rarely that 
such stories get consistent play in academic circles, but when they do, 
their credibility is well documented. This power of love seems to be 
more than we had expected and pushes our conceptions to the very fron-
tiers of knowledge. Maslow (1968) had studied how "self-actualized" 
persons have actually been able to re-define situations. This is akin 
to what Bergson (1935) had previously spoken of as the second source of 
society: that beside the conventional society founded on social pres-
sure, there was also society founded upon as~iratio~ --that an idea, a 
way of being, a definition of the situation was so inviting people would 
convert to it readily. 
Folklore of the various religions throughout the ages contain many 
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examples of personal experiences of the power of faith, belief, and 
love. As we shall discuss extensively in the fourth section, much of 
our inability to deal with love except in a scientific, technique-
oriented fashion has been diffused. We need a new framework to discuss 
it. This is because belief and faith run counter to the scientific, 
technological paradigm through which we have been seeing the world. 
The larger culture has a tendency to borrow the findings of invest-
igations of belief, faith, and love to serve prevailing goals. Thus, 
the human potential and positive thinking movements have abounded with 
seminars and books on "how to use faith to be a better businessman" or 
11 how to sell more life insurance through positive thinking." Such 
efforts were bound to be limited to further the goals of the prevailing 
competitive ideology. 
More importantly, there has been the tendency to treat love, faith, 
and belief -- in fact all items dealing with emotions and sentiments --
as purely psychological items. All humanistic and value/belief compon-
ents are treated as being merely in the actor's head. Thus the mind-
body split of science was preserved: science could continue creating 
the world as before but without opposition. 
If we admit that these components are essential to the creation of 
the world, then a vastly different paradigm is demanded. This is pre-
cisely the thesis of this work: these "humanistic items" are not merely 
products of individualist mechanisms, they are part of the ongoing crea-
tion of the world. If humanistic psychology is to be more than mini-
mally effective, it needs a companion humanistic sociology. Much more 
is involved than the mere mind-set of the actor. We are discussing 
social process when we deal with love, faith/belief, and the so-called 
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"personal" power. To relegate the humanistic components to the realm of 
mere internal mood inside the head of the actor is to miss the entire 
point. Modern human beings are alone, separate, and alienated precisely 
because we have relegated all humanistic sentiments to the internal 
"self", while proceeding to make the world in the scientific, mechan-
i sti c image. 
The Social Creation of Reality 
By overloading the "self" with all the emotional, values, and human 
sentiments that we cannot manage to unload anywhere else, we have a 
"self" which is literally ready to explode. It is small wonder that 
personalities "split" and fall apart, for there is no place in the 
modern world to map these humanistic "things" --the things that matter 
most. As Horney (1937) in The Neurotic Personality of Our Time was the 
first to argue it is society who has dropped out; it is not a matter of 
neurosis, but of sociosis and anomie. And to bridge our way out, we 
must bring the humanistic elements back to center play in society. The 
first step is rea 1 i zat ion that these so-ca 11 ed "i nterna 1 " components --
belief, faith, emotions, mood-- are not internal at all. The so-called 
"personal" power is not an individualistic "will power" but something 
much different: the creation of reality. 
As Heidegger wrote in Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art, we 
are talking of creating the world and shaping it as an artist might. 
This is not a new mechanistic technique, but a new way of being, seeing, 
perceiving, and creating. 
It is essential to observe that feeling is not something that 
runs its course in our •inner lives.• It is rather the basic 
mode ••• of which and in accordance to which we are always 
already lifted beyond ourselves •••• Mood is never a way 
of being determined in our inner being for ouselves. It is 
above all a way of being attuned, and letting ourselves be 
attuned, in this or that way in mood. Mood is precisely the 
basic way in which we are outside ourselves (Heidegger, 1961, 
p. 99). [Italics Originalj--
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Mood is a way through which the rest of the world can come in. It is 
here that we might firmly grasp the way social nature of these supposed 
"internal" states. 
"Self-actualization" is not so much an internal state as it is a 
way of interrelating with the world. It will be remembered that Maslow 
(1971) himself in tracing the origin of his concept of self-
actualization gave away the fact that it began as a social concept. 
His model for a self-actualized person was Ruth Benedict. He then pro-
ceeded to find others who reminded him of Benedict and began the forma-
tion of his theories. But it must be recalled that Benedict herself was 
not interested in promoting her own self-actualization: she was much 
more interested in other things --and it was this interest, this 
outside-herself quality that was contagious. One of the things that 
Ruth Benedict was most interested in was synergy. 
Self-actualization, then, has the very roots of its origin in 
unison with the very social concept of synergy. "One plus one is more 
-than two" suggests that the people involved are both involved in 
something bigger and outside of themselves. 
If we examine the examples that Sorokin used for the power of love, 
we find that they are not examples of personal power at all. The 
Mennonite farmer did not manage to 11 COn 11 the Russian soldiers through 
his superior acting ability and personal charisma. Instead, he 
committed himself to a process in full faith. It was a belief and faith 
in the power of love that pulled him through. 
100 
This is not the mechanistic power of science or some mere internal 
state. It is a process which is constructed. The process is initiated 
by commitment and faith. It should be obvious that this belief had to 
strike a familiar chord with the soldiers in order to be successful. It 
is not personal charisma of the performance of the belief which is so 
crucial, but the inviting nature of an invitation in which he is 
sincere. This is Bergson's "society by aspiration" again. 
There is a fundamental difference between the mechanistic power of 
science and what is referred to by the humanists as "personal power ... 
Rogers (1977) in his book, On Personal Power, said that it took him a 
long time to realize that he was talking about power. The reason for 
this is that he was not -- not in the traditional sense. What he was 
said just happened to have political implications. Rogers wrote 
about a way of being which is strong, which is influencing, and which 
participates in a process. 
The typical scientific view of power is cause and effect. It is 
literally manipulation --meaning 11 in hand 11 --forcing power. The 
humanistic version of power is closer to the word "influence" which 
means literally "to flow in." It is part of a process. Manipulative, 
scientific power assumes that one must first have the situation "in 
hand .. and then control the variables. Humanistic "influence" is a com-
mitment to a process that is above and beyond you. It is not a 
"personal" power at all, but a socially constructed dynamic. 
Charisma itself is more of an invitation than a mechanism. As 
Whitman wrote: "To believe what is true in your innermost heart is true 
for all men, that is genius." It was the anthropologist Carpenter 
(1970, p. 1) who later added: 11 The artist talks to himself out loud. 
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If what he has to say is significant, others hear and are affected." 
It is a matter of these "internal .. themes striking a common chord. The 
artist through his art brings these into play so that they may be acted 
upon. It is not that these matters of belief and faith have been inter-
nal but that they had previously been only latent. 
Mills• (1959) sociological imagination of turning private problems 
into public issues was none other than the artist•s attempt to turn those 
private, 11 interna1" problems into a dialog concerning cultural strains 
that will make sense to those around him. It was a networking strategy: 
what Carpenter would refer to as 11 finding an audience." 
This process of creating the definition of the situation is then a 
social-mapping of individuals around core themes. It is not just the 
i nterna 1 ability of the actor to "bring off his performance," but the 
fact that his faith invites participation. It is believable. The char-
fsmatic individual gives us permission for what we have been yearning to 
enact. That some individuals act as catalysts for our humanistic 
values/beliefs in no way makes them internal factors. 
The psychologist Jung (1964) reduced the contents of consciousness 
to a series of archetypes or themes. They await enactment. Such a psy-
chology provides for a tailor-made base for a social dramaturgy for man 
as the creator for enacting those themes. The themes themselves are not 
strictly internal. They are foundations-- of both consciousness and 
the drama of social life. 
Faith (and belief) implies not just a concentration of energy and 
convincing role performance, but implies a belief in something --a 
content. If we overload the self by claiming that beliefs are only 
internal mechanisms (e.g., personal opinions) then we have succeeded in 
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reifying psychology at one pole only to leave science (and its .. real 
world .. ) intact at the other pole. We have obscured the social task and 
the real possibility of making the world. 
As Horney (1937) taught us, neurosis tends to occur along lines of 
cultural strain. By overloading the 11 Self 11 with all the 11 material 11 that 
science has not been able to deal with --with belief, faith, values, 
human longings -- we have made psychology into a dumping ground which is 
neither satisfactory nor effective. We have relegated psychology to the 
role of 11 band-aid" on cultural wound. 
If we treat love, magic, and the other humanistic concerns as only 
internal, we do them a real disservice. To treat belief and faith as 
mere mechanisms of the individual, we miss the scope and impact of the 
entire humanistic thesis. Those who have testified to and experienced 
humanistic experiences --the "magic" of faith and belief-- testified to 
forces in their lives --not opinions. Reality construction is partici-
patory. Definition of the situation and faith testify to the possiblity 
of visualizing and creating another world. Belief and faith are not 
internal aspects of self, but the very wind in the sails of humanism. 
The faith which has been called the power of love is a real entity 
that is capable of transforming consciousness and situations. This 
belief flies in the face of the scientific reality. But love has shown 
its ability to transform experience and the outcomes of events. 
The Romantic Quest: The Hero 
The effort to effect a new definition of the situation against the 
ongoing 11 real ity" is by its very nature romantic. It is the quest of 
the hero. The core of the social disciplines is tied to this romantic 
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tradition. They were born in the "change the world" conversation -- the 
quest for better. Becker (1971) summarized: 
let me address a comment to the hardheaded realist, who 
may smirk at the Quixotic lance splitting and utopianism. I 
don•t see how it can be denied that the science of man is, his-
torically and by its very nature, a utopian science (p. x). 
The human disciplines seek to implement a new vision; to make an 
ideal into reality. Returning to Marx•s statement quoted earlier: 
philosophers have described the world; it is now up to us to transform 
it •• To somehow dream a dream of the good society and then to 
create that society. This represents initially an attempt to "save the 
world" pure and simple: for Marx, from the abuses of capitalism that 
produced alienated man; for Comte, from the excesses of the French Revo-
lution and such violent change. 
Each of the early sociologists offered up their dream in hope that 
it would be taken as the basis for a new society -- for a new definition 
of the situation. The reality of "what is" was replaced with the mis-
sian of creating a new world -- a romantic adventure in its very 
essence. 
Sociology and social change strategies have thus always been 
associated with the theater of the heroic. Even the strict scientist 
toiling with his data and variables has been doing this for a greater 
cause: the progress of mankind -- the betterment of the world. We have 
not been sufficiently aware of the extent that the very enterprise 
itself is heroic. The effort is to create the Good: to fly in the face 
of what is-- "reality" --and create a new definition of the situation 
and a new world. Sociology and psychology might be seen as attempts to 
create a new self-fulfilling prophecy. The hero toils to change the 
world. 
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Most of us, however, have become sophisticated with our efforts. 
The sociologist does not want to "save" the world but provide some under-
standing which will effect change and make it somewhat better. The 
psychologist does not feel confident any longer that people can be 
changed, but s/he strives to help. Yet despite our mature sensitivity to 
the problems of change, we must not lose sight of the heroic intent 
inherent in sociology or a psychology. This heroic effort provides the 
very structure and the grammar of the disciplines themselves. 
If we seek to create a better self-fulfilling prophecy, then we gain 
a different understanding of "truth" and "reality." "Truth" becomes what 
we cannot readily change --the limits of our efforts to visualize a new 
world. Yet these "truths" themselves are subject to change almost daily. 
Thus the social disciplines are framed, in principle, by the idea that 
the potential for new visualization is inexhaustible. It is an effort in 
full opposition to any limits on our ability to change things: a heroic 
quest of the highest order. 
It was Ernest Becker who sought to analyze the nature of this heroic 
quest and the implications of the hero on social change strategies. In 
The Birth and Death of Meaning (1962), Escape From Evil (1975), and 
and The Denial of Death {1973) he examined cultures as hero systems: 
symbolic attempts to deny death and create the Good. It was an effort 
which in trying to deny death and escape from evil also implied a more 
complex denial of mystery and the miraculous (Becker, 1971). Denial is a 
strategy which purchases security at a terrible price and furthermore 
does not prove to be effective. 
The extent to which we can change the basic "realities" and stretch 
the parameters of existence is always a difficult question. How much 
can the self-fulfilling prophecy create a new world? 
••• here is where religion enters in as mankind•s age-old 
question for the ideal heroism • • • • As the noted socio-
logist Peter Berger reminded us, religion and social science 
meet in their judgement of the social fictions. The scientific 
analysis of the social structure and the psychology of society 
would tell us why it is strangling itself with the best of 
intentions (Becker, 1971, p. 181). 
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The quest to make the Good must contain elements which have signif-
icantly contributed to its own unsuccessfulness. Indeed, Becker went 
so far as to contribute much of the social evil in the world to immature 
efforts to create the Good. Becker {1975) quoted the psychologist Otto 
Rank: 
All our human problems, with their intolerable sufferings, 
arise from man•s ceaseless attempts to make this material world 
into a man-made reality ••• Aiming to achieve on each a 
"perfection" which is only to be found in the beyond • 
thereby confusing the values of both spheres (p. 91). 
The ideal world becomes a sanctuary against the terror of life. 
Man•s psychology seeks to deny mortality and impermanence, while society 
seeks to reify this into an ongoing system transcending death. Each 
culture offers prescribed ways of overcoming death and evil. This 
"ensures the future" and keeps us from confronting the things that we 
fear most. 
Roheim said that culture, the marvelous pagentry of the human 
drama, was the fabrication of a child afraid to be alone in 
the dark. The ideal question for religion has always been a 
derivative of this. •what kind of fabrication would be proper 
to an adult who realized that he was afraid 1 (Becker, 1971, 
p. 195)? [Italics Original] 
We have sought to deny the animal nature of human beings and the 
transitoriness of life. How can we recast our view in such a way as to 
celebrate life? 
The heroic task is caught up in the art of how to make sense out of 
life. We may see that meaning has been socially constructed, but 
although we may lift the masks from the cultural drama, we cannot do 
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away with human need for meaning construction. Becker argued that the 
hero system-- which is an attempt to create a self-fulfilling prophecy 
against the impermanence of life -- is the very foundation of meaning. 
It is through identification with heroes that children are first 
socialized into the ongoing culture; the child learns societally pre-
scribed strategies of transcendence and creating meaning. It is pre-
cisely through the hero system that a child learns the culture. 
Becker (1971) saw the heroic process intrinsically related to the 
very birth of meaning. Even for one who has seen through the learned 
social fiction, it is still necessary to retain and create some system 
of meaning. It is necessary to create a new construction or re-enact 
the old, for this is tightly interwoven with our sense of security and 
continuity. It is how we construct our interactions. 
When we become aware of the socially created nature of our hero 
systems, we are immediately confronted with a nagging doubt. The 
ability of the hero to implement a new self-fulfilling prophecy by shear 
will becomes transparently fragile. 
When we look at the lives of the greatest, the most daring 
innovators, one fact shines out: that no matter how compelling 
is the edifice he creates, man simply cannot feel that 
he has the authority to offer up his own meanings (Becker, 
1968, p. 192). [Italics Original 
The problem of the hero suspended in thin air by only his will and 
vision becomes paramount. It is easy to fall, and the higher the 
vision, the steeper the fall. When the shadow of doubt creeps in, it 
too, like the dragons of evil and the tentacles of fear, must be slayed. 
The hero strives to transcend death: to deny its impact and create 
a quest that will be meaningful in the face of the fire: a haven and a 
vision against the dust. It is an attempt to quell the darkness and 
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escape from evil. Vet, any light we cast leaves behind a shadow from 
which we would like to escape responsibility. We seek to deny death and 
evil, and also to escape from the latent consequences, to abate the 
darkness. 
The heroic effort, Becker (1975) noted in the Escape From Evil, has 
often itself been responsible for the creation of social evil. By 
denying what we fear and rushing to eliminate it in others rather than 
ourselves, we have often polluted the situation more than helped. The 
strategy of heroically making the good has often been to stamp out evil 
without owning up to the part that our own denial has played in the 
process. 
Becker (1975, p. 94) quoted the psychologist Erich Neumann: "The 
shadow is the other side. It is the expression of our own imperfection 
and earthliness, the negative which is incompatible with the absolute 
values ... 
Becker commented that it is "the horror of passing life and the know-
ledge of ·death .. from which we wish to escape. It is also, as Jung 
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noted, our feelings of inferiority that we wish to feel. To "jump over 
our own shadow ... We try to do this by 11 looking for everything dark, 
inferior, and culpable in others 11 (Jung, 1970, p. 203). 
The shadow, which is in conflict with the acknowledged values 
cannot be accepted as a negative part of one•s own psyche and 
is therefore projected -- that is, it is transferred to the out-
side world and experienced as an outside object. It is com-
bated, punished, and exterminated as 'the alien out there• 
instead of being dealt with as one•s own ••• problem 
(Neumann, 1969, p. 50). 
Sociologists have made a meager attempt to analyze this dynamic 
through the concepts of "manifest" and 11 latent" functions (Merton, 
1949). While manifest functions are intended, latent functions 11 are 
-------
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Eonsequences which are neither intended nor recognized" {Martindale, 
1960, p. 472). Latent functions may be as neutral as colleges function-
ing as marriage markets, or they may subvert and destroy the entire sys-
tem as anthropological accounts of the "crimes .. of missionaries testify. 
Yet, for the most part, sociologists have not undertaken a thorough 
study of how acts in social-psychological settings create and maintain 
those very structures in the marco-society which we deplore the most. 
This may well have been the intent of Mills' {1959) Sociological 
Imagination: to ask us to see how individual problems relate to 
social issues, not just as a way of networking from personal problems to 
a larger context, but as a means of integrating and emphasizing the 
extent to which social problems are generated by personal strategies. 
It is distancing ourselves from our fears that Becker saw as the 
fundamental dynamic for the creation of social evil. By projecting evil 
onto other people, we scapegoat our problems and then fight wars against 
this 11 foreign other 11 without realizing the extent our own participation 
plays in the creation of evil. Crusade strategies for creating the Good 
remain essentially ineffective. Such heroic strategies generate the 
very evil that they were designed to eliminate. 
This is all the more crucial because attempts to make the Good often 
carry with them the conviction of religious zeal. The 11 do-gooder 11 
enters into a strategy with full force and indignation. Having identi-
fied the 11 CU1 prit, .. we seek to erase "him 11 while denying our own part. 
Hero systems carry with then an innate weakness and vulnerability 
a fatal flaw, if you will. In dreaming the good dream, we wish to 
escape from the doubts of disbelief, deny the frailty of our myth con-
struction, and reach for sure-fire salvation. We seek to deny the 
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fragileness of our self-fulfilling prophecies. For when the hero falls 
from the wings of vision, we are left alienated in the world. 
Both Becker and Jung saw that in order to overcome the shadow of 
evil, we must come to grips with the very shadow that we would deny. We 
cannot escape from evil, nor can we avoid our shadow side. This was 
Becker's reason for focusing upon the denial of death, the structure of 
evil, and our escape-from~evil mechanisms. We must acknowledge and even 
embrace its existence. 
Jungian psychology also focuses upon the impossibility of suppres-
sing the shadow. If we consciously deny its existence, it re-surfaces 
in the unconscious -- both in dreams and as a source of our actions. The 
individuals must learn to "own their shadow .. in order to achieve psycho-
logical health. "The hero must realize that the shadow side exists and 
that he can draw strength from it. He must come to terms with its des-
tructive powers • must master and assimilate the shadow" (Jung, 
1964, p. 121). Not only must the shadow be assimilated for psycho-
logical health, but incorporation of it is often a source of creativity. 
By dealing with this other side, new strategies and strengths can be 
achieved. For, as Becker (1968, p. 258) noted, "For man, strength 
means understanding." 
Strength can be gained from dealing with those very things which we 
would like most to deny. Instead of abandoning heroism, Becker (1971) 
pressed the ideal heroism farther in an attempt to make it effective: 
When the new emergent symbolic man sense despair and the bur-
den of the miraculous, he wove tight the denial of the Oedipus 
and reached for sure r-eligious power. For a long time, evo-
lution seems to have allowed the creature to relax somewhat, 
to take possession of itself and its world. But whether or 
not these musings are so, it seems clear that the confortable 
illusion is now a danger to human survival; and closedness to 
the miraculous is an evasion of human sensibility; man now 
seems to have to move ahead with his own strength to the 
frontiers of anxiety. And who knows what would come of that 
(Becker, 1971, pp. 198-199). 
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What kind of world could we then make and live in? And what would 
life be like? The heroic quest has come a long way since the first 
creature huddled by the fire in the cave, sensed death, and launched a 
romantic adventure to achieve meaning. The romantic quest proceeded 
through the early religious mystics, to the knights and their ladies, to 
the social reformer, and to the modern effort to build a science of 
humanity. 
Bergson (1935) noted the similarity between romantic love and 
mysticism: 
romantic love has a definite date: it sprang up during 
the Middle Ages on the day that some person conceived the idea 
of absorbing love into a kind of supernatural feeling, into 
religious emotion as created by Christianity and launched by 
the new religion into the world. When critics reproach 
mysticism with expressing its~lf in the same terms as 
passionate love, they forget that it was love which began by 
plagiarizing mysticism ••• (p. 42). 
Bergson continued: 
We may add that the nearer love is to adoration, the greater 
the disproportion between the emotion and the object, the 
deeper therefore the disappointment to which the lover is 
exposed -- unless he decides that he will ever look at the 
object through the mist of the emotion and never touch it, that 
he will, in a word, treat it religiously • • The margin 
left for disappointment is now enormous, for it is the gap 
between the divine and the human (p. 43). 
Bergson (1935, p. 53) concluded that "the truth is that heroism may 
be the only way to love." If we cast our heroism to the realm of the 
ideal, the gap can prove staggering. Lucka (1922) writing in 
The Evolution of Love said that: 
Not only the great thinker's thirst for knowledge, the mystics 
religious yearnings, the aesthetic of the rare artist, but also 
the love and longing of the passionate lover must reach beyond 
the attainable to the infinite. This earth is the kingdom of 
•mean• emotions and •mean• men. And the lover, unable to bear 
its limits, creates for himself a new world --the world of 
metaphysical love (p. 303). 
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Yet, this world is unobtainable on the day-to-day physical level --
at least for very long. Still, the hero strives: 11 TO dream the impos-
sible dream to reach the unreachable star... Yet often falling 
to earth to realize that we have only been 11 f1ogging windmi1ls. 11 Like 
Don Quixote, it is necessary to pick oneself up and launch the vision 
again. However, we must realize that the process of 11 picking oneself up 
again 11 is intimately related to the whole process of dreaming and the 
very dynamic of the hero. 
When romance comes crashing to the ground, it often reveals itself 
as just another fantasy -- a part of the myth-making function at the 
carnival of life. Yet, when we climb on the wings of vision again, it 
often becomes easy to forget the fall. It is a lot like fear and pain: 
when they are gone, we have only the dimmest memory of what they were 
like. When someone invites us to smell the flowers, we try the vision 
-~gain pretending that previous falls have made us immune from falling. 
Yet, the world is often not secure for our dreams. Not everyone will 
love us. Often our dance of love is only a pretense which no one else 
will support. It is hard to find someone to make a vision with and even 
harder to find someone who shares the same vision. Often the nature of 
the particular vision is such that it gets rapidly chased from view by 
its own shadow. Many have given up the dream and many cannot give up 
trying. 
There are at times very real forces outside ourselves which mean us 
harm. At times the world can be a very dangerous place. Sometimes, 
faith and the power of self-fulfilling prophecy to spin a better world 
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can keep us safe. And at times, other realities intrude. 
We can visualize and often create another world. The power of the 
dreamers can transform the world as it is, down to our very perceptions. 
But sometimes it makes little difference whether our heads are in the 
clouds or buried like the ostrich in the ground -- the world can deal us 
a blow when we are not looking. 
For dreams to come to fruit in the world, they must be nurtured and 
allowed to r1pen. Sometimes they are not ready. Sometimes they have 
been planted on barren ground. Sometimes they are inadequate. 
Evil must be admitted to exist. The attempt to deny it only 
strengthens its existence. We must learn to own our shadow and face our 
projections. We must strive to understand what we would deny. As Fromm 
(1968) wrote: 
To be fully aware of one's humanity means to be aware that, as 
Terence said, 'Homo sum, nil humani a me alienum puto' (I am 
man and nothing human is alien to me); that each one carries 
all of humanity within himself --the saint as well as the 
criminal; as Goethe put it, that there is no crime of which one 
cannot imagine oneself to be the author (p. 61). 
The core of Fromm's work concerned love and creativeness, but he 
also dealt with destructiveness (1975) and the escape mechanisms of dis-
tancing {1943, 1945), without which his philosophy would have been 
incomplete. 
We may assume that destructiveness, if we do not fixate it by our 
strategies to combat it, carries the seeds of its own destruction. We 
must be careful not to dwell only on evil and dismiss all attempts to 
create the Good a priori. We may use as our philosophical point of 
departure the fact that most people desire good. Good and evil are not 
necessarily co-balanced in a zero-sum game. Our questions become ones 
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of strategy: what will work?; and for what structural reasons does the 
good negate itself? We reach for an understanding of the "Good" which 
Nietzsche (1955) characterized as "beyond good and evil'' --a "Good" that 
was not subject to the zero-sum game of the "good'' vs. "evil" 
controversy. 
The hero's task is always incomplete. It is never a total victory 
for very long. In some ways, it is not so much a religious quest as a 
profession. Oddly enough, we must come to see that the hero 
represents the last vestiges of science. 
The hero mounts on wings of vision to steal fire from the gods and 
slay dragons on earth. This is very similar to the scientist's inquiry 
to find "God's rulebook": to discover the truth and mount a movement. 
The hero is the would-be savior: from excursions into the frontier of 
the unknown, he will return with new techniques and materials for making 
the world. Like the scientist, the hero carries the banner of a cause. 
Often it is the same banner -- the service of humanity. In fact, 
science, especially the human sciences, has cast itself very much into 
the role of the hero. 
Finally, the power of the hero is the scientific power: it is 
force, not influence. To rely upon the involvedness of influence crip-
ples the heroic achievement of meaning. The hero seeks potions, amu-
lets, and treasures that will function as techniques for changing the 
world. Even when it may appear that the hero is using influence, later 
~e find him circumventing the process and claiming credit for that 
influence, just as if it had been out-and-out manipulation. Heroes are 
interested in salvation. In relating meaning to such a quest, the 
humanistic power of influence often appears too subtle. 
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The rational effort of mind over matter is not only scientific, but 
heroic. The psychologist Fricker {1981, 1982) has given us an interest-
ing insight into the hero. Fricker, a war hero who has received most of 
the medals awarded by the American government, began counseling the 
wounded in V. A. hospitals concerning the hero mythology. Later, he 
linked child abuse with the failed would-be hero. 
The image of the hero is basic throughout society and achievement 
of the heroic is the very measure of success. It is this basic hero-
mechanism that Fricker saw as the problem. He claimed that for psycho-
logical maturity, one must "let their hero die." By giving up the hero 
archetype, ironically enough, one is then often capable of functioning 
in effective ways which from the outside look heroic. However, alle-
giance to the hero archetype perverts, pollutes, and renders would-be 
heroic efforts ineffective. 
The hero may to some extent thrive on the existence of evil much as 
the policeman thrives on crime for a living wage. We are speaking here 
of the rescuer who needs someone to save. He may unconsciously create 
his "dependents." He may inadvertently identify with the hero image and 
need to be recognized as a hero to the extent that his "public 11 is 
enslaved by the deference demanded of them by reciprocity. Or the 
hero's ineffective attempts to create the Good may actually pollute the 
situation and make it worse. 
Self-esteem is a normal human need. However, the hero image can 
easily be carried to a demand for abnormal deference. Social scien-
tists, like others, may demand allegiance to the expert role out of all 
proportion to the contribution they are actually making to society. 
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The thesis being presented here is that Becker was quite right about 
the limits, abuses, and ineffectiveness of the hero's attempt to rescue 
us from evil or escape. Unwittingly, the social disciplines embraced 
the archetype of the hero as a social change strategy. However, the 
hero strategy was hopelessly entangled with the scientific paradigm --a 
paradigm which we have already seen negates the humanistic vision. 
Becker took the matter as far as his Western rationalism and reli-
ance on Freudian psychology would allow him. Freud was a "grit your 
teeth and stare at the fire" realist. Jung, on the other hand, acknow-
ledged the reality of the fire, but also focused upon other things. He 
focused on the recovery of ancient cultural rituals for the creation of 
meaning in life.l And he developed the idea of archetypes as the under-
lying themes of that meaning. 
In studying the archetypes, Jung found two encompassing patterns in 
which they could be grouped. He proceeded to employ this type of organ-
ization for analysis of the archetypes. The first was the archetype of 
the Hero. The second was that of the Magician. Jung then proceeded to 
analyze the Hero and the Magician psychologically. As demonstrated in 
this section, Becker examined the Hero as a social change strategy, 
noting its interrelation with the idea of a "social science." However, 
the implications of the Magician as a social change strategy have not 
~een examined. 
lThis is not to say that Becker {1968, p. 381) was not aware of 
this level of meaning, only to say that he did not stake his vision on 
developing the contents of that view; for example, he writes, "We needed 
a science which would help us 'live the dream' better than it was lived 
in the Middle Ages, or in 'primitive' society -- a science that would 
seek to develop the conditions of life enhancement.•• However, Becker's 
focus is upon the resurfacing of those things we had relegated to 
denial, not upon the active creation of celebration, although he advo-
cated such efforts. 
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Indeed, much of the material which Becker used will be incorporated 
in the next section as a foundation. He pointed the way, although he 
did not take it. We must look to ways in which celebration and incor-
poration of the mysterious can be used as a basis for a social change 
strategy. 
In the next section, we will focus upon love, synergy, and the role 
of the magician as social change strategies, and attempt to develop 
their implications for a humanistic sociology. In doing so, we will 
attempt to avoid the traps which Becker characterized as intertwined 
with the romantic, heroic quest. 
CHAPTER IV 
LOVE, SYNERGY, ANn THE MAGIC 
Humanistic Sociology focuses specifically upon the recovery of 
... -
love, magic, and the "Good" and the application of these values to the· 
social world. We return to the age-old question: "How do we make the 
Good?" The answer must be formed in the light of humanistic values 
themselves. We must develop ways of framing our questions that avoid 
the traps outlined by Becker as "the escape from evil" and the denial-
approaches of the shadow and the hero. We must seek answers which leave 
the humanistic experience intact and therefore, do not violate its basic 
grammar or spirit. To do this, we must focus on the nature of the 
humanistic values of love, synergy, and the magical. 
Unfortunately, we find little serious scholarship to guide us: 
It is amazing how little the empirical sciences have to offer 
on the subject of love. Particularly strange is the silence 
of the psychologists, for one might think that this is their 
particular obligation. 
Sometimes this is merely sad or irritating, as in the case of 
the textbooks of psychology and sociology • • • • More often, 
the situation becomes completely ludicrous. One might reason-
ably expect that writers of serious treatises ••• should 
consider the subject of love to be a proper, even basic, part 
of their self-imposed task. But I must report that no single 
one of the volumes on these subjects in the library where I 
work has any serious mention of the subject. More often, the 
word •love• is not even indexed. 
I must confess that I understand this better now that I have 
undertaken the task myself. It is an extraordinarily diffi-
cult subject to handle in any tradition. And it is triply 
so in the scientific tradition. It is as if we were at 
the most advanced position in no-man•s land, at a point where 
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the conventional techniques of orthodox psychological science 
are of very little use. 
And yet our duty is clear. We must understand love: we must 
be able to teach it, to create~ •• or else the world is 
lost to hostility and suspicion (Maslow, 1953, pp. 57-58). 
[Italics Original] 
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And yet, with the exception of the work of Erich Fromm, little has 
changed since Maslow wrote these words. Serious writers have chosen to 
study those things that fit easily into the scientific tradition. They 
have not chosen to study love. Knowledge has not been pressed to this 
frontier, partly because it challenges the very parameters of our pres-
ent paradigm. 
Love and magic are not amenable to the scientific method.' Becker 
(1973) argued that our whole culture and lifestyle has been constructed 
to provide a denial of death. But the "denial of death" of which Becker 
spoke is but the tip of the iceberg. The real taboo in our society is 
not the "denial of death" but the denial of mystery. Most have system-
atically sought to eliminate anything which would suggest life to be 
miraculous or magical. Love has been neglected as a subject for study 
' 
because it subtly undermines the scientific tradition that has become 
our very world view. In order to undertake a serious study of love, it 
was first necessary to unravel the nuances of that scientific world 
view. 
However, even in Western culture, the magical has not completely 
disappeared. Utopian visions seem to re-open the child-like eyes of awe 
and wonder in all of us from time to time. It may be a vision we have 
in the forest when time stands still and we realize that we have always 
had this dream -- as thoughts bubble to the surface and then are gone 
just as clouds passing by. We talk of never going back, of making a 
change. It may be the insight of the poet who touches us in a way we 
had almost forgotten. 
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From time to time, the magic gets rekindled and we see life more as 
a miracle than as the cause and effect of science: we go through major 
life transitions and reach back for understanding and meaning. Children 
are born and life awakens itself with fresh possibilities. People we 
loved die and life again becomes such a fragile construction on this 
side of the veil. Our lives change and who we thought we were are also 
changes. We fall in love and the world is transformed down to our very 
perceptions. We undergo a career change or a divorce or a cross-country 
move ••• and the world seems so different before we manage to snap it 
back in place. 
There are the experiences that Maslow might term ''peak~: the 
~eurekas," the magical moments between new lovers or old friends, the 
milestones in our lives, and the experiences where the walls of the 
world fall before us and we are left with a moment of recognition as our 
life passes before us. There are those sparks of inspiration which can 
only be called magical --when we draw from that spring we term 
creativity. And the times we find ourselves at the shoreline and pass 
beyond ourself. 
Even in our very linear, scientific culture, the magic has not 
disappeared. These experiences are the very foundation of meaning in 
our lives. We seek to bring these experiences that we have in private 
spaces back to the larger world -- to somehow use them to change and 
remake that world. Love and the magical exepriences are the very 
essence of the humanistic vision. It is from these experiences that we 
wish to create. Yet the larger culture, in its day-to-day activity, 
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remains almost blind to the very existence of these humanistic values. 
They are on the fringes of our culture, waiting to haunt us in our 
dreams and confront us in our crises. Still, it seems the larger world 
does not listen. Yet an articulation is crucial. Unless we can testify 
to them in public, they go unnoticed in the legislation of reality. How 
do we make these experiences public and use them as a basis for shaping 
a common vision? This is the focus of a humanistic sociology. 
Ornstein (1968) told an interesting story to justify intuitive 
knowledge to rational scientists. It works equally well here to illu-
strate this discussion of love and the magical. Suppose, he said, there 
are two groups of scientists: one working during the day and the other 
QUring the night. The ones at night keep reporting to the day shift 
about the stars that they have seen. The day scientists refuse to leave 
the confines of their daily world, but they do agree to explore the 
possibility. Using all their equipment and systems, they search the 
sky. At times, they even look through the same telescopes and in the 
same places --but in the daytime. Finally, they conclude that those 
seeing the stars are fools. 
But the long legion of dreamers from Christ to William Blake are 
not fools. They are looking at a different time of day. The current 
scientific apparatus does not fit their vision. Love and magic cannot 
be proven --they do not do well when doubted, and repeated testing only 
tests them out of existence. They do not appear in mock or artificial 
settings. And it seems that they only occur when we are involved in 
life, not as armchair speculations or outgrowths of contrived settings. 
The time of day the mystics do their seeing is that hour when 
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you feel your own mortality and at the same time see the beauty and won-
der of the world. 
Love and magic are not instruments. They do not lend themselves to 
prediction and control which is the basis of scientific power. They do 
not come with ••handles" that allow them to be turned into technologies. 
Fromm (1956) noted in The Art of Loving that most of what we say we know 
about life has been achieved by rendering things dead and then perform-
ing autopsies on them. We know much less about living bodies because 
they do not fit our analytical dissection. Love and magic cannot be 
laid bare by the analysis of the structure and function of organs and 
skeletal frames. They resemble more the breath of life itself. 
Science was supposed to be a salvation: a Tower of Babel up to the 
heavens. Knowledge is power, maintained Francis Bacon. Knowledge has 
to be tamed into power; but in its would-be heroic quest, science•s 
methods resemble more the harpoon of Captain Ahab than the light of 
truth. We are in danger of stabbing life to death in order to grasp it. 
Love and magic speak of a different kind of power that does not need to 
be tamed or framed by analysis. And yet it is crucial we develop a way 
of talking about love and magic that affords their public recognition in 
the construction of the world. Just because love and the magical cannot 
be framed by the scientific approach, it does not mean that we cannot 
talk about them. Such a dialog is essential if we are going to develop 
a paradigm that will supplant the normal scientific order of things. 
It was Wharf (1956) who argued we must develop ways of communicating 
that overcome the strict scientific assumptions contained in our very 
conceptions of what "thought•• is. He felt that science had mistaken the 
grammar and syntax of Western language, with its subject-predicate/ 
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actor-object/cause-effect bias, for the world. He envisioned a new lan-
guage which might transpose the confines of Aristotlean logic to the 
multiplicities of the dreamer. 
This is also the basis of much of Jungian psychology (Jung, 1964). 
Jung said that the crucial problem ·Of our age is the recovery of the 
intuitive, 11 feminine" aspects of self and culture. Rationality and our 
"Tower of Babel" word-abstractions have advanced so far that we 
neglected and left behind the intuitive, non-rational aspects of self. 
The intuitive and the .. feminine" must now advance and "catch up" with 
the rational, scientific world we have created. The advance and devel-
opment of the intuitive must then supplant our description and way of 
talking about the world. If Science and Western culture at this stage 
were to advance without recovering the intuitive, then it would leave 
behind the person and the self. 
Mills (1959) in The Sociological Imagination made the distinction 
between .. rationality" and "reason ... Rationality is mistaking a method 
of thinking (i.e., the scientific method) for thinking itself. It is 
categorical but does not produce reason. Reason is the ability to 
think; it is not dependent on an a priori method of thought. Freedom 
involves the self•s capacity to make judgments based on experience. It 
is not a pre-determined pattern, but the emergence of insight. In our 
~ge, we have mistakenly assumed a parallel between rationality and 
reason, when in fact they are opposite poles. To forego allegiance to 
the scientific method does not mean that we have abandoned thinking and 
reason. 
If we are to develop a paradigm of humanistic values, we must not 
allow a method of thought to dictate our thinking. To study love and 
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the magical --which is the essence of the humanistic conception of man 
-- we must find ways of approaching our task that are consistent with 
our subject. To re-vision society in ways that will promote humanistic 
values, we must re-order our theory of the social world. We must not 
make love and the magical fit our methods, but construct methods that 
accommodate love and magic. Our knowledge of love and the magical is in 
such a poor state of affairs precisely because the human disciplines 
have chosen to model themselves after science. We have forgotten that 
science is opposed to these values at its very core. 
As was argued in the second chapter, the history of Western thought 
has been a movement away from knowledge strategies that embrace "the 
Good" and towards strategies which seek to find "the truth." The scien-
tific approach has gradually obscured love from view -- especially as a 
practical path in the world. Intuitively it makes a great deal of sense 
to talk about love as a "reverse image" of science. While it is proba-
bly important not to carry this metaphor too far, it does provide an 
interesting starting point for an articulation of a love paradigm. 
As discussed, science has five major characteristics: 
1. Objectivity, Detachment 
2. Doubt, Testing 
3. Power, Prediction, Control 
4. Experimental, Artificial 
5. Value free. 
One can begin to develop a love paradigm by extrapolating a 
dialectic with science: 
Objectivity, Detachment -- Love is a collapse of boundaries; an 
"entering into ... It is an involvement: an interaction where "1 11 and 
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"not-I" intermingle and meet. Love takes place on this shifting bound-
ary back and forth. 
Doubt, Testing --Love is based on trust, belief, and faith. It is 
not satisfied with what "is," it is a commitment that even if love is 
found lacking, to create it. 
Power, Prediction, Control Love involves "letting go" and sur-
rendering to an outcome. It hopes and seeks to influence, and yet it is 
unexpectable, unobligated, and uncontrolled. It resembles the "free 
gift" of grace. For 1 ove to enter, ego must recede. 
Experimental, Artificial --While love is playful, it is not arti-
ficial or experimental. It involves entering into the moment in full 
reality. 
Value-free We are as far from the value free approach as 
possible. Love is the heart of meaning. 
Love does not fit the scientific dynamic. It is magical. Love at 
its core is akin to the earlier tradition of magic. Love is not part of 
the scientific paradigm, but of the magical view of reality. The use of 
the work "magic" might be criticized by those who feel that it might 
threaten the credibility of the humanistic enterprise. Yet I have not 
chosen the word "magic" lightly. Oespite the false allusions and the 
difficulties it encounters, magic is precisely the right word. Science 
declared war against magic; and it was precisely the "magical view" of 
reality that science has historically sought to replace. 
Roszak (1975) showed how science specifically sought to move from a 
sacred basis of culture to a secular one. This moved culture from a 
foundation of myth, magic, and mystery to one emphasizing history, tech-
nology, and reason. With scientific reality, 
••• in place of myth, we have history. In place of magic, 
technology. In place of mystery~eason. Here, then, we have 
a second, inverted triangle -- a profane triangle whose orien-
tation is toward the Earth and away from transcendent exper-
ience • • • • The transformation is blunt and bold: one 
Reality Principle knocking its predecessor for a loop ••• 
the great reversal has been the total secularization of cul~ 
ture 1n mind and deed -w certainly the most-potent, daring, 
and original project of modern times, as well as the most dis-
tinctive historical contr1but1on of Western society (Rozak, 
1975, pp. 159-160). [Italics Original] 
It was the mystical conception of reality that science wished to 
sweep from view. If we want to view love and magic as more than just 
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curious appendages to the scientific reality, then it is necessary to 
re-open the old schism between science and humanistic values. This is 
particularly true because science has a tendency to circumscribe our 
humanistic efforts: re-package them to use as technologies for its own 
advance. There is no appreciation for the fact that by such a process 
something crucial is lost. What is lost is the humanistic ethos! 
This is nowhere more evident than with many of the new techniques 
for personal and social transformation that have emerged from popular 
psychology. Suddenly, we have a science interested in the functions of 
the 11 right side of the brain. 11 It is as if science had suddenly real-
ized it had forgotten to appropriate a number of items to its vision. 
We have what might be called the territorialization of the right side -
of the brain. The traditional sciences now move in haste to quicken the 
maturity of the "immature .. social sciences. Science seeks to circum-
scribe these right brain (i.e., intuitive) functions and turn them into 
technologies. The scientific strategy has been merely to enscribe the 
new "right-brain" technologies into the scientific vision and then 
return to business as usual. The realization that these .. technologies" 
contain a grammar and syntax drastically different from the scientific 
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paradigm goes unnoticed. Much of the impetus behind each particular 
technique is quickly diffused and routinized. The skin of science grows 
over the schism leaving a scar. And in our day, little of the scien-
tific covering remains unscared. 
Technologies of Love and Magic 
The conversion of attempts to address love and the magical into te-
chnologies has become the major way of dealing with humanistic efforts. 
Science can then return to the business of making the world as if noth-
ing happened. Love and magic are routinized as new techniques within 
the system. To complicate matters, many humanists have played into this 
game and even encouraged it. Eager for status and credibility within 
the scientific community, they have sought to HpackageH their views in 
ways that scientists might easily understand and incorporate in their 
framework. They have argued for their humanistic views in ways that 
would be marketable to the larger audience -- Western culture. Indeed, 
for example, we find McGregor (1960)1 seeking to sell humanistic values 
to management by referring to love as a Hhygiene factor.H 
Such is an understandable metaphor: just like failure to have 
breakfast, if one does not get their love Hneeds" met before going to 
work, it will interfere with the day's work. Despite the attractiveness 
of such expedient marketing approaches for encouraging executives to pay 
attention to the human side of enterprise, such an approach seriously 
diminishes our understanding. Love is not a hygiene factor -- it is the 
!McGregor's work is frontier breaking for management theory; Maslow 
uses his work extensively; there is a humanistic tone to his effort. 
haps if we were but initiated into the secret, we would be able to read 
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active component in the creation of meaning. 
Even for those who would wish to avoid the scientific approach, the 
traps which are inherent in any effort to avoid the scientific method 
are subtle. And it is difficult to outgrow the scientific mind set. 
The popular culture is always clammering for some new way of remedying 
our situations. It becomes easy to technologize love. Love becomes 
translated into power in the scientific mode. And if the humanist does 
not turn the effort into a technology, then often the media does. 
We are a culture craving instant techniques for love and mean-
ing. We seek techniques in the cause and effect mode. Have not we been 
raised to expect that Science will provide us with "push-button" tech .. 
niques for love? In high school, we can all remember our eagerness to 
learn techniques which would make us lovable. If only we had the right 
clothes or memorized the right phrases, then love would surely come our 
way. Unfortunately, as we have matured to adulthood, most of us have 
not given up the desire to find such a formula. We have changed our 
"outfits" --down to even the houses and the cars we "wear" and the club 
we join. We have a new rendition of catch phrases, ways of "being," and 
~motional recipes that will solve our problems. Yet, there appears to 
be no shortcut to intimacy. The "horrible" truth is there are no quick 
psychological techniques that will return us to wholeness. As Fromm 
{1968, p. 88) wrote: "There are no psychological shortcuts to the solu-
tion of the identity crisis except the fundamental transformation of 
alienated man into living man." 
When it comes to relationship, we are all novices. We are breaking 
new ground each time. Yet the 11 little scientist" in all of us wonders 
from time to time if perhaps the world is not "color-coded" that 
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perhaps if we were but initiated into the secret, we would be able to 
read situations and operate in them masterfully. We have demanded such 
techniques from our social science and rushed towards each new gimmick 
for intimacy much as we would try a new fad. But this all belies and 
covers up the real problem. Love cannot be technologized. Even with 
those insights which do work, if we turn them into techniques and ready-
made steps/programs, they become but parodies of themselves. 
A technique is foolproof. You step into it. It makes no difference 
who the user is, what their motivations are or their level of understand-
ing. A light-switch is operated equally well by a genius, a moron, a 
saint, or a criminal. You turn it on and turn it off. We have come to 
expect such devices. Science has courted the inception of such fool-
proof techniques. But there are no foolproof solutions to the major 
problems of existence. If, indeed, we are fools, then nothing will save 
us. 
However, encouraged by science, we have shunned such wisdom and 
sought a type of "knowledge" which allows us the knower to remain essen-
tially unchanged. We would like merely to "plug into" techniques without 
ever having to change ourselves. "Indeed," as Fromm (1968, p. 95) said, 
"what most people would like is to be aggressive, competitive, maximally 
successful in the market, liked by everybody and at the same time tender, 
loving, and a person of integrity." We neglect to observe that the prob-
lems may stem from our own value structures, wishes, and desires. 
"This lack of ethical engagement reflects a corresponding lack of 
knowledge of those truths which most profoundly change the knower and 
thus cause life to transcend itself" (Roberts, 1982, p. 189). By 
searching for push-button techniques for love, we have once again 
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aligned ourselves to the mechanistic approach of the scientific world 
view. Such techniques {and the separation of the knower and what is 
known) are luxuries that we can ill afford. Such a strategy obscures 
and further postpones our understanding of love. This eagerness to cast 
any insights which we may have upon intimacy into scientific techniques 
tend to obscure and pollute the understanding of love that we do have. 
Fad-like techniques of intimacy then become a mock theater of the 
intimate. 
For example, humanistic psychology has found that authenticity is a 
crucial component for meaningful interaction -- a prelude to synergy and 
significant involvement. Popularized, however, we find this insight 
translated into almost a normative compulsion "to be real." It is 
carried to its logical extreme in the status-like charade of "I'm more 
real than you. 11 Such a reaction completely misses the point. Authen-
ticity emphasizes that if one is secure and open, such transparency act-
ually works itself out in meaningful relationship. One does not have to 
mechanistically play the "game" to achieve interpersonally. 
The above is by no means a random example. It represents in a very 
crucial sense how humanistic psychology and the counterculture movement 
were routinized into popular fads that could then be dissipated by the 
larger marketplace mentality. The larger culture responded to the coun-
terculture by mass producing its symbols and packaging its techniques. 
The human potential movement was safely relegated to weekend retreats 
for affluent business people -- addressing problems of individual con-
sciousness but leaving intact the social structure which had produced 
these problems. The Scientific culture technologizes and then moves on 
looking for new worlds to conquer. Humanistic efforts are thus 
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routinized to the world of Science with its neutral values and foolproof 
technologies. Unless .we realize the pervasiveness of this process, 
humanistic efforts to base culture on love and the magical are doomed to 
failure. They become but adjacent commodities marketed like any other. 
Treated in this manner, love becomes but another item in the bag of 
tricks which we acquire and use to manipulate people. The magical 
becomes only something we stage to overpower people and get something 
that we want. We have exchanged "love as world view 11 for "love as a 
scientific, mechanistic technique.~ Such mechanization of love further 
estranges us from the world and those very ways that could heal the 
split. By subverting the sacred world of humanistic values to a secular 
scientific technology, we are changing not only the 11 internaP world of 
the human heart, but the world itself. 
The alarming thing is, he said, that this time it isn't 
the changeable things that are changing, but the unchange-
able as well. Anyhow, that's the danger-- even for me. Not 
only dress and manners and bank balances and the social order, 
but the sea and the sky. 
The sea, the sky ••• not only the sky and the sea are in 
question. The song of birds, firelight and sunlight, the 
woods, the turn of the season, the earth itself and the smell 
of it, the whole natural magic going on behind our little 
journey from the cradle to the grave. Well, you have to 
choose. What are they? Are they still what they have always 
been: the perspective of our mortality and, for some of us, 
an emblem or at least an analogy of our immortality? Or have 
they become, as it were, infected by our impermanence? Are 
they little more than a stage-setting to our personal and 
social drama? It's a question of relationship and our view of 
that relationship. Are we related to them at all, as mankind 
has always supposed? Is the earth that we touch a part of 
ourselves, or has it become just a thing we walk on, like 
pavement? Are we becoming, in our consciousness, separated 
from the stars -- as indifferent to them as we are to electric 
chandeliers in the lounge of a hotel? Are we being driven, or 
driving ourselves, into exile from the unity of nature? It is 
a simple question (Van Den Berg, 1961, pp. 235-236). 
Van Den Berg (1961) commented: 
The answer to this 'simple question• is less simple ••• 
primarily because the answer from the present, the answer from 
the middle of the twentieth century, is lacking. The answer 
is important; it inaugurates the recovery of a fatal 
separation (p. 236). 
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The scientific vision has pushed to the edge of its frontier and is 
now standing on the pinnacle of its success. By ignoring the difficult 
questions of values and human consciousness, science has been able to 
shape a world by separating mind from matter. The scientific self-
fulfilling prophecy has been an overwhelming success: it declared the 
world to be an object separate from the realm of the human and proceeded 
to study this world apart from human values, purposes, and participa-
tion. Any attempt to include human involvement was accused of being 
anthropomorphic. The world was gradually shaped and carved to this 
vision. With such objectification, few noticed that magic and wonder 
had been chased from view. 
With the scientific consciousness, the world itself changed. The 
mechanical scientific metaphors gradually replaced the metaphors of 
Nature -- and the world was shaped to this new artificial image. A walk 
in the woods no longer meant what it once had: children marched out 
from the classroom not to smell a flower but to count its petals; the 
trees became timber; the rocks became mineral resources, and the forest 
itself changed. It was logged and paved and cities with factories were 
erected on the most scenic spots. The world was made manageable and 
fitted to the scientific vision. All that did not fit into the scien-
tific view was minimized or trivialized. Gradually, also the human 
elements were also changed. There was no longer a place for them in 
this scientific world. Religion became a soothing opiate and love was 
deemed expedient. 
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Perhaps none were more graphic in describing this change than the 
American Indians. They saw the approaching scientific civilization 
changing both the landscape and their world. Ohiyesat an Indian writer, 
said: 
As a child I understood how to give; I have forgotten this 
grace since I became civilized. I lived the natural life, 
whereas I now live the artificial. Any pretty pebble was val-
uable to me then; every growing tree an object of reverence. 
Now I worship with the white man before a painted landscape 
whose only value is estimated in dollars! Thus the Indian is 
reconstructed, as the natural rocks are ground to powder and 
made into artificial blocks which may be built into the walls 
of modern society '(Mcluhan, 1971, n.p.). 
The scientific view of the human as separate from nature was not 
only taught in this new frontier, but its view was implemented. Things 
which did not fit into the scientific vision were relegated to the 
"interior" nature of man. Van Den Berg (1961) argues that the con-
sciousness of the "individiual" was changed when all that did not con-
firm the scientific reality was swept into the interior regions. We are 
fascinated by those "psychological" regions-- belief, feelings, percep-
tions -- because they are so vastly different from the physical reality. 
Yet, while we were fascinated by those things of the "psyche" that had 
not yet been tamed by science, the landscape itself-- the world --
changed. They became things of science -- separate from the human. 
Human beings were left alienated from the world, and lacking any 
"realistic" canopy which would cover the human, were soon alienated from 
each other. Not only did we think and deal with the world in scientific 
terms, but the world was deemed identical with these scientific terms. 
A value-neutral science was incapable of providing us with a world which 
contained meaning. Value-free techniques framed a world where human 
purpose and values were seen as separate from the natural process. 
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Alienated from the world and from life itself, we were somehow strangers 
to the whole process. 
Science sought a 11 knowledge 11 of nature separate from the human 
"observer." It achieved such a vision and legislated such a world. 
There was no place for the human except as a consumer for the playthings 
of technology. Humans were left alienated --a consumer and not a 
producer separate from the means of production and not able to feel 
involved in the process at all. The self-fulfilling prophecy of science 
had been realized at a terrible cost. This separation of the human from 
nature was worse than even the earlier mind-body split. Now, not only 
did the spirit have no place to dwell, but it was a "freak 11 of the 
universe-- an anomaly: a 11 psychological" curiosity. 
The world had changed and we did not feel at home in it. Our way of 
viewing each other became colored by the scientific lens. The scienti-
fie view was translated into reality. Reason had replaced mystery, his-
tory had replaced myth, and technology had replaced magic. Science had 
succeeded in constructing a world without regard to human values or 
purpose. With such an objectivity, the human element could only appear 
as an anomaly: a "freak" exception in an otherwise natural process. 
Scientific rationality prevails in our world. Science has not taken 
us on wings to heaven, but has left us estranged. Mills (1969, p. 165) 
wrote that 11 We are at the ending of what is called The Modern Age... We 
have learned from the Enlightenment that .. increased rationality may not 
be assumed to make for increased freedom ... 
Science, it turns out, is not a technological Second Coming. 
That its techniques and its rationality are given a central 
place in a society does not mean that men live reasonably and 
without myth, fraud and superstition ••• The increasing 
rationalization of society, the contradiction between such 
rationality and reason, the collapse of the assumed 
coincidence of reason and freedom -- these developments lie 
back of the rise into view of the man who is 'with' 
rationality but without reason, who is increasingly self-
rationalized and also increasingly uneasy. It is in terms of 
this type of man that the contemporary problem of freedom is 
best stated • • • • 
From the individual's standpoint, much that happens seems the 
result of manipulation, of management, of blind drift ••• 
Given these effects of the ascendant rationalization, the 
individual 'does the best he can.' He gears his aspirations 
and his work to the situation he is in, and from which he can 
find no way out. In due course, he does not seek a way out: 
he adapts. That part of his life which is left over from 
work, he uses to play, to consume, 'to have fun.' Yet this 
sphere of consumption is also being rationalized. Alienated 
from production, from work, he is also alienated from 
consumption, from genuine leisure (Mills, 1959, p. 168). 
Man becomes alienated from life. Mills (1959) continued his 
indictment: 
In our time, what is at issue is the very nature of man, the 
image we have of his limits and possibilities as man. History 
is not yet done with its exploration of the limits and mean-
ings of 'human nature.' We do not know how profound man's 
psychological transformation from the Modern Age to the con-
temporary epoch may be. But we must now raise the question in 
an ultimate form: Prnong contemporary men will there come to 
prevail, or even to flourish, what may be called The Cheerful 
Robot? Back of all this ••• there lies the simple 
and decisive fact that the alienated man is the antithesis of 
the Western image of the free man. The society in which this 
man, this cheerful robot, flourishes is the antithesis of the 
free society (p. 171). 
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We must not underestimate the role that technology played in this 
process of alienation. It often seems that the humanistic vision just 
short-circuited even at its highest peaks. This will remain the case as 
long as we approach humanism from a scientific, technological framework. 
The technological approach contains an internal grammar that is funda-
mentally at odds with the spirit of humanism. 
Science assumes we need to be in control of our environment. We 
can then manipulate one variable or another to produce the "desired" 
effects. Unless we can eliminate outside variables and standardize 
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internal variables, phenomena are not amenable to study using the scien-
tific method. To produce scientific techniques, we must first assume 
control. A technique can then function as a mechanism much as a light 
switch. A technique is at our command. As long as it is in working 
order, we need not concern ourselves with understanding its internal 
mechanism. If we seek techniques of love and magic, then we are seeking 
techniques that we can command without having to understand the process 
of love or the magical. We can then turn them "off 11 or 11 0n 11 with no 
more regard for understanding the workings of love than we have for 
understanding the workings of a light switch. 
This is not to say that benefits do not accrue from love. However, 
these are benefits from a way of living and are not to be cast in the 
vein of scientific techniques. They are not mechanisms where one 
presses a lever to get a desired result, but integrated structural com-
ponents of a way of life. The benefits of love do not occur on command 
or by manipulation. They are more like 11 free gifts .. -- related to a way 
of being -- closer in kind to the religious idea of a "gift of grace" 
than to cause and effect. Indeed, if love is manipulated or obligated, 
we say that that isn•t love. The complicating aspect of the techno-
logical conversion of love and magic is that, having been raised in a 
scientific culture, our minds have been indoctrinated to think in this 
way. We want to find the switch. 
The use of love and the magical as techniques -- as means rather 
than ends changes them considerably. It is the conversion of love 
and magic into neutral technologies that invites the con artist, the 
evil magician, and the manipulative lover. If love and the magical were 
techniques, then the strategy of "loving a little to get what you want" 
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becomes reasonable. However, it is a question here of commitment. Is a 
person committed to love as a technique for getting what they want or as 
a way of knowing life? Love works in strange ways. We will never know 
for sure beforehand whether the person we are relating to is using love 
as an attitude, or employing it as a technique. Thus, love and the 
magical ·- and attempts to create the Good --will always be interfaced 
with the possibility of the con artist. 
It is in such a discussion of technology that the problem of "good 
vs. evil" might be focused upon most effectively. For it is precisely 
at the moment when we are the most trusting, open and loving that we are 
the most vulnerable to the con artist•s "switch ... Love is always a 
risk. To seek techniques that eliminate the possibility of risk, mis-
understands love. 
We might do well here to follow the classic legends and make a dis-
tinction between the ••good magician" and the 11 bad magician ... Roszak 
(1969) wrote: 
••• what significant difference is there between cultures 
based on scientific and visionary experience? The difference 
is real and it is critical. It requires that we make a dis-
tinction between good and bad magic -- a line that can be 
crossed in any culture ••• and which has been crossed in 
ours with the advent of technology. 
Good magic opens the mysteries to all; bad magic seeks simply 
to mystify. The object of the bad magician is to monopolize 
knowledge of the hidden reality (or simply to counterfeit it) 
and to use the monopoly to befuddle or cow. The bad magician 
-- in the form of the priest or the expert -- strives to 
achieve the selfish advantage of status or reward precisely by 
restricting access to the great powers he purports to 
control. Something of the distinction that I am making 
survives in the Catholic Church•s concept of simony, the sin 
against the Holy Ghost. The simoniac priest who uses his 
privileged control of the sacraments for personal gain is, by 
the teachings of the Church, committing the blackest of 
sins (pp. 260-261). 
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The doctrine of cause and effect restricts experience: it does not 
require understanding or exploring the mysteries. An "expert" who has 
mastered a body of knowledge can always pull a "switch", turn it into 
technique, and use it for fair or foul. 
The religious leader Ram Dass (1977) told a story that further 
illustrates this distinction. He compares "enlightenment" to a roulette 
wheel where one accumulates more and more "winnings." As the stakes 
become higher and higher, there is always the temptation to pick up your 
chips and go somewhere else. Love and affection are always readily 
--
exchangeable in the surrounding marketplace for power, for status, or 
for personal gain. 
It is a question of commitment: a trust that one has placed their 
stakes in the right place, and a faith that love is the right path. 
Without trust and a commitment to the process of love, even the highest 
saint can always convert "winnings" into technologies to exchange for 
something else. The problem of the con artist and the good and bad 
magician thus remains forever unsolvable. In a Hindu legend, the 
"Devil" and "God" were once partners, but the "Devil" did not trust the 
process and pulled out at the last moment: evil originates from an 
inability to maintain commitment to the process. 
We have even sought to technologize God and turn prayer into a 
push-button technology for achieving what we want. Fromm (1956) con-
eluded a chapter on "Love and Its Disintegration in Contemporary Western 
Society" with the following comments: 
In the religious revival of recent times, the belief in God 
has been transformed into a psychological device to make one 
better fitted for the competitive struggle • • • • The best-
seller in the year 1938, Dale Carnegie•s How to Win Friends 
and Influence People, remained on a strictly secular level. 
What was the function of Carnegie's book at that time is the 
function of our greatest best-seller today, The Power of 
Positive Thinking by the Reverend N. v. Peale. In this 
religious 6ooR it is not even questioned whether our dominant 
concern with success is in itself in accordance with the 
spirit of religion. On the contrary, this supreme aim is 
never doubted, but belief in God and prayer is recommended as 
a means to increase one's ability to be successful. Just as 
modern psychiatrists recommend happiness of the employee, in 
order to be more appealing to customers, some ministers 
recommend love of God in order to be more successful. 'Make 
God your partner' means to make God a partner in business, 
rather than to become one with Him in love, justice, and 
truth (pp. 88-89). 
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Religion and prayer can then be readily circumscribed by the 
prevailing scientific culture and turned into technologies. This is the 
strategy of the black magician. Love becomes a technique and prayers 
become commands. God is harnessed to technology just like any other 
resource. Such strategy thoroughly implies a misunderstanding of the 
humanistic spirit. Yet this tendency to deal with the humanistic vision 
in technological terms is precisely what we see occurring time and time 
again. Humanistic efforts were thus short-circuited. If we convert the 
humanistic ethos into technologies, we have hedged our bets, manipulated 
our commitment and once again enthroned science. 
We must acknowledge that love is not a mechanism that can be 
repaired when defective so that rewards will come on cue. We can never 
be sure about the course of love. The poet Gibran {1923) wrote: 
••• think not you can direct the course of love, for love, 
if it finds you worthy, directs your course •• 
When love beckons to you, following him, though his ways are 
hard and steep • • • • For even as love crowns you so shall 
he crucify you. Even as he is for your growth so is he for 
your pruning. Even as he ascends to your height and caresses 
your tenderest branches that quiver in the sun, so shall he 
descend to your roots and shake them in their clinging to the 
earth •••• 
• • • But if in your fear you would seek only love's peace and 
love's pleasure, then it is better for you that you cover your 
nakedness and pass out of love's threshing-floor, into the 
seasonless world where you shall laugh, but not all of your 
laughter, and weep, but not all of your tears (p. 11). 
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Love is an "entering into"-- it is a "letting go." Love is a com-
mitment to a process. cne is over "one•s head," and never quite in 
control. With love, one risks vulnerability. If a person touches 
another deeply, they both are touched. To reach a person at their core, 
you must allow that person to also reach your core. It is not a matter 
of one person controlling and manipulating the other: both are involved 
in an experience of great depth. One person can always withdraw-- you 
have allowed them that power. There are no guarantees. 
It is the miracle of love that authenticity, openness, and vulner-
ability can lead to response. The benefits which can be related to 
love, trust, and the magical are part of a larger structural complex. 
They cannot be readily abstracted or turned into tools. They occur 
together as components of a process. If we convert them into "means" to 
obtain an end, they loose their depth. Indeed, following Kant, much of 
humanism might be summarized in the idea that people should be treated 
as ends in themselves rather than merely means to an end. If we seek 
technologies that control people, then we have significantly diminished 
our idea of the human. Humanism implies that we emphasize the full 
human potential rather than reduce others to smaller role-like versions 
for our use. 
Love is always a risk because if we allow people their full human-
ness, we cannot predict and control the outcomes. Here, Becker (1968) 
made a distinction similar to Roszak•s concept of the good and the bad 
magician. 
mostly people approach each other from the point of view 
of their roles, rather than as whole beings •••• They have, 
in effect, subverted the possibilities of their total being to 
the narrow interest of action and uncritical survival •••• 
The question posed by any cultural game is the question about 
higher and lower esthetics -- about 'good' art and 'bad' 
art ••• whereas true esthetics should liberate man, develop 
his freedom, and further his whole self, 'everyday' esthetics 
sacrifices most of the total man to a mere part, to the part 
that must convey the sliver of conviction necessary to sustain 
the ongoing cultural game •••• 
• • • But 'higher' esthetics is precisely that; it calls more of 
man's spirit into play, releases more of the inner personality 
and brings it to ~ear upon the world • 
• • • The problem, inescapably, is a social one. We have 
destroyed the interhuman in our time simply because we have 
refused to implement social forms which would liberate 
man ••• (p. 273). 
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''When science opted out of life and objectivized man, scientists of 
course lost the possibility of seeing any mystery at all in man, of see-
lng any heightening being, even in secular terms" (p. 267). 
Such reduction of man destroys the spirit of humanism. If we 
reduce man to a "means" and deal only with the version we can manipu-
late, then we have lost our humanistic intent. We have substituted bad 
art for good -- the bad magician for the good. 
The Difference Between the Humanistic 
and Scientific Power 
The distinction between the paradigm of technology/science and the 
paradigm of love and the magical brings us to a discussion of the 
difference between scientific power and the humanistic version. Perhaps 
in no other respect is the difference between the paradigms so flagrant. 
Technology does not require that we enter into a process and 
understand it: only that we withdraw and manipulate. Conversely, love 
is a commitment to a process in hope that we will gain a sense of 
oneness with love and life. It is this "security of harmonious 
partnership with nature [that] ••• is a glimmer of the good old magic'' 
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(Roszak, 1975, p. 168). As a recent poet expressed it, "magic is no 
instrument, magic is the end." It is "aliveness" which the humanistic 
vision wishes to embrace. 
God is Alive, Magic is Afoot. 
God is Afoot, Magic is Alive. 
Alive is Afoot. Magic never died • 
Though His death was published 
Round and round the world, 
The heart did not believe ••• 
Magic is Afoot. God moves. 
Alive is Afoot. Alive is in command. 
Many weak men hungered, 
Many strong men thrived; 
Though they boast of solitude, 
God was at their side ••• 
Magic is Afoot. It cannot come to harm. 
It rests in an empty palm. 
It spawns in an empty mind. 
But Magic is no instrument. 
Magic is the end. 
Many men drove magic, but magic stayed behind. 
Many strong men lied; 
They only passed through magic and out the 
other side. 
Many weak men lied; 
They came to God in secret and though 
they left Him nourished, 
They would not say Who healed. 
Though mountains danced before them, 
They said that God was dead. 
Though His shrouds were hoisted, 
The naked God did live ••• 
This I mean to laugh with in my mind. 
This I mean my mind to serve 
'til service is but Magic moving 
through the world, 
And mind itself is Magic coarsing through 
the flesh, 
And flesh itself is Magic dancing on a clock, 
And time itself, the Magic length of God.2 
The magical version of love seeks to embrace the Magic. Love is 
not technology, love is magic. Humanism seeks to move past role-like 
2Excerpts from a poem by Leonard Cohen. 
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theories of man to embrace instead the creature who is moving on the 
hands of time itself. 
This is a different system of meaning than the scientific heroism 
which would rule and control. The humanist seeks to become part of 
knowledge. Roszak (1975, p. 165) wrote that while the word "magic" 
might give "the phrase a more unorthodox turn than Martin Buber would 
have approved, his !-Thou relationship is the essential quality of the 
magical vision." 
Since magic frequently takes the form of a petition for favor 
or a rite towards some natural force, it is easy to mistake 
its aim as power • • • • What authentic magic seeks, however, 
is not power, but security -- the security of being at one 
with nature, of moving receptively with its grain and sharing 
its purposes. What is it that true magicians are after? A 
state of being, not a method of manipulation • • • But 
besides the security that comes of trust and cooperation, 
there is also the security that comes --or seems to come 
of domination, provided our ability to dominate can be made 
absolute. This is the image of security that seduces us into 
wanting another sort of power -- forcing-power. Here again 
the demonic has a shrewd trick to-pTay us. ft convinces us 
that security can be gained sooner through force than trust. 
Especially when we become afraid in crisis, grow rigid and 
lose our adaptability, the appeal of forcing-power can be 
irresistible. Once our connection with nature ceases to be a 
respectful relationship between person and person and becomes 
the relationship of human master to alien thing, then we have 
a very different kind of magic: black magic, the magic of 
evil sorcerers who have no wish tOlknow ~nature of things; 
they only use it for selfish advantage-{Roszak, 1975, pp. 166-
167). [ItaTTcs Original] 
The benefits of love occur 11 as if by magic. 11 They are outcomes of 
a shared purpose. At times, these gifts may even be asked for, but such 
invitations are categorically different from a technique which commands 
a given effect. The magician, as the lover, asks, invites, courts. The 
technological scientist commands, manipulates, and seeks to control. 
The difference between a humanistic version and a scientific 
version of power might be truly illustrative here. The scientist seeks 
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to control, force, and eliminate risk. The humanist emphasizes respect 
and invitation. The humanist treats love as a gift that cannot be com-
manded, but which ''magically" is given. Love and compassion cannot be 
obligated or expected --they border on the miraculous. The scientist 
attempts to grasp the process. The humanist knows not from where love 
comes or where it goes, but that it is a spring from which we have 
drawn. Unlike the scientist who may initially begin with such data col-
lection before converting it into technique, the humanist desires to 
~~~the process without turning it into shorthand. Scientists followed 
Bacon's attempt to temper knowledge into power. The humanist sees power 
as useless unless it promotes us to knowledge. 
Here, we encounter an odd paradox. A humanist might well define 
power as the ability to let go: to enter into the situation and allow 
one's full self to come into play. Power would then be more closely 
related to strength: the security to let the lines of self drop without 
worrying about losing one's self. Power could then be construed as the 
ability to enter fully into the moment --a capacity to bear risks. 
Humanistic power is akin to the ability to be vulnerable and trans-
parent: to let yourself go. In such a relaxed atmosphere, one draws 
more fully on creative powers. One is capable of influencing a situa-
tion with much more "power" than afforded by manipulation. It is this 
entering into the present while suspending determination of outcomes 
which is the prerequisite of influence. 
Influence is always potentially mutual and thus involves a risk. 
By entering fully into the present, we allow the future to escape from 
our predetermined mold. It is only by letting go of a predetermined 
future that we can hope to attain influence. This is a difficult task 
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for the mind. And yet, if we are to desire humanism, then we must allow 
for a plurality of actors. We cannot reduce human beings to prescribed 
futures. And this pluralism cannot be circumscribed and controlled. 
Humanism refuses to conceive of human beings as smaller role-like ver-
sions which can then be manipulated. This, as Becker (1968, p. 364) 
notes, "takes a strong person because it means opting for man as an end, 
and this means introducing indeterminancy into the world." It is only 
by such faith in the human spirit and refusal to violate the fundamental 
human components that we can hope to speak of humanism. The humanist 
trusts in the power of love to transform situations and understandings. 
This power of love cannot be "scripted 11 in advance -- at least not 
in a scientific version of controlled outcomes. It requires moving past 
a symbolic, abstracted version of love and allowing love to occur on its 
own. The humanist foregoes manipulation trusting in a larger direction 
and power. The humanistic power does not seek to force, but seeks to 
court and invite. It is compelling in the sense of an aspiration of the 
heart, yet one may refuse its invitation. 
The humanistic power is close to the child-like sense of playing 
where one•s power is discovered and created in action. As with play, 
discovery is often greater than what would have been expected. While 
scientific power must rely upon the rationally preconceived, play allows 
the creative an opportunity to blossom. In this spirit of openness, one 
finds solutions and influence which could not have been predicted. 
Influence invokes a sense of play which then shapes the world. This 
deeper awareness is powerful because it embraces a way of being which 
seems preferable. It is this open invitation that people aspire to 
follow. 
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One courts by bringing joy, aliveness, and understanding into the 
moment. With a sense of awe and quiet wonder, one invites the other 
into the gentleness of laughter and the security of joy. Through 
respect, one courts social arrangements which will be beneficial to all. 
This concern for the human is paramount to motives and goals. The 
-humanistic power is a faith which hopes the magic will appear: that a 
creative power will be released bringing the situation into focus and 
influencing it in the desired direction. Sometimes this happens. Some-
times it does not. Yet even when the humanistic power does not work, the 
humanist cannot retreat to another strategy. The humanist can only set 
the stage, court the 11 muse 11 , and extend an invitation. He or she may 
emphasize and confront, but the humanist will not take by force. 
The scientific power will seek to force an outcome at any cost with 
no regard for the pollution created by such coercion. However, if the 
humanist tries to take the Other by force, the very essence of the 
humanistic vision is lost. To court by force is closer to rape than to 
love. The secrets we wished to unfold remain unfulfilled. If we must 
force love, then it is not love. If we must trick or swindle or in other 
ways try to coerce love to render its fruits, then we will never be quite 
satisfied with their sweetness. 
Perhaps it is because we have conceived of love as a gift and thus 
outside of our control that we find it so valuable. Love that can be 
bought or forced is only a pretense. Real love is similar to a free 
gift. Those seeking scientific and technological ways of controlling and 
predicting love will never be satisfied with their results for love will 
slip through their grasp. Love is not a force which we can chain to our 
intentions. We must all remember that at times there has been nothing 
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that we could do to 11 Win 11 a love. And at other times, we have been loved 
far beyond anything we could have ever predicted. 
Humanistic Power 
The power of love is vastly different from the power of science and 
technology. This is the key to our understanding of love and the prob-
lems that have been encountered trying to fit it to a scientific 
framework. 
Love is related to growth. But we cannot force love or successfully 
barter, steal, or manipulate it. Buscaglia in his popular account Love 
shows a clear understanding. He illustrates the relation of love to a 
different view of power. It cannot be framed as science and technology 
yet still remain love: 
Love is ••• not a thing in the sense that it cannot be 
bought or sold or weighed or measured. Love can only be 
given, expressed freely. It can't be captured or held, for 
its neither there to tie nor to hold (Buscaglia, 1972, p. 107) • 
. There are people available for purchase, the body and 
mind in the name of love. But it's only a self-deceiver who 
believes that love can truly be bought. He may buy another's 
body, his time, his earthly possessions, but he will never buy 
his love. One may choose to pretend love for a price. This 
is a dramatic art which has been perfected by many to the 
extent to which it is impossible for anyone to discern the 
deceit. But this game of playing love is not easy. The cost 
is great and never worth the price. 
Love cannot be captured or tied to a wall. Love only slips 
through the chains. If love wills to take another course, it 
goes; and all the prisons, guards, chains or obstructions in 
the world aren't strong enough to detain it for a second. If 
one human being ceases to will to grow in love with another, 
the other may play several parts to hold him. He may become a 
villain and threaten him; he may become generous and offer him 
gifts; he may become crafty and trick him into remaining, or 
he may change his own 'self' to meet the other's needs. But 
whatever he does, the other's love is gone and he will 
receive, for all his energies, only an empty body, devoid of 
love -- all but dead. So the price for his efforts will be to 
live out his life holding on desperately and giving his love 
to a lifeless, loveless human frame. This, though it may seem 
revolting, is common practice, often performed for security, 
fame or fortune. The dynamics become even more grotesque when 
one considers that this dead-ended relationship forfeits all 
possibilities of the lover•s continued growth. Love is always 
open arms. With arms open you allow love to come and go as it 
wills, freely, for it 1 ll do so anyway. If you close your arms 
about love, you•11 find you are only left holding yourself 
(Buscaglia, 1972, pp. 93-94). 
Love invites and helps to us make grow in love, but it cannot be 
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controlled. Jourard {1971, p. 57) made this point quite forcefully as 
he concludes a discussion of love with the following words: "There is no 
end to this chapter, or to loving. Unless, afraid of possible hurt, we 
decide, not to love. but to control and use." 
Love seeks to encourage love; to facilitate it. Yet, we cannot 
force a person to grow in love with us. At times a person seeks love 
elsewhere. There are times when one is too defensive to risk love. The 
limits of the power of love are that we cannot force a person to attend 
to our love; we can only offer the opportunity, get their attention, and 
court and invite. 
Love must always be an aspiration that the other person either has 
or is willing to entertain. One cannot move past a person•s defenses 
into a communion of love unless that person allows us. Maslow•s (1962) 
discussion of growth shows this aspect of the humanistic power quite 
clearly: 
Defensiveness can be as wise as daring; it depends on the 
particular person, his particular status and the particular 
situation in which he has to choose. The choice of safety is 
wise when it avoids pain that may be more than the person can 
bear at the moment. If we wish to help him grow, then all we 
can do is help if he asks for help out of suffering, or else 
simultaneously allow him to feel safe and beckon him onward to 
try the new experience like the mother whose arms invite the 
oaoy to try to walk. We can•t force him to grow, we can only 
coax him to, make it possible for him, in the trust that 
simply experiencing the new experience will make him prefer 
it; no one can prefer it for him. If it is to become part of 
him, he must like it. If he doesn't, we must gracefully 
conceae that it is not for him at th·is moment (p. 54). 
[Italics Original] 
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The humanistic power is not force and compulsion. It is the power 
of being actualizing itself. This is what Nietzsche spoke of as "the 
will to power." Tillich (1954) wrote: 
••• basically the will to power in Nietzsche is ••• a 
designation of the dynamic self-affirmation of life. It is, 
like all concepts describing ultimate reality, both literal and 
metaphorical. The same is true of the meaning of power in the 
concept the 'will to power.' It is not the sociological func-
tion of power which is meant ••• enforcing one's will against 
social resistance, is not the content of the will to power. 
The latter is the drive of everything living to realize itself 
with increasing intensity and extensity. The will to power is 
not the will of men to attain power over men, but it is the 
self-affirmation of life in its self-transcending dynamics, 
overcoming internal and external resistance. This interpreta-
tion of Nietzsche~s 'will to power' easily leads to a systema-
tic ontology of power (p. 36). 
This is why Nietzsche is sometimes referred to as the "Father of 
Humanistic Psychology." He gives us a different ontology of power 
the humanistic power. Power in this sense is the will to life; it is 
the power of love. 
Humanistic conceptions of power differ radically from the scientific 
power of cause and effect. We cannot successfully treat the human with 
the same mechanical tools we have used in the physical sciences: 
That which is forced must preserve its identity. Otherwise, 
it is not forced but destroyed • • • • One cannot transform a 
living being into a complete mechanism, without removing its 
centre and this means without destroying it as a living 
unity (Tillich, 1954, p. 46). 
Nietzsche spoke of freedom for things as opposed to freedom from 
things. He noted that when most people use the word freedom, they are 
speaking as if they meant freedom from, but what they really desire is 
freedom for: the ability, the opportunity to accomplish some purpose. 
Power can also be conceived of in this way. Power for is the humanistic 
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power and relates to actualization. Power from or power over is the 
scientific power which needs control and domination. Fromm (1947) used 
this same distinction to develop his conceptions. He termed them power 
~ and power ~: 
Power of = capacity, and power over = domination. This 
contradiction, however is of a particular kind. Power"' 
domination results from a paralysis of power = capacity. 
'Power over' is the perversion of 'power to.' • Domination 
is coupled with death, potency with life (p. 994). 
Fromm (1947, p. 98} noted that this conception was also not foreign 
to the thinking of Spinoza (Ethics IV, Def. 8} who wrote that "by virtue 
and power, I understand the same thing." The hu!llanistic power is the 
power ~f actualized being. It is the eower of love. Charisma is the 
personal power: it is an attraction to realized living. "Love is an 
action, the practice of a human power, which can be practiced only in 
freedom and never as the result of a compulsion" (Fromm, 1956, p. 18). 
Charisma awakes in us a participation in a larger feeling which is 
alive. The person who displays charisma may not always be the saint that 
we had hoped, but the personal power that we sense awakens an aliveness 
in us. We are attracted towards the humanistic power. We do not need to 
be forced, but willingly join the dance. 
The idea of the humanistic power well illustrates the energy of 
love. Fromm (1947, p. 106) wrote that: "One's own power to love pro-
duces love -- just as being interested makes one interesting". 
If I am interested, I must transcend my ego, be open to the 
world, and jump into it. Interest is based on activeness • 
The interested person becomes interesting to others because 
interest has an infectious quality (Fromm, 1968, p. 85). 
This is similar to giving: 
In the act of giving something is born, and both persons 
involved are grateful for the life that is born for both of 
them. Specifically with regard to love this means: love is a 
power which produces love ••• (Fromm, 1956, p. 21}. 
••• not only in love does g1v1ng mean receiving. The teacher 
is taught by his students, the actor is stimulated by his aud-
ience, the psychoanalyst is cured by his patient -- provided 
they do not treat each other as objects, but are related to 
each other genuinely and productively (Fromm, 1956, p. 21) 
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Humanistic power is akin to magic; love produces love -- something 
is born. Somehow one is larger. By giving and letting go, some larger 
power is awakened. The scientific power must manage all variables; 
humanistic power taps another type of force. A psychologist might refer 
to this as the power of the developed personality. Religious sources 
might say it is a gift of God. Sorokin (1950, p. 1) referred to it as 
"the mysterious energy,of love" and notes that "man•s freedom lies in his 
ability to cultivate his greatest source of creative and regenerative 
power ... 
This requires that we develop a different stance towards power than 
we are normally accustomed to taking. In principle, the scientific 
power is infinite. On the other hand, the humanistic power admits to 
limits. Magic only goes so far. Outside of the Self is always Other. 
No matter how much power one may have, one never has all the power. 
There is always someone else. There is the limit of power: we always 
know it is impossible to have it all. No matter how magical we become, 
we do not control it. On the distant snore, there is always another who 
we must recognize as also having power. 
The humanistic power is based on hope and the strength of the person 
who can love. It is perhaps this attitude that best characterizes the 
humanistic power. Fromm {1968) wrote of this movement toward actuali-
zation of love in The Revolution of Hope. It is the attitude of court-
ing, inviting, and hoping that is the humanistic power. It is the 
movement toward life and fuller realization; the attractiveness which 
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springs from the human breast; the patience which permits growth; and the 
knowledge that only thr·ough the humanistic power can we approach that 
which the heart desires. 
Hope is paradoxical. It is neither passive waiting nor is it 
unrealisti,c forcing of circumstances that cannot occur. It is 
like the -crouched tiger, which will jump only when the moment 
for jumping has come. • •• To hope means to be ready at every 
moment for that which is not yet born, and yet not become des-
perate if there is no birth in our lifetime. There is no sense 
in hoping for that which already exists or for that which can-
not be. Those whose hope is weak settle down for comfort or 
for viQ~ence; those who hope is strong see and cherish all 
signs,6f''·new life and are ready every moment to help the birth 
of that which is ready to be born •••• Faith, like hope, is 
not prediction of the future; it is the vision of the present 
in a state of pregnancy (Fromm, 1968, p. 1). 
Love is hope in action. It is the humanistic power. 
Humanistic power is a different type of .. ego-management ... Ego seeks 
to maintain con.~pl, yet control which does not allow an opening is over-
management. We must arrange our power in such a way as not to cancel out 
the life we wish to experience. We must find ways of participating in 
other selves while leaving the boundaries porous enough that we do not 
destroy what we touch. 
Everyone feels that in many ways they are not deserving of love. We 
feel that we must manipulate it, earn, or exchange for it. But love is 
always beyond our control. It is never scientific. When love is given 
to us, it is never because we have discovered the right prescription. 
Love is outside the cause and effect perspective. It is always a gift. 
Perhaps the world goes together in a way that we are only beginning to 
suspect. This is the humanistic power. 
No one really wants to live in a world strictly of their own making. 
If one does, then often when we get exactly what we thought we wanted, we 
do not want it anymore. For as humans, we desire life sometwhat larger 
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than the rational dictates of our fantasy. We desire something new to 
press us past our contrived projections. We desire Other to add to our 
presence, to come into our lives, and shape the living somewhat differ~ 
ently than we had planned. The scientific power of instituting a plan 
and literally carrying through, loses creativity and, above all, it loses 
and, above all, it loses our full participation. We do not want the 
world as thought would dictate it on the blackboard. We want the full 
hand of 1 i fe. 
This difference between the humanistic and the scientific power is 
what Roszak {1975, p. 166) referred to as "being-power" and "forcing-
power." Humanistic psychology has sought to advocate and document the 
transforming nature of "being power." Perls (1969, p. 1) wrote 
that "if by chance we find each other, it's beautiful; but if not, it 
can't be helped." Maslow (1962) wrote of a "psychology of being" that 
transforms a person's life and the world around them. Rogers {1961, 
1977} wrote of a non-possessive type power. Jourard (1968, 1971) empha-
sized transparency and openness as preconditions to transforming experi-
ence and relationships. Fromm (1976) summarized his thesis of scientific 
materia 1 ism and the world of spirit with the question: "to be or to 
have?" 
Love cannot be understood through the scientific-technological frame 
of reference which is the mainspring of Western culture. This may well 
require us to bridge sacred ground and re-vitalize some of the old relig-
ious concepts which Science sought to supplant. One of these concepts is 
the Christian notion of "grace." Grace is a gift of God. It is a free 
gift: "the unmerited love and favor of God" (Webster, 1966, p. 627). 
It is a miracle not subject to our rational dynamics. Even the mystics 
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vJrite with some consistency about the 11 dark night of the soul" (Roszak, 
1980). It always occurs 11 as if by magic." The light transforms the 
darkness only when man has given up the attempt to fight back the night. 
And while there may be ways to seek love, we must realize that we are 
over our head and not in control. Grace, like love, cannot be obligated. 
It always appears as a miracle after one has relinquished control. 
We might wonder here at the fact that "charisma" means literally 
(from the Greek) "a ~lift of grace. 11 It is a personal power springing 11 as 
if11 by magic. We might also note that the most significant experiences 
in our lives appeared almost .. miraculously." They were not things of 
science. They are better understood from a quite different paradigm. 
Sociology might also borrm-J another concept from the religion of the 
East. This is the idea of 11 karma ... Karma means literally 11 tO do." It 
represents the 11 totality of a person's actions .. (Webster, 1966, p. 798). 
It expresses the idea that a person's way of life is associated with cer-
tain consequences. Karmas cannot be manipulated. Such a conception of 
it would miss the point. Karma is not a technique; it is the associated 
consequences of a way of living. Benefits do not accrue as causes and 
effects but as integrated structural components characteristic of a given 
way of life. Similarly, the benefits from love and the magical are part 
of a whole and do not lend themselves to technology. Joy is associated 
with trust. Faith is related to love. Laughter may be correlated with 
hope. Being is associated with the magical. But these are not dependent 
and independent variables. They are part of a different paradigm. They 
are components of a way of life that interact and nourish each other. We 
must not expect to plug them into a technological framework. 
We must seek a different paradigm in order to understand and explore 
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love. But although we conceive of love as akin to a gift of grace, this 
does not mean that we must surrender all desire, follow love, and resign 
ourselves to despair until it occurs. Just because love cannot be ana-
lyzed scientifically, does not mean that we cannot approach it as an art 
(Fromm, 1956). Even though we cannot control and predict results in a 
scientific fashion, does not mean that our efforts at invitation and 
courtship might not be more successful than we ever dreamed. We must 
learn to court the "Muse of Love" on love's own terms. We can learn to 
free ourselves from structures and arrangements which prevent love's 
magic. And we can discover and explore ways to encourage and facilitate 
love's coming more fully into play in our lives. 
To understand love, we must move beyond the scientific world view of 
Western culture and beyond the expediency of technology. This means mov-
ing directly into a dialog with love and the magical. Many have said 
that we cannot talk about love, but what they mean is that we cannot cap-
ture it or chain it to a scientific framework. However, we must not sur-
render love and the magical to a strictly irrational framework that has 
no implications for the rational ordering of the world. Love is irra-
tional only in the sense that it cannot be controlled. It is not a pro-
duct of cause and effect dynamics, yet we can still talk about it in a 
coherent manner. We can approach an understanding of love and allow that 
understanding to direct the course of our inquiry and the nature of our 
social change strategies. Having spent all of this time orienting toward 
a discussion of love, it is now time to open the door and approach the 
subject directly. We must place love front and center stage. 
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Developing an Understanding of Love 
Nothing is harder than to write about love. We know that love 
exists, yet we're afraid that if we go beyond the briefest of poetic 
insights, we'll send it fleeing. It alludes our grasp. And yet, it 
beckons for our lives. 
If one wishes to know love, one must live love, in action • 
• • • One will learn love only with fresh insight, with each 
new bit of knowledge, which he acts out, and which is reacted 
to, or his knowledge is valueless-~aglia, 1972, p. 91). 
[Italics Original] 
Any discussion of love challenges us at the very core where we have 
staked our lives. Throughout the ages, people have testified to love as 
<, .... 
the largest experience in life. Yet, it is hard to r~cognize what we 
have not known. As Kieffer (1977) wrote: 
One of the difficulties of developing a const,tent definition 
of intimacy is its subjective character. • •·• One can only 
understand aspects of intimacy to the extent that he or she 
has been privileged to experience them (p. 275). 
Asking a person to write on love is like granting free license to 
explore one's own personal life. Just as marriage provides a magnifying 
glass for viewing the nature of social relatio~hip, writing on love 
highlights one's own maladjustment. The literature on love is plagued 
by the fact that too often we learn more about the author's individual 
pathology than we do about love. As Ortega y Gasset (1957, p. 25) once 
commented on Stendhal's famous discourse De l'Amour (1822): "Stendal's 
case is pretty obvious: we are dealing with a man who never truly loved, 
nor, above all, was every truly 1 oved." 
Yet we must begin to write fully threatened by the fact that we 
might learn something. We must bridge our vulnerability, realizing that 
any discussion we have, given the very nature of love, will always be 
partial and incomplete. 
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It is difficult to defi,ne love. The word has been used to describe 
almost everything from ·human bondage to the Holy Spirit. We even have a 
variety of words and types of love: Agape, Eros, Love of God, Romantic 
Love, Infatuation • • • • Love seems to have almost as many faces as 
there are ways of meeting: there is the erotic love which sends us soar-
ing and then reduces us to a fearful quiver awaiting a sign. There is 
the Christian love which defines neighbor as self. There is the romantic 
love of knights and their quests. And there is the bridge of married 
love embracing a quiet solitude based on years of familiarity and common 
experience. 
There is also the oneness and communion with nature where all is 
experienced as related and at peace. There is the love of country where 
all is dedicated to furthering and preserving a noble cause. And altru-
ism which through one more good act once again seeks to make the world 
better. 
And there are still other loves. Maternal love which is the eternal 
permission of the mother for the child to be. There is the paternal love 
of justice. And there are the fleeting moments of infatuation which 
afterward leave us wondering what possessed us. Indeed, we find almost 
everything classified as love: from God to sweethearts to ice cream. 
Under the word "love," we find almost everything from the excesses of 
passion to the tenderness of knowledge lumped together. How do we sort 
through the maze of all that has been called love? 
Often, we are a far cry from the majesty depicted by the poets. 
Some 11 loves" even look more like hate: couples who seem to stay together 
simply because they could not bear to forego the "joy" of making the 
other miserable. We find countless battered people living well past the 
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boundaries of sadism, brutalized but addicted. All for love •••• For 
many it seems hard to separate love from obsession. 
There are loves which seem merely recreational in nature and, there 
are loves which consume us whole. There is the love which is as soft as 
joy. And there is the love that awakens our growth and happiness. 
There is the love of God and the oneness and harmony of the spirit. 
And there is self-love: respect and caring for our own lives. 
Out of all of this, how can we ever presume to talk of love? How do 
we make sense out of this diversity? How do we get lost in our own 
efforts to love? And how do we avoid mistaking some writer•s personal 
pathology for an insight? For we must recognize that across all of this 
there is a common grain. There must be something. There must be some-
thing that all these 11 kinds 11 of love have in common: that they share. 
In truth, it must be so that: ..... there are not 1 kinds• of love. 
Love is only of one kind. Love is love. One knows and expresses and 
acts out what he knows of love. He does this at each stage of growth 11 
(Buscaglia, 1972, p. 96). 
We are stranded at different way stations. Yet the heart seeks 
love. Oivided across a disjointed existence, we cry out for meaning. 
What is this love that we seek? It has so many faces. 
Love is both the heights and the solitude; the times we see infinity 
in the twinkling of any eye, and the day-to-day existence. It is the 
peaks the 11 soul can reach, when feeling out of sight for the ends of 
Being and ideal Grace. 11 Love is also where we can relax. 
How do I love thee? Let me count the ways. 
I love thee to the depth and breadth 
and height 
My soul can reach. 
I love thee to the level of everyday•s 
most quiet need, 
By sun and candle-light 
(Browning, 1845, p. xliii). 
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Love is our freedom song. It is a communion of spirits. And it is 
a quiet relatedness. 
Love is trust and faith; innocence put to risk once again. "Only as 
a child shall you enter the kingdom of heaven. 11 Love is play that 
awakens the eyes of awe and wonder looking fresh once again. It takes 
another chance on birth: 
I love thee with the passion 
put to use in my old griefs, 
And with my childhood•s faith. 
I love thee with a love I seemed 
to lose with my lost saints. 
I love thee with the breadth, smiles, 
tears, of all my 1 i fe · 
(Browning, 1845, p. xliii). 
Love is also a way of knowing. Not only does. one come to know the 
other, but also oneself, and ultimately life. 
Love is an active creation of meaning based on faith. Love stands 
and creates. It is a saying 11yes 11 to life. To follow the poet William 
Blake {1800): 
The Angel that presided o•er my birth 
Said, 11 Little creature, form•d of Joy 
. and Mirth, 
Go love withou the help of any 
Thing on Earth (p. 141). 
Love cannot be proven. Or sometimes even justified. But it is a 
step that humans take. 
This will to love does not lend itself to the normal masculine, 
rational mode of scientific inspection of philosophical analysis. It is 
not something which we can readily define and categorize. As Nietzsche 
{1846) suspected we needed a new approach to court an understanding of 
1 ove: 
Supposing the truth is a woman -- what then? Are there not 
grounds or the suspicion that all philosophers ••• have been 
very inexpert about women? That the gruesome seriousness, the 
clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have usually approached 
truth so far have been awkward and very improper methods for 
winning a woman's heart {p. 2)? 
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Love does not open its secrets to the philosopher's dissection, and 
it flees from the scientist's grasp. Supposing that the truth is love 
••• ? Love is something that we know is there, but trying to reduce 
it to words and capture it on paper represents a serious misunder-
standing. It is more caught by the spirit as the minstrel sings: 
Well, then what's to be the reason for 
for becoming man and wife? 
Is it love that brings you here, or love 
that brings you life? 
For if loving is the answer, then who's 
the giving for? 
Do you believe in something that you've 
never seen before? 
There is love. 
He is now to be among you at the 
calling of your hearts, 
rest assured this troubadour is acting 
on His part. 
The union of your spirits has caused Him 
to remain, 
for whenever two or more of your are 
gathered in his name 
There is love. 
A man shall leave his mother and a woman 
leave her home, 
They shall travel on to where the two 
shall be as one. 
As it was in the beginning is now and 
'till the end, 
woman draws her life from man and gives 
it back again 
and there is love {Stookey, 1971, n.p.). 
Love is more of a mystical force: a spirit -- the active component 
in meaning. We make and create love in our meaning. And yet, after we 
have succeeded in ''awaking" love, it seems that love was there all the 
time and we were just missing the dance. Love is not passive; it 
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requires our active stance toward the world. It requires the participa-
tion of our lives. 
Love is a commitment and a choice: a saying "yes" to love. "It is 
believed that to fall in love is already the culmination of love, while 
actually it is the beginning and only an opportunity for the achievement 
of love" (Fromm, 1947, p. 106). 
Love is an opportunity to create another world -- an invitation to 
the spirit to glimpse another reality. It is an invitation to meaning. 
"Love is an activity, not a passive affect; it is a •standing in,• and 
not a •falling for 11• (Fromm, 1956, p. 18). Love is defined: it is 
where we choose to face life and unveil its meaning. It is difficult to 
define love beforehand because love is the active component in the 
creation of meaning. It is through love that people reach, transcend 
their boundaries, and allow meaning to come into play. 
Love thus offers a different paradigm and source of meaning than the 
heroic. Love is certainly as strong or stronger than death. It makes 
one feel in place in the universe. Love offers a different kind of drama 
and relatedness than that of the hero. Love is the attunement which the 
which the magical tradition emphasized: it is relatedness -- an over-
coming of separateness and feeling a part of "something" else. Love 
provides meaning and makes sense of one•s existence: "Genuine love is 
rooted in productiveness ••• to be alive means to be productive, to 
use one•s powers not for any purpose transcending man, but for oneself, 
to make sense of one•s existence, to be human" (Fromm, 1947, p. 103) 
Yet, no matter how much we think we know of love, from time to 
time, we are all left with our faces pressed to the glass. So much of 
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what we say we know of love is based in faith on glimpses that we have 
seen. 
If I speak in the tongues of men and of angels, but have not 
love, I am a noisy gong or a clanging cymbal. h1d if I have 
prophetic powers, and understand all mysteries and all know-
ledge, and if I have all faith, so as to move mountains, but 
have not love, I gain nothing. If 1 give away all I have •• 
• but have not love, I gain nothing • • • • Love is patient 
and kind • • • • Love does not insist on its own way •••• 
Love bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, 
endures all things. Love never ends; as for prophecy, it will 
pass away; as for tongues, they will cease; as for knowledge, 
it will pass away • • • • For now we see in a mirror dimly, 
but then face to face. So faith, hope, love abide, these 
three; but the greatest of these is love (Holy Bible, I 
Corinthians: 13). 
There is the faith as a self-fulfilling prophecy which transforms 
visions as hopes become real. But the power of faith and the future 
vision of hope are nothing without the experience of love. Love is 
where we choose to celebrate life. It is our experience of meaning. 
This is why love is such a difficult subject. We are dealing not 
with just subjectivity, but with meaning itself. Love is where people 
have allowed themselves to face life. It is where they have allowed 
themselves to be touched to the core. Meaning is thus the thread that 
runs through the various forms of love. Yet to conceive of 1 ove as the 
active component in the creating of meaning, perhaps, obscures as much 
as it clarifies. 
So far in approaching love directly, I have been content to cite my 
favorite understandings of love. To approach love in a systematic 
manner, we need a more thorough understanding of other treatments of the 
subject. We need to explore what others have said of love throughout 
history. 
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Plato's Approach to Love 
Like most historical reviews, this will return us immediately to 
Plato. Plato's views place us squarely in the humanistic tradition. 
Love is seen as intertwined with the Good and the Beautiful. For Plato 
(416 BC, p. 86f), love is generation and birth in beauty: "Love is 
desire for the perpetual possession of the good • Its object is 
to procreate and bring forth in beauty." 
Plato is not speaking of the birth of children, per se, but of the 
generation of ideas and the movement of history. According to Plato, 
love belongs neither to the human world nor the divine. It is the 
bridge between the two. It is neither part of the real world nor part 
of the ideal world, but a "spirit" transiting the passage. Between the 
dream and the real, love is "A being of intermediate nature, a spirit 
that bridges the gap between them and prevents the universe from falling 
into two separate halves" {Plato, 416 BC, p. 81). 
It is a movement towards the ideal, yet it is an experience in the 
real. Love is an experience in this moment, but it also seeks for 
future moments. The spirit of love -- the desire for generation and 
birth in beauty while moving toward the Good -- is what has sown the 
seeds of most of the progress of man and the art and religion which we 
have surrounded our lives. It is a desire for progeny either physical 
or spiritual: to leave behind a legacy of love. 
Love represents a passage from the mundane toward the Good and the 
Beautiful. It is the relation of the dreamer to the real in a gentle 
evolution across time. 
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Romantic Love 
We may also gain significant insight by reviewing the historical 
origins of romantic love. Perhaps when romantic love was new, it was 
more transparent and revealed more of its intrinsic nature. The roots 
of romantic love can be found in the twelfth century as practiced by the 
knights and ladies of the courts of Europe. Romantic love burst upon 
the scene seemingly out of nowhere and spread throughout the countryside 
in the songs of the wandering troubadours. This new feeling did not go 
unnoticed. It was discussed at great length by the ladies of court. 
Gradually, the popular insights into the nature of love were formulated 
into a series of statements which became knovm as the "Rules of Love" 
(Capellanus, 1184). 
Love as practiced in this age was an attempt to reify feelings and 
heighten desire. As enacted by lovers on the heights of passion. it was 
an attempt to deify desire. It was romance founded upon impossibil-ity. 
It represented an all-consuming passion. It did not provide the basis 
for marriage, but was a banner for bravery on a knight's quests. He 
dedicated his life and his deeds to his lady. She followed him with her 
attention and thoughts. He lived now not for himself, but for her. He 
braved deeds and fought in battles and tournaments for her glory. The 
nobility of love gave meaning to his adventures and his routine. 
Romance was an exalted state: a love potion brewed by destiny. As 
Kephart (1972, p. 109) wrote, "It was the destiny of every lady to 
meet the knight of her dreams; and for every knight there was one fair 
lady." All nobles wanted to experience this new feeling called "love." 
Indeed, the "Rules of Love" even made experiencing love into a norm 
(Capellanus, 1184). 
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The "Rules of Love" were formulated by the ladies of court so as to 
present the nature of this new feeling. Love was defined as "a certain 
inborn suffering derived from the sight of and excessive meditation 
upon" the beloved (Capellanus, 1184, p. 28). The nature of love was 
codified by a series of rules which were agreed upon as expressing the 
essence of love. I believe that we can detect four basic themes running 
throughout the 31 "Rules of Love." 
First, love was felt to be sporadic: an emotion of constantly 
varying intensity. "It is well known that love is a·lways increasing or 
decreasing. If love diminishes, it quickly fails and rarely revives. 
The difficulty of attainment makes it prized" (Capellanus, 1184, 
p. 184). 
Secondly, as depicted by the code, love is exclusive. No less than 
three of the 31 rules expressly mention jealousy as increasing love. A 
fourth rule says that "No one can be bound by a double love, 11 and a 
fifth that "A.new love puts to flight an old one." 
The "Rules of Love" also institutionalizes courtship. There is an 
emphasis on inviting, courting, and hoping. 
Love is 'impelled by the persuasion of love.' 
It is 'a stranger to avarice.' 
'That which the lover takes against the will 
of his beloved is without relish.' 
Love is based on the 'giving of hope.' 
Finally, romantic love of the twelfth century is all-consuming. It 
concentrates one emotionally and psychologically, occupying one's full 
attention. 
One regularly turns pale in the presence 
of the beloved. 
The heart palpitates. 
He eats and sleeps very little. 
Love can deny nothing to love. 
Every act ends in the thought of the beloved. 
Thinks of nothing except what he thinks 
will please his beloved. 
Is constantly and without intermission 
possessed by the thought of his beloved 
(Capellanus, 1184, p. 35). 
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Much of this romantic love consists of a focused attention on the 
other. This is why jealousy is so threatening to the conception. When-
ever the knight might roam, the lady was always with him. It was a love 
maintained in the mind's eye. 
It was a love which insisted upon hope rather than force. Yet it 
was a romance which kept its distance; a romance which circumstances and 
convention would never permit fully. It was a romance which fed "on 
obstacles, short excitations, and partings ••• 11 {De Rougemont, 1956, 
p. 292). Although courtly love might be consummated sexually, it was 
never consummated in desire and allowed to routinize as a basis for 
society. It was kept on a pinnacle of intense infatuation: never 
allowed to fully bloom, but cultivated nonetheless. 
Despire this romantic love's sporadic and fleeting nature, the 
knights and the ladies of court sought to intensify and prolong its 
passion. Perhaps this is why they defined love as a kind of "inborn 
suffering." 
Passion means suffering, something undergone, the mastery of 
fate over a free and responsible person. To love love more 
than the object of love, to love passion for its own sake, has 
meant to suffer and to court suffering ••• there is the 
secret which Europe has never allowed to be given away; a 
secret which it was always repressed (De Rougemont, 1956, 
p. 50). 
This is a conclusion which clearly shocks our sensibilities, for 
Romantic Love is clearly part of our emotional heritage. Eros is in 
legend the god of desire, but is it passion that we crave? De Rougemont 
(1956) in Love in the Western World wrote: 
All Pagan religions deify desire ••• [they] could not do 
otherwise than make Eros into a god; Eros was the most powerful 
force within them, the most dangerous and the most mysterious, 
the most deeply bound up with the event of living •••• 
[But] what have we to fear from desire? It loses its absolute 
hold over us the moment we cease to deify it (p. 312). 
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In other cultures, there was not such a schism between desire and 
the social order as there was in Christian Western Europe. In the East, 
a dictum that desire produces suffering and that one should give up all 
attachment to desire extended to giving up any temptation to combating 
desire. Unlike other areas subject to the pagan influence, romantic 
love thrived in the cultural atmosphere of Western Europe. It spread 
through the feudal kingdoms fueled by codes of love which would keep it 
from being routinized into a nonnal part of life. "It has been our 
dramatic luck," commented De Rougemont (1956, p. 318), "to have opposed 
passion with the weapons foredoomed to foster it." 
The aescetic flavor of organized Christianity provided the ideal 
cultural backdrop for a romantic love based on institutionalization, the 
heights of desire. The lady and her knight sought to keep love on a 
razor's edge. Passion became the quest. Having started with an impos-
sible love, they sought to savor every last bit of feeling. The "Rules 
of Love" provided a way to heighten a feeling: a way to add spice to 
1 ife. 
This is all interesting nostalgia, but what relevance and under-
standings does it offer for our modern age? Do the four basic elements 
of the "Rules of Love" -- sporadic emotion, an exclusiveness of atten-
tion, courtship, and total preoccupation show us something of our-
selves and the nature of love? Is there an understanding here that is 
more clear because we can look at it in the past? 
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It is probably that for most of those at court, love originated as 
a diversion. Yet passion soon got out of hand. The more intense 
romantics soon moved beyond the routinized flirtation of the Rules of 
Court and took the myth more seriously. They saw it as more than just a 
"Game of Love" they. found in it a patch to meaning. For in this love 
and this longing, they found something finer: a desire, an image of 
themselves ••• and of life. 
The one essential trait to be desired in a lover (Capellanus, 1184) 
which was a prerequisite to the experience of love, was a "good char-
acter" -- someone one could aspire to, or more accurately, someone one 
could aspire with. One then sought to turn the world into something 
befitting the image of the beloved. Love went beyond the day-to-day and 
testified to an infinity of perfection. While love was not allowed to 
become the basis for normal life, this love somehow seemed stronger than 
death: a different system of meaning. In the challenges of the quest, 
the knights braved death and experienced an awareness they had never 
sensed before --they were doing it for her. In their tales, the ladies 
glimpsed a vision they had kept tucked in their hearts. 
Romantics chose a vision which flew in the face of reality. No 
matter how impossible the task, it was but another challenge to which 
one must rise. Yet, they sought to create a vision which was more real 
than real. At its peaks, romantic love developed the fever of mysti-
cism. Still, it was a very real road fraught with challenges, death, 
and sufferings. It is a path which is most curious for "love" to have 
taken. 
Why does Western Man wish to suffer this passion which lacer-
ates him and which all his common sense rejects? The 
answer is that he reaches self awareness and tests himself only 
by risking his life-- in suffering and on the verge of 
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death • • • • European romanticism may be compared to a man 
for whom suffering, and especially the sufferings of love, are 
a privileged mode of understanding (De Rougemont, 1956, p. 51). 
Such an analysis reads like a summation of Freud's insights upon 
Eros and the whole of the human (Western) psyche. De Rougemont (1956) 
continued: 
Of course, this is only true of the best romantics among us. 
Most people do not bother about understanding about self-
awareness; they merely go after the kind of love which prom-
ises the most feeling. But even this has to be a love delayed 
in its happy fulfillment by some obstruction. Hence, whether 
our desire is for the most self-conscious or simply the most 
intense love, secretly we desire obstruction •••• Happy 
love has no history -- in European literature (p. 52). 
When we unleash feelings, we unleash more than just love. As May 
(1969) has noted, we open the gates also to the daimonic and the shadow 
side. As De Rougemont said, "Eros ceases to be a demon only when it 
ceases to be a god 11 (Lewis, 1960, p. 17). By deifying Eros, romantic 
love immediateley creates problems because passion has two sides. There 
are the heights of desire and there is also tragedy. 
It is romance based upon the intangible. In the Western romantic 
tradition, it is the impossibility or the obstruction which gives our 
accounts of love their "romance ... Romeo and Juliet would not be remem-
bered if it were not for their tragedy. There is Don Quixote who sought 
to love Oulcena past all flaws. And in Tristan and Iseult which became 
the base for the Wagner opera, we find that 11 the myth of passionate love 
is all contained in the legend as set down by the 12th century poets .. 
(De Rougemont, 1956, p. 20). De Rougemont considers the Tristan myth as 
the representative myth of romantic love. Again, it is a tale of love 
potions, destiny and fatal love. De Rougemont (1956) made a startling 
conclusion which holds true not just for Tristan and Iseult but for many 
who have followed the romantic heritage: 
Tristan and Iseult do not love one another • • • • What they 
love is love and being in love. They behave as if aware that 
whatever obstructs love must ensure and consolidate it in the 
heart of each and intensify it infinitely in the moment they 
reach the absolute obstacle, which is death. Tristan loves 
the awareness that he is loving far more than he loves Iseult 
the Fair. And Iseult does nothing to hold Tristan. All she 
needs iS her passion ate dream. Their need of one another 1 s 
in order to be aflame, and they do not need one another as 
they are. What they need is not one another's presence, but 
one another's absence. [Italics Original] 
The love is mutual in the sense that Tristan and Iseult 'love 
one another', or, at least, they believe that they do. 
Certainly their mutual fidelity is exemplary. But the 
unhappiness comes in, because the love which 'dominates• them 
is not a love of each for the other as that other really is. 
They love one another, but each loves the other from the 
standpoint of self and not from the other's standpoint. Their 
unhappiness thus originates in a false recfProc1ty;wh"ich 
disguises a twin narcissism (p. 41). [Italics Original] 
Such a "twin narcissism" is far from uncommon. Romantic love as 
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generated in feudal Europe was based on absence, ~n image in the mind, a 
passion for passion. It is small wonder that later observers including 
Stendhl, 1822, would discount romantic love as only a projection (Ortega 
y Gas set, 1957). 
Much of our romantic love is the disguised "twin narcissism." It 
is the "love of love" and romance where the person is merely incidental. 
As Buber (1947, p. 21} wrote, "Many celebrated ecstasies of love are 
nothing but the lover's delight in the possibilities of his own person 
which are actualized in an unexpected fullness." 
It is the love of love as an actualizing force which overshadows the 
person being loved. In this way, love is self-love fulfilled by proxy. 
Love gives one the security in which to bloom. Love never really moves 
past a self-orientation into a "we." The actualizing force is never 
really discovered to contain self, other, and all of life, but is 
treated as only a means. Love and Other remain projections of Self. 
170 
But as Browning ("the ends of Being and ideal Grace") noted, love is 
moving into a different realm than just what self ''wants." 
Don Quixote is an example which might easily support the idea of 
love as projection. Surely there is nothing which Dulcena could ever 
say or do to make him a disbeliever. His love is untainted by reality. 
In such lies its beauty ••• and its fatal flaw. 
Yet the matter might have turned out quite differently if non 
Quixote had but fallen in love with someone else who shared his vision. 
Perhaps their's would have been a love 
Where each asks from each 
What each most wants to give 
And each awakes in each 
What else would never be 
{Muir, 1960, p. 117). 
Don Quixote's love is a total commitment of faith. We must wonder 
at the power of such love to awaken grandeur in even the humblest. Love 
at its best is mutual support and growth: where "each awakes in 
each " . . . . 
Yet, so often it is our experience that love awakens life in the 
loved only to crucify the lover. One can easily see why so many have 
regarded romantic love as only projection: a matter of simply waiting 
for someone to unleash one's dream upon. However, not all love is 
tragic. 
The problem with dealing with romantic love only as a projection is 
that the theory of projection is essentially a discounting mechanism. 
We use the term "projection" only when the attempt to create a self-
fulfilling prophecy is unsuccessful. Only when love fails or proves to 
~e ridiculous do we refer to it as "projection." If the same process of 
casting our dreams and hopes is succesfsful, we don't call it 
"projection.'' We call it the mutual creation of meaning. 
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Guggenbuhl-Craig (1979), in a chapter entitled "Romance as 
Fantasy," noted that much of romance hinges on the enactment and reali-
zation of latent abilities. Their fulfillment and growth is not a 
matter of projecting one's wishes onto another, but of realizing and 
cultivating real aspects of a person which have not been given a chance 
to bloom. Romance is thus an exercise in mutual realization of fantasy. 
It does not simply reduce one to another's projections. 
He used the example of a child whose parents may sense a talent in 
the child. They then give the child an opportunity to develop and 
explore that ability. This is different from projection where the par-
ents force their hopes on the child. It is the recognition of a real 
ability in the child which is encouraged and loved into fruition. 
Creative fantasy emphasizes "becoming" and the creation which is loved 
and supported to realization. 
Van Den Berg (1961) argued that we retain this fragile theory of 
projection because it allows us to maintain the common denominator of 
our cultural meanings and at the same time discount all alternative 
meanings. Despite the poverty of such an approach, this allows us to 
act while keeping our world intact and unchallenged by extra-individual 
meanings. Yet it is precisely the nature of romantics and lovers to 
offer and even want to celebrate these altenrative meanings: to seek 
sources of inspiration and meaning outside our agreed upon common 
denominators. 
Warmoth (1981) suggested that we might better understand "peak 
experiences" as the creation of a personal myth. Romantic love is cer-
tainly a peak experience providing an outlet for the personal mythos and 
the creation of meaning. If there is too great a discrepancy between 
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each ind·ividual's myth and the Other's and they are not capable of 
arriving at a larger understanding or a new synthesis, then the rela-
tionship is going to have problems. 
In many ways, romantic love turns away from the world and offers us 
new meanings from the inside out. It is an attempt to make dreams real. 
From the depths of each individual, an effort is made to touch the 
"real" world and enact a meaningful creation. 
This is the heart of romantic love: sharing of meanings which have 
laid dormant awaiting an opportunity for life in the light of day. This 
is the reason that romantic love shakes us to the roots of our souls. 
This is why a lover becomes such a part of self. This also accounts 
for the pathological nature of some loves, as well as other loves which 
are our birth in beauty. 
Many of the characteristics of Romantic love noted in the "Rules of 
Love" can be accounted for by noting Romantic love's relation to the 
mutual creation of meaning. It is the spinning of another world. 
Romantic love withdraws from the world at large; focuses its attention 
inward; and then seeks to shape the outer world in the image of the 
newly perceived reality. It is a phenomenon of attention and the focus 
of wil '1. 
As Romantic love is a matter of attention, as Ortega y Gasset 
(1957) noted, there is a definite relation between love and the pheno-
menon of hypnosis. "Falling in love" is a hypnotic magic. It creates a 
new reality more real than the life to which one had been accustomed to 
previously. 
But "Is love blind 11 or is it a matter of 11 each awaking in each 11 ? 
Maslow (1962) addressed this question directly: 
••• the lover perceives in the beloved what no one else can, 
and there is no question about the intrinsic value of his 
inner experience and of the many good consequences for him, 
for his beloved, and for the world. If we take as an example 
the mother loving her baby, the case is even more obvious. 
Not only does love perceive potentialities but it also actual-
izes them. The absence of love stifles potentialities and 
even kills them • • • • All personalogical and psychothera-
peutic experience is testimonial to this fact that love 
actualizes and non-love stultifies, where deserved or not. 
The complex and circular question then arises here, •To what 
extent is this phenomenon a self-fulfilling prophecy? 1 as 
Merton-has called it. A hus6and 1 s conviction thatlnis wife is 
beautiful, or a wife•s firm belief that her husband is coura-
geous, to some extent creates the beauty or the courage. This 
is not so much a percept1on of something that already exists 
as a bringing into existence by belief. 
And yet, even beyond all this complexity, the lurking doubts 
remain to those who hope ultimately to drag all these problems 
into the domain of public science. Frequently enough, love 
for another brings illusions, the perceptions of qualities and 
potentialities that don't exist, that are not therefore truly 
perceived but created in the mind of the beholder and which 
then rest on a system of needs, repressions, denials, projec-
tions, and rationalizations~ If love can be more perceptive 
than non-love, it can also be blinder. And the research 
problem remains to nag us, when is which (pp. 98-99)? [First 
Two Italics Mine] 
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Being loved or loving creates another reality. Beyond projection 
and illusion, bringing into existence by belief must involve a path that 
one is yearning or at least willing to walk. The potentiality must be 
capable of realization ••• of being acted upon. Not only must the 
potential exist, but it must be one which both are willing to choose to 
enhance. 
The lover withdraws from the ordinary world and creates/actualizes 
a world of love held in the mind•s eye. Romance is thus always floating 
between the real and the dream: between becoming and the heights of 
vision. 
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Agape 
If we follow the heart's desire, we seek to move closer to the 
magic that we glimpse in love. Bergson (1935, p. 168) wrote: ~Magic 
is then innate in man, being but the outward projection of a desire 
which fills the heart.~ 
Besides the turning inward away from the world -- of Romantic 
Love, there is another strategy of loving which has characterized our 
cultural traditions. This is the Christian lo~~= the brotherly love 
which has been termed ~agape.~ It originates from the Scripture of 
' 
' 
"Love your neighbor as yourself~ and the golden rule of ~do unto others 
as you would have them do unto you." 
This love seeks to move outward into the world and trying there to 
shape it and change it through love. This concern for the world, and 
moving into the world because of love, is the very basis of the distinc-
tion between Western and Eastern thought. 
Agape also provides an interesting contrast to the romantic love of 
Eros. Agape and Eros have been used as a basic distinction for styles 
of loving by a sufficient number of writers to warrant specific atten-
tion in any serious discussion towards a definition of love (Singer, 
1966; De Rougemont, 1956; Lewis, 1960; Williams, 1973). 
Whereas romantic love is "particularistic, .. focusing on one person 
and taking a journey inside, away from the world; the love of Agape is 
.. universalistic .. and attempts to move outward into the world toward all 
people. The romantic love confronts the world on the shoreline of one 
type of boundary: one cannot retreat completely from the world. It is 
confronted in our economic exchanges for survival if nothing else. The 
universal love of Agape confronts another boundary: the extent to which 
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we can love and touch humanity and the extent any love of humanity must 
be mediated by some type of facilitating structure: a moral code, an 
organization, a social movement. 
Many writers have concluded that ultimately, though Agape and Eros 
confront different boundaries and embrace different strategies, they 
dove-tail into one another: that if either path is reached fully, they 
become the same Love (O'Arcy, 1957; Harpert 1966). Other writers have 
argued for the supremacy of one type of love over the other (Lewis, 
1960; De Rougemont, 1956). Yet, if we sociologically seek one defini-
tion or understanding of the nature and process of love, we must search 
for common strains .which are present in each. What allows us to speak 
of both romantic love and the Christian love as love? 
Surely the fire and the zeal of the Christian mystics equals that 
of any romantic knight. We find Christianity giving love a central 
place in the universe and the calling of man. "God is Love" proclaims 
the New Testament. Lewis {1960) makes the important distinction that 
there is a difference between saying that "God is Love" and saying that 
"Love is God." The correct interpretation, he claims, of Scripture is 
that God is perfect Love and all human loves are much smaller 
approximations and glimpses. 
It is moving with the grain and purpose of this perfect love -- "on 
earth as it is in heaven" --which gives meaning and relatedness to 
life. The mystics and various branches of Christian theology give dif-
ferent renditions of how this path is to be approached, yet they all 
agree that God's Love is the center. As St. Augustine (Ortega y 
Gasset, 1957, p. 49) wrote: "My love is my weight: because of it I 
move. 11 
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Christian theology goes even further. Not only is love the central 
basis for meaning and life, but it is living amongst us. It is our 
direct link with God. 
According to Christian theology, as Christ prepared to ascend into 
heaven, He told his followers that a Holy Spirit would appear; that 
"whenever two or more ar·e gathered in My Name, 11 there he would be also. 
This Holy Ghost would dwell whenever two or more came together to share 
a higher purpose. As Thomas Aquinas wrote, "Love • is the proper 
name for the Holy Ghost" (Singer, 1966, p. 298). 
The love of Agape is this outpouring of faith in a way of living in 
which the Holy Spirit (Love) can dwell. It is here that we find the 
strength for altruism and charity: a connectedness with all human 
beings. There is a faith that behind our human masks we participate in 
a larger spirit. 
According to Christian theology, this love is a gift of grace. It 
is love given out of abundance, not reciprocity. The emphasis is upon 
giving, not on exchange "Love is a phenomenon of abundance; its premise 
is the strength of the individual who can give 11 (Fromm, 1947, p. 131). 
In theology, man and life are but a dream in the mind of God. Love 
is not contained by man, but experienced as something outside man•s 
parameters that calls one to something larger than self. As the poet 
wrote: 11 When you 1 ave you should not say, • God is in my heart, • but 
rather, • I am in the heart of God• ." • think not you can direct the 
course of love, for love, if it finds you worthy, directs your course 
(Gibran, 1923, p. 13). 
Love is thus not a human phenomenon subject to the normal laws of 
sociology and psychology. It is not a phenomenon of reciprocity and 
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subject to the fair exchange of distributive justice. It is closer to 
the qualification in reciprocity which Gouldner (1970) made: what he 
termed these as "norms of benevolence". It is clear that these spring 
from a different source than reciprocity. They are an aspiration to an 
ideal and an intimation of something higher: a contribution to the 
spirit of man. It is a free gift made because of belief in something 
higher. 
Love as a Spirit 
Love is also not merely a feeling. In early Christian Europe, the 
tarot deck was used by Gnostic sects, who found exceptions to the organ-
ized theology, sought to smuggle their secrets across Europe. The 
"Lovers" card in the tarot deck is most instructive. It is only the 
woman in the card -·the intuitive, feeling side-- which looks up at 
the archangel. The rational, masculine side can only look to the woman. 
It is only through "feelings" --the intuitive-- that we can glimpse 
the secret. Love is a spirit which cannot be grasped by the intellect 
alone. 
Yet, when we speak of love as related to feelings and the intuitive 
side, we must clarify. Love strictly speaking is not a feeling and 
subject to psychological analysis. It is just that feelings are capable 
of taking us to love. As Bergson (1935) noted, when we assign a suprem-
acy to feelings, there is really only one feeling that we have in mind: 
that is love -- the rest is simply excess baggage. This path of feel-
ings to love is why we reify 11 feelings." Feelings and the intuitive are 
but a door. Unless we realize this, we become lost in a reification of 
anger, jealousy, and personal greed. 
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As Buber (1957) argued, love stems not from the social or the 
psychological: it demands study of a different realm which he termed 
the 11 interhuman 11 --the space between individuals: between the psycho-
logical world of the individual and the social realm of the group. 
The fundamental fact of human existence is neither the indi-
vidual as such nor the aggregate as such. Each, considered by 
itself, is a mighty abstraction •••• The fundamental fact 
of human existence is man with man. What is peculiarly char-
acteristic of the human world is above all that something 
takes place between one being and another the like of which 
can be found nowhere in nature •••• All achievement of the 
spirit has been incited by it. Man is made man by it •••• 
It is rooted in one being turning to another as another ••• 
• I call this sphere, which is established with the existence 
of man as man but which is conceptually still uncomprehended, 
the sphere of 'between' {Buber, 1947, p. 244). 
This is further reason why the subject of love has been so problem-
atical for sociology and psychology: because love is neither a group 
phenomena or an individual phenomena. It belongs to the realm of 
"between." There is little room for spirits in traditional psycholog-
ical and sociological circles. Sociological analysis focuses on group 
phenomena: the reciprocity of social exchange and the presentation of 
the experience of love to the social drama. It does not focus on the 
''inbetween 11 space of person with person because that space is precisely 
the discipline boundary between psychology and sociology. 
The idea that love is a spirit that plays between individuals 
becomes a most satisfactory way of speaking of love. It does not fit 
our discipline boundaries for psychology and sociology, and yet it 
clarifies a lot of problems. 
is not a feeling: 
Buber (1970) was most insistent that love 
Feelings accompany the metaphysical and metapsychical fact of 
love, but they do not constitute it; and the feelings that 
accompany it can be very different ••• but the love is one. 
Feelings one 'has'; love occurs. Feelings dwell in man, but 
man dwells in his love. This is no metaphor but actuality: 
love does not cling to an I, as if the You were merely its 
'content• or object; it is between I and You. Whoever does 
not know this, know this with his being, does not know love, 
even if he should ascribe to it the feelings that he lives 
through, experiences, enjoys, and expresses (p. 66). 
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Love is not an attribute of the psyche. It is beyond the indivi-
dual and while we may develop a mind-set and way of being which enhances 
the possibility of our participation in lovet love is not personally 
owned. "Feelings dwell in man, but man dwells in his love." This is 
consistent with the conception of love as the Holy Spirit. Love is out-
side of man; one participates in love, becomes 11 larger." Love is not 
the property of an individual but is experienced in the interplay of 
Self with Other. Neither is love a social force. It occurs between 
Self and Other. If we are theological, it occurs when the boundary 
between I and You blurs: whenever two or more are gathered in a higher 
purpose that allows the Spirit to enter. If we wish to be secular, then 
love is a magical creation of interaction which can be reduced to 
neither individual nor group phenomena. Love is not Me and it is not 
You. It is not even Ours in the sense that it can be attributed to our 
relationship. It happens when we allow the nature of our relation to be 
such that love can play between us. This is the nature of love: that 
we dwell in love foregoing other ways of relating. "Whoever does not 
know this ••• does not know love." The nature of love is a sharing 
outside of ourselves and is not attributable to either the power of our 
personalities or to social forces. 
Love is a "small bird" which only "shows up" when it is safe; when 
the other possible social games (power, status, exchange) are dropped 
and when ego needs have been safely managed in such a way as to allow 
the sharp boundaries of ego to give way to openness. It is only then 
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that love comes to play. There must be room and opportunity for the 
Spirit to come into play transforming our selves and the nature of our 
interaction. Love is found on this boundary between self and society: 
when we have somehow stepped out of the social drama and out of the nar-
rowness of self. 
The Christian idea of Agape in many ways approaches an understand-
ing of this process. The writings of theologians and mystics give us a 
feeling for this process. The mystics speak of the 11 dark night of the 
soul .. -- the light that comes in after we have surrendered all effort. 
God is encountered after we have dropped all social games and ego 
attempts, and realized that life is caused by neither social forces or 
by ego. After we have dropped cultural renditions, social games and ego 
attemptsj we come to realize that life does not go away. It remains as 
a miracle: uncaused in any normal and explainable sense. Life is not 
accountable in terms of the psyche or the social, yet it continues to 
pulsate. It is much larger than either our individual renditions or our 
social dramas. 
Agape as Inclusion 
The vision of Agape rests upon the premise of 11 0pening one•s 
heart ... In this opening, one participates in a greater spirit of life 
to which all have access. Both the mystics and the Christian theolo-
gians speak of such a path. In following one•s heart, one is related to 
God and the greater Love which is the heart of the universe. Agape 
expands outward opening to hopefully embrace all of mankind in a vision 
of 11 peace on earth, goodwill 11 towards all. Through charity and altruism 
we seek to transcend the narrowness of ego boundaries and participate in 
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a common spirit. The neighborly love of Agape represents an attitude 
towards the world: a stance which greets all people in a loving manner. 
It is not exclusive. While romantic love is particularistic focusing on 
one person in particular, Christian love is universal and non-
particularistic, embracing all people. 
In romantic love, a couple desires to withdraw from the world and 
focus upon each other. The world thus remains only as a theater or a 
stage for the exploits of their romance. In the Christian love, all 
people are part of the vision. In Agape, love is both the principle and 
the ethos for relation of Self to all Others. "If you have done it in 
the least of men, you have done it unto me." Love becomes a way of mov-
ing in the world cognizant of our common humanity. The heart seeks to 
expand outward leaving none out of a shared vision. 
Romantic love, as we have discussed, functions about the social 
process of exclusion and limited focus. The Christian love functions by 
a social process of inclusion. It is the love of all mankind. To 
embrace such a stance requires that we develop a certain sophistication 
conc~rning the social dynamics of inclusion. Bergson {1935) was most 
helpful here. In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, he differen-
tiated between the closed society based on social pressure and social 
obligation, and the expansive or open society. In the closed society, 
one obeys out of force: "You must because you must." In the open 
society, the basis of social integration is "aspiration": people follow 
because they have been swept away by enthusiasm -- the "impetus to 
love." This impetus to love is the second basis or source of society. 
In Bergson•s views, we find a way of dealing with the Christian 
love adequately. He wrote that: 
Social obligation always has in view ••• a closed society • 
• • • • It is not concerned with humanity • . • • Who can 
help seeing that social cohesion is largely due to the neces-
sity for a community to protect itself against others, and 
that it is primarily as against all other men that we love the 
men with whom we live? ••• We love naturally and directly 
our parents and our fellow countrymen, whereas love of mankind 
is indirect and acquired •••• We come only by roundabout 
ways, for it is only through God, in God, that religion bids 
man love mankind ••• (Bergson, 1935, p. 32). 
182 
Bergson (1935, p. 35) said that "it is not by widening the bounds 
of the city that you reach humanity; • the difference is not one of 
degree but of kind... The difference in kind is between the closed soul 
and the open soul. ()) the one hand, we have the •;attitude ••• of an 
individual and a community concentrated on themselves. At once indivi-
dual and social, the soul here moves round i~ a circle. It is closed ... 
"The other attitude is that of the open soul ••• [if] we say that it 
embraces all humanity; we should not be going too far, we should hardly 
be going far enough, since its love may extend to animals, to plants, to 
all nature" (Bergson, 1935, p. 38) • 
• • • it is not by process of expansion of the self that we 
can pass from the first state to the second. A psychology 
which is purely intellectual, following the indications of 
speech, will doubtless define feelings by the things with 
which they are associated; love of one•s family, love of one•s 
country, love of mankind; it will see in these three inclina-
tions one single feeling, growing larger to embrace an 
increasing number of persons •••• 
The first [two] imply a choice, therefore an exclusion. 
The latter is all love. The former light directly on an 
object which attracts them. The latter does not yield to the 
attraction of its object; it has not aimed at this object; it 
has shot beyond and reached humanity only by passing through 
humanity (Bergson, 1935, pp. 38-39) • 
The desire of the open soul is simply to open to love. It is thus 
a different principle than the more familiar loves. It has no object 
other than love. This leap of faith cannot be justified by strictly 
experiential grounds. The love of particular people --even larger 
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numbers of people -- is subject to a different dynamic than all-embracing 
love. In some ways this Christian love has everything to do with people 
in general and little to do with particular persons. It is an attitude 
or a way of approaching life: a fundamental way in which we are outside 
ourselves. 
Others have noted this inclusive-exclusive nature of love and how 
much social dynamics differ from ideal of Agape. In the classical soci-
ological concept of the "in-group and the out~group," people develop 
feelings of love and inclusion by excluding from the group (Sumner, 1906, 
p. 12). A "we" which is intimate and loving is formed in reaction to 
a "they" which is non-intimate and threatening. We know who we love by 
excluding those we do not love. Becker (1968, p. 379) followed Whitehead 
in noting that one of the basic sources of evil is that "alternatives 
exclude... The choice of one direction in some ways deprives us of time 
and energy for exploration in other directions. 
In the last chapter of The Ways and Power of Love, Sorokin (1951) 
also saw this exclusion dynamic as the fundamental problem that must be 
dealt with by any humanitarian effort. If there is no leap beyond the 
natural process of exclusion-inclusion, then we will love those close to 
us and dislike those foreign. 
Agape seeks to embrace all in a collective vision of humanity. Yet 
as Carpenter (1970) noted, sometimes the last thing we want to do is 
love and touch everyone. This would dissipate our energy and destroy 
the very content of our love. We give ourselves very intensely to a 
few, but to try to love every person in this way would destroy us. We 
have only so much time and energy. The number of intimate, intense 
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relationships that any one person can have is finite in number and quite 
probably small. We cannot love everybody in a direct, personal manner 
than we could attempt to make love with everyone in the world. There is 
not enough time or energy ••• but this also misses the point. 
As Johnson (1972) argued, we desire not a full merger with each and 
every being, but a feeling of relatedness and ·integration, i.e., a feel-
ing of participation in humanity. Then, we are content just to be part 
of this humanity. This need not take the form or pattern of our other 
or pattern of our other intimate relations. The neighborly love is a 
friendliness: a way of approaching the world. 
As Bergson (1935} argued so successfully, the love of humanity is a 
direct leap of intuition, but to live this love requires some type of 
intervening and mediating structure. We cannot simply reach out and 
touch each person directly in face-to-face interaction. There must be 
some type of buffer or intervening way to map the self to all of 
humanity. To love all of humanity requires a social form: a code, an 
organization . . . some type of structural component to relate self to 
a 11. 
In many ways, Christianity is a set of attitudes and codes for 
dealing with others. This is why it is often so dogmatic: it is not 
concerned with people per se, but with one's approach toward them. 
Agape requires that we immediately find ways of opening to love. These 
are usually quickly translated and reified into moral codes. The sue-
cessful moral code becomes a way which others imitate: it allows them 
to feel further related to humanity and the heart of life; we enter in 
and participate, readily following aspiration: 
This is what occurs in musical emotion, for example •••. 
In point of fact, it does not introduce these feelings into 
us; it introduces us into themt as passersby are forced into a 
street dance. Thus do pioneers in morality proceed (Bergson, 
1935, p. 40). 
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Bergson portrayed a sweeping vision of love across human history. 
He felt evolutionary theories were wrong in that they did not go far 
enough: they did not explain why a man --the product of evolution 
could theorize the theory of evolution: they did not explain 
consciousness. Bergson saw the force behind evolution as the desire 
for consciousness and greater awareness: an "impetus to love" which is 
the primary force behind society. Great moral leaders who from time to 
have shown us practical ways of opening our heart and loving. We have 
willingly followed hoping to feel related and at home with life. 
Religion and morality have both an open dynamic form which is new 
and fresht and a static form which loses the original aspiration and 
must then rely upon social pressure. The static form is what Ortega y 
Gasset (1957) referred to as social usage. Usages lag behind the 
creative impetus and tend to be outmoded at the very time they become 
conventions. Yet there is the tension between the old and the new. 
The force of human evolution and the desire of the human heart is 
toward the open, toward relatednesst toward an aspiration: 
In all times there have arisen exceptional ment incarnating 
this morality. Before the saints of Christianityt mankind had 
known the sages of Greece, the prophets of Israel t and 
Arahants of Buddhismt and others besides. It is to them that 
men have always turned for that complete morality which we had 
best call absolute morality ••• (Bergsont 1935t p. 34) • 
• • • exceptional souls have appeared who sensed their kinship 
with the soul of Everyman • • • • The appearance of each one 
of them was like the creation of a new species •••• Each 
of these souls marked a certain point ••• of a love which 
seems to be the very essence of the creative effort (Bergson, 
1935, p. 95). 
"It is these men who draw us toward an ideal societyt while we 
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yield to the pressure of the real one" (Bergson, 1935, p. 68). This 
impetus to love is the dynamic of social movements: to include more and 
more in the dream. It is a synthesizing process of opening and closing, 
and trying to become more open. The love of Agape rushes in and trans-
forms us. It is a dialectic as we try to learn how to love. But we 
must remember that it represents a fundamentally different form of 
loving. 
Never shall we pass from the closed society to the open 
society, from the city to humanity, by any mere broadening 
out. The two things are not of the same essence. The open 
society is the society which is deemed in principle to embrace 
all humanity. A dream dreamt, now and again, by chosen souls, 
it embodies on every occasion something of itself in crea-
tions, each of which ••• conquers difficulties hitherto 
unconquerable. But after each occasion the circle that has 
momentarily opened closes again. Part of the new has flowed 
into the mould of the old ••• (Bergson, 1935, p. 267). 
The force of Agape is a dream -- a dream of God according to 
Christian theology -- it is a dream of gradually growing to heaven on 
earth. In our lifetimes, we will not achieve it. But that is the dir-
ection in which we desire to move •• "Between the closed soul and 
the open soul there is the soul in process of opening. Between the 
immobility of a man seated and the motion of the same man running there 
is the act of getting up 11 (Bergson, 1935, p. 63). 
In the Jewish version of the Old Testament, we must remember that 
when Moses asked God what his name is he replied "I am becoming that 
which I am becoming .. (Fromm, 1956, p. 58}. 
Love and the Study of Man. 
~e can well see why the "Human Potential" movement turned to what 
was previously strictly religious sources; and why Humanistic Psychology 
and Sociology rapidly become "cluttered" by religious and value 
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considerations. Any attempt to deal with man as man -- to conceive of 
psychology and sociology humanistically -- must enter the field of 
practical religion. 
This is not a new approach. It was the genius of August Comte that 
he insisted that a Science of Man meant a Religion of Humanity. If we 
explore love seriously, then we must also come to this startling 
realization. Love is related to the effort to change the world the very 
cornerstone on which Comte wished to found Sociology. Following Agape, 
he sought to move outward to all of humanity. As Becker (1968) wrote, 
Comte's 
••• life's work is normally considered to fall into two dis-
tinct phases: ••• the first work was a treatise on all the 
sciences, putting forth the striking proposal that sociology 
followed logically in the history of the development of the 
sciences •••• The second work enunciated the 'Religion of 
Humanity' based on love: in the new community sociology would 
subserve social order and be used to promote social interest 
instead of the private selfish interest that was rampant ••• 
admirers of Comte based their admiration on the first work, 
and considered that the second work was done in the grip of 
some kind of dementia or senility ••• We shall return later 
to the reasoned and necesary unity of Comte's system; suffice 
it to say that for now that, contrary to the opinion of many 
superficial commentators, Comte was well aware of what he was 
doing --the two 'phases' of his work were an integrated 
whole. The first period was a systematization that he under-
took on a positivistic, scientific basis to avoid charges of 
mysticism which he knew might be leveled against his guiding 
ideas. The second period was a frank predication of his life 
work on feeling, love, and morality, which he felt were the 
basis for his whole position (p. 44). 
If we study man as, man and refuse to relegate the humanistic vision 
'\. 
to some smaller system, some interesting things emerge. If we begin to 
formulate a Humanistic Sociology by focusing on love as the central 
force in the creation of meaning in man's existence, we find the going 
difficult for we are forced to the boundaries of our normal way of 
perceiving. 
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In Th~_Phenomeno.!!.__~f Man, Tei I hard de Chardi n ( 1959) began with the 
following statement: 
••• what conclusions are forced upon us, when [man] is 
placed fairly and squarely within the framework of phenomenon 
and appearance ••• Seeing. We might say that the whole of 
life is in that verb -- if not in end, at least in essence. 
Fuller being is closer union; such is the kernel and conclu-
sion of this book. But let us emphasize the point: union can 
only increase through an increase in consciousness, that is to 
say in vision • • • • To try to see more and better is not a 
matter of whim or curiosity or self-indulgence. To see or to 
perish is the very condition laid upon everything that makes 
up the universe, by reason of the mysterious gift of 
existence. And this, in superior measure, is man's 
condition. 
But if it is true that it is so vital and so blessed to know, 
let us ask again why we are turning our attention particularly 
to man ••• Is it not precisely one of the attractions of 
science that it rests our eyes by turning them away from man 
(p. 31)? [Italics Original] 
Yet, if we wish to understand love and humanistic efforts, we can-
not rest our eyes for long. If we desire love and closer, fuller union 
then we must turn back to those hazy regions where Self faces Other and 
confronts 1 ife. For "Man, the centre of perspective, is at the same 
time the centre of construction of the universe. And by expediency no 
less than by necessity, all science must be referred back to him" 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p. 33). [Italics Original] 
In many ways love is an intimacy with Self, with Other, and 
ultimately with Life: a way of Knowing. We must bridge the distance. 
Psychological and Sociological Approaches to Love 
Although organized sociology and psychology have not followed Comte 
nor Chardin•s vision on a discipline-wide basis, there have been some 
important exceptions. These attempts allow us to expand our knowledge 
as we explore a definition of love. Other attempts have not dealt 
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explicitly with love but contribute to our understanding of love. 
Warmoth {1981) commented that three of the major theories in psychology 
have really concerned love: Freud was the master of the study of Eros; 
Adler's writings on will actually framed a theory of narcissism or self-
love; and Carl Rogers presented the stance of the unconditional love of 
Agape. 
We might approach a definition of love by noting the various compo-
nents which the social disciplines have associated with love. Often 
writers will find that approaching love directly is too hazy and will 
switch their terms. Thus instead of studying love, they will write 
about something they feel is correlated with love but less difficult to 
understand. They will write on growth, trust, or self-actualization. 
Others will explore primary groups, successful marriage, or the nature 
of the sacred. Some of these ideas and insights we can use directly. 
Others must be revised, extrapolating the kernal of truth for our pur-
poses. Through such an approach, it is possible to discover a basis for 
a theory and definition of love. 
Freud•s theory of the 11 libido 11 has been narrowly interpreted as 
sexual energy. It is the desire to unite; to become part of something 
larger. Libido moves to decrease distance and to incorporate within 
self. Fromm (1956) wrote: 
Freud•s error in seeing love exclusively as the expression 
or a sublimination -- of the sexual instinct, rather than rec-
ognizing that sexual desire is one manifestation of the need 
for love and union • • • • Freud has been criticized for his 
overevaluation of sex. This criticism was often prompted by 
the wish to remove an element from Freud's system which aroused 
criticism and hostility among conventionally minded people 
•••• My criticism of Freud's theory is not that he over-
emphasized sex, but his failure to understand sex deeply 
enough. He took the first step in discovering the signifi-
cance of interpersonal passions • • • • In the further devel-
opment of psychoanalysis it is necessary to correct and deepen 
Freud's concept by translating Freud's insights from the 
physiological into the biological and existential dimension 
(p. 30). 
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What is the key to Freud's concept of which Fromm speaks? Fromme 
(1963) in The Ability to love followed Freud in noting that love is an 
attachment. "Love is an attachment influenced by previous and other· 
attachments Love exists only in the context of our total exper-
ience" (Fromme, 1963, p. 209). 
Following Freud, he argued that love is an attachment primarily and 
that the emotional components are secondary (Fromme, 1963). Emotional 
aspects come later; it is the attachment which is the primary aspect of 
love. As Fromme {1963, p. 354) wrote, "love is something we learn." 
The formation of our attachments teach us a pattern of loving. It is 
our way of growing in love. 
Menninger (1942, p. 261) said that "What Freud really showed was 
that one does not •fal1 1 in love: one grows into love and love grows 
in him." 
Would we pe pressing too far to say that love is the life force: 
the desire to attach our self to something outside of ourselves? Viewed 
existentially, could we not claim that this is the force which holds 
both the individual and the social together? Could we not say that love 
and attachment are the very fabr·ic of the creation of meaning? If we 
press an understanding of Freud, it appears that this becomes our 
answer. 
Freud {1915) stated his views in the following words: 
We assume that the human being has a certain amount of love, 
called libido, which, at the beginning, while remaining within 
the borders of its own self, is directed at its own self. 
Later on in the development, actually from a very early state 
on, this love detaches itself from the self, it aims itself on 
things outside, which are therefore, in a way, incorporated 
within us (p. 360). 
Freud continued: 
If the things get lost or if they are destroyed, the love or 
libido which we had attached to those things, will become free 
again. This love can then aim itself on the things that took 
the place of the first things, but it can equally well return 
to self. It appears that the latter is painful. Why it 
should be painful, why the detachment of things causes 
suffering, we do not understand ••• What we see is that the 
libido clings to things, and that it does not want to give up 
things even if good substitutes are ready for it (p. 360). 
Van Den Berg {1961), whose translation this is, commented: 
What prompts the libido to leave the inner self? In 1914 
Freud asked himself this question -- the essential question of 
his psychology, and the essential question of the psychology 
of the twentieth century. His answer ended the process of 
interiorization. It is: the libido leaves the inner self 
when the inner self has become too full. In order to prevent 
it from being torn, the I has to aim itself on objects outside 
the self; ••• ultimately man must begin to love in order not 
to get ill {p. 235). 
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CXte must attach one's self to something larger in order to not 
become ill; in order to create meaning. It will/be noted later that 
Fromm uses .this in the formation of his definition of love. Fromm 
(1956) saw love as overcoming separateness. Meaning is achieved 
in relation to something larger than self. Love is a way of achieving 
relation and meaning. 
The work of other psychologists and sociologists may also provide 
us with a basis for understanding love. Sociological and psychological 
frameworks have related love to giving (Sorokin, 1950; Fromm, 1947, 
1956), care (Mayeroff, 1971), growth (Maslow, 1962), and creativity 
(May, 1975; Menninger, 1942). Love is seen as a nourishing force which 
expands and is essentially productive. It is given freely and is self-
generative. It provides an atmosphere for personal growth and the 
5afety in which giving becomes receiving. 
Love has also been correlated with the willingness to trust 
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(Biddle, 1966; Gibb, 1978), the release from fear (Jampolsky, 1979), 
courage (Moustakas, 1972; May, 1975) and self-disclosure (Jourard, 1968; 
1971). It seems that I can only know as much of myself as I am willing 
to reveal to You. Trust is needed if I am going to allow You to see Me 
as I really am. If love is to occur, I must allow you a space where 
you can be as you are. As one feels more and more free to relax and 
open, the other can do the same. 
J 
I love her. What does this mean? ••• As she discloses her 
being to me or before my gaze, my existence is enriched. I am 
more alive. I experience myself in dimensions that she 
evokes, such that life is more meaningful and livable. My 
beloved is a mystery that I want to make transparent. But the 
paradox is that I cannot make my beloved do anything. I can 
only invite and earn the disclosure that makes her transpar-
ent. I want to know my beloved. But for me to know, she must 
show. And for her to show her mysteries to me, she must be 
assured I will respect them, take delight in them (Jourard, 
1971, p. 52). 
This is why the humanistic power cannot control but must invite, 
wait, and court. Love requires an atmosphere of trust for it to show 
itself. One must move past fear with the courage it takes to be one•s 
self. Trust is the prerequisite for self-disclosure and love. 
Love also has been related to knowledge and to intimacy. Kieffer 
(1977, p. 267) defined intimacy as ~the experiencing of the essence of 
one•s self in intense intellectual, physical, and/or emotional communion 
with another human being.~ It is the central human experience where one 
must focus any effort at a humanistic discipline. ~As Angyal (1965) has 
contended, the maintenance of closeness with another human being is the 
center of one•s existence until the very end of life~ (Kieffer, 1977, 
p. 268). 
~effer followed Biddle (1976) in analyzing intimate relationships 
along the dimensions of breadth, openness, and depth. ~Breadth ••• is 
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the range of activities shared by the partners. The openness dimension 
includes facets of disclosure of 'self' in the Jourardian sense ••• 
(Kieffer, 1977, p. 271). 
Openness ••• is the mutual disclosure of the intellectual, 
physical, and/or emotional identities of each partner in the 
process of their interaction • • • • Disclosure is an essen-
tial element in the escalation of intimacy ••• (Kieffer, 
1977, p. 274). 
"Depth ••• is the degree to which an intimate relationship incor-
porates identities that are central to the partners" {Kieffer, 1977, 
p. 275). 
Trying to define intimacy conceptually is an exceedingly difficult 
task because, as Kieffer noted, as anyone experiencing love knows, not 
only do people melt and b 1 end, but so do our concepts: "Within the 
experience of intimacy he or she may discover once again, at least for a 
few moments, that intimacy is a mystery that defies explanation" 
(Kieffer, 1977, p. 277). 
Yet, we must find ways to point to the experience. As Bergson 
(1935) noted, it should not bother us that we must speak of love in 
abstract terms: we should remember the experience. 
Loyalty, sacrifice of self ••• charity, such are the words 
we use when we think of these things. But have we, generally 
speaking, in mind at such times anything more than words? 
Probably not, and we fully realize this. It is sufficient, we 
say, that the formula is there; it will take on its full mean-
ing; the idea which is to fill it out will become operative, 
when the occasion arises (p. 36). 
It is important that we talk about the things which we have found 
vital even if we are no longer immediately in contact with that 
experience. Just the act of a collective and public remembering 
taking them into account; making space for their existence -- brings us 
all a step closer to remembering. Love is a rare and very special 
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experience. Much of the magic of life is remembering what we know: the 
trust, the child-like space of awe and wonder, the dislcosure and the 
openness where love can find us once again. 
Reiss (1960, 1971) spoke of the "Wheel Theory of Love" as depicting 
the process of increased intimacy. The spokes of the wheel are rapport, 
self-revelation, need-fulfillment, and mutual dependency. As each spoke 
moves, the wheel turns and love increases. Each movement also increases 
each of the component spokes. 
By far the major contribution to an understanding of love is the 
work of Erich Fromm. He is perhaps the only psychologist or sociologist 
who has dealt explicitly and extensively with love throughout his life's 
work. Fromm's full significance has not been adequately understood pre-
cisely because his thesis is situated at the juncture between sociology 
and psychology. 
Fromm's contribution contains the seeds of a genuine understanding 
of love and a conceptual framework for enacting those insights in the 
social world. His understanding invites us toward envisioning a human-
istic sociology. That he moves so quickly from the psychological to the 
macro-sociological has led many to discount his views as superficial. 
~-e does move rapidly between micro-psychological and macro-sociological 
levels, but his is an initial effort. The boldness of this scope is 
demanded by the very thesis that he is posits. Although, the outline 
which he conceptualizes is not filled in any great detail, within his 
writings can be found the basic parameters of a Love Paradigm. 
The precise component addressed in Fromm's work shifts over the 
course of his career, yet his argument and emphasis on love remains the 
same. In Man for Himself (1947), the focus was upon productivity and 
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the potent power of love. In it, we find the genesis of much of Fromm's 
theory of love. The Art of Loving {1956) was a direct effort to form-
ulate a "Theory of Love" and note the implications for the practice of 
love in a decaying Western culture. The Revolution of Hope (1968) 
focused on one crucial aspect of love and embraced the key component of 
"aliveness." The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1973) dealt with the 
reverse side of creativity and love: it is a study of what happens when 
the will to life and love is blocked. In To Have Or to Be? (1976), he 
argued that the crucial question in ethics is the difference between 
ethical systems based on acquisition and those in the humanitarian trad-
ition emphasizing "Being" and love. In other works, Fromm confronted 
our refusal to create meaning and embrace our own freedom (1941); the 
relation of the healthy person to social arrangements {1955); psycholog-
ical problems as a form of the alienation depicted by Marx; and the 
integration of religious values and psychological insight (1950t 1966). 
Throughout, he spoke of creating value and meaning: facilitating the 
growth of healthy personalities that can love and also providing a 
social context in which love can flourish. 
His "Theory of Love" was formally contained in The Art of Loving 
(1956) and was an expansion of specific ideas expressed in Man For 
Himself (1947). Fromm began his theory with the fact of human 
separateness. 
Man ••• is life being aware of itself. This awarenss of 
himself as a separate entity, the awareness of his own short 
life-span, of the fact that without his will he is born and 
against his will he dies, that he will die before those whom 
he loves, or they before him, the awareness ••• of his help-
lessness before the forces of nature and society, all this 
makes his separate, disunited existence an unbearable prison. 
He would become insane could he not liberate himself from this 
prison and reach out, unite himself in some form or other with 
men, with the world outside. The experience of separateness 
arouses anxiety; it is, indeed, the source of all anxiety 
(Fromm, 1956, p. 6). [Italics Original] 
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Man must seek for a manner of relatedness with the whole of life. 
It is through relatedness -- overcoming separateness -- that one finds 
meaning in life. 
Human existence is characterized by the fact that man is alone 
and separated from the world; not being able to stand the sep-
aration, he is irnp.elled to seek relatedness and oneness •••• 
It is the paradox of human existence that man must simulta-
neously seek for closeness and for independence; for oneness 
wi·th others and at the same time for the preservation of his 
un4queness and particularity • • • • The answer to this para-
dox -- and to the moral problem of man --is productiveness. 
One can be productively related to the world by acting and by 
comprehending ••• [The] power of love ehables him to break 
through the wall which separates him from another person and 
to comprehend him (Fromm, 1947, pp. 102-103). [Italics 
Original] 
Man, set apart by his self-awareness and the capacity to feel 
lonely, would be a helpless bit of dust driven by the winds if 
he did not find emotional ties which satisfied his need to be 
related and unified with the world beyond his own person 
(Fromm, 1968, p. 68). 
Fromm (1956) outlined several paths to overcoming our separateness. 
There are "orgiastic states" --trances, drug experiences, sexual orgasm 
-- which integrate mind and body, but are episodic in nature. "Conform-
ity'' offers a chance to feel at one with the group and is relatively 
permanent despite the fact that it lacks intensity. One may also over-
come separateness by ''creative activity" in which the artist merges with 
the creation. However, none of these customary ways are entirely 
satisfactory. 
The unity achieved in productive work is not interpersonal; 
the unity achieved in orgiastic fusion is transitory; the unit 
achieved by conformity is only pseudo-unity. Hence, they are 
only partial answers to the problem of existence. The full 
answer lies in the achievement of interpersonal union, of 
fusion with another person, in love (Fromm, 1956, p. 15). 
[Italics Original] --
Fromm's (1947) definition of genuine love was that 
Love is the productive form of relatedness to others and to 
oneself. It impl1es responsibility, care, respect, and know-
ledge, and the wish for the other person to grow and develop. 
It is the expression of intimacy between two human beings 
under the ~ition of the preservation of each other~ 
_!nte9rity {p. 116). [Italics Or1gina1J -
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Care implies that 11 Love is the active concern for the llfe and the 
growth of that which we love" (Fromm~ 1956, p. 22). Responsibility is 
related to faith (Fromm, 1947). Love takes the opportunity offered by 
"falling in love" to expand and enter into a dialog of response to 
another person. Respect is the abi 1 ity to see another as he or she 
really is. Fromm ( 1956, p. 23) noted that "respect is not fear or 
a·we ," but is akin to the root of the word, which means 1 i tera lly "to 
look at." 
Love is a way of knowledge: of feeling related and at home in the 
world. It is both a path to knowledge and a path to meaning. Love is a 
different path to knowledge than the scientific power of analysis, 
dissection, and control. 
The basic need to fuse with another person as to transcend the 
prison of one's separateness is closely related to another 
specifically human desire: to know the 'secret of man.• 
There is one way, a desperate one, to know the secret: it 
is that of complete power over another person; the power which 
makes him do what we want, feel what we want, think what we 
want; which transforms him into a thing • 
The other path to knowing 'the secret' is love. Love is the 
active penetration of the other person, in which my desire to 
know is stilled by union. • Sadism is motivated by the 
wish to know the secret, yet I remain as ignorant as I was 
before. I have torn the other being apart limb by limb, yet 
all I have done is to destroy him. Love is the only way of 
knowledge, which in the act of union answers my quest. In the 
act of loving, of giving myself, I discover myself, I discover 
us both, I discover man (Fromm, 1956, p. 24). 
We must now explore a crucial distinction which Fromm uses for a 
conceptualization of love. He wrote: 
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••• if we call the achievement of interpersonal union 'love,' 
we find ourselves in serious difficulty • • • • Should we reserve 
the word 11 love" only for a specific kind of union, one which 
has been the ideal virtue in all great humanistic religions 
and philosophical systems of the last four thousand years of 
Western and Eastern history? • • • Do we refer to love as the 
mature answer to the problem of existence, or do we speak of 
those immature forms of love which may be called symbiotic 
union (Fromm, 1956, p. 15)? 
In symbiotic union, there is attachment based on need but without 
preserving each other's integrity. The individual integrity of at least 
one member is surrendered to preserve union. This "love" is dependence 
based on reciprocal need. 11 Two become One" but at a price. It is not a 
matter of two whole persons coming together in relationship, but of two 
partial persons uniting: two halves who make a whole. In some ways, it 
becomes a matter of addition. 11 lmmature love says: 'I love you because 
I need you.• Mature love says: 'I need you because I love you'" 
(Fromm, 1956, p. 34). 
In the sym~iotic relatedness the person is related to others 
but loses or never attains his independence; he avoids the 
danger of aloneness by becoming part of another person, either 
by being 'swallowed' by that person or by 'swallowing' him 
(Fromm, 1947, p. 113). 
Archetypically or as ideal types, Fromm differentiated two forms of 
symbiotic union. Curiously, he treats them as masochistic (submissive) 
or sadistic (domination). 
The masochistic person does not have to make decisions, does 
not have to take any risks; he is never alone-- but he is not 
independent; he has no integrity; he is not yet fully born. 
The person renounces his integrity, makes himself the 
instrument of somebody or something outside himself; he does 
not solve the problem of living by productive activity. 
The sadistic person wants to escape from his aloneness by 
making another person part and parcel of himself. He inflates 
and enhances himself by incorporating another person, who 
worsh·ips him (Fromm, 1956, p. 6). 
Yet, despite the fact that between sadism and masochism, there is 
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11 a considerable difference in a realistic sense; in a deeper emotional 
sense, the difference is not so great as that which they both have in 
common: fusion without integrity 11 (Fromm, 1956, p. 17). 
In both instances, there is a fundamental inability to handle 
power. One person must lose in order for another person to win. This 
inability to deal with power is the distinction which Fromm has drawn 
between mature and immature love. 
I will argue that in a relationship, interpersonal magic is the 
ability to share power. It is important to note that Fromm•s conception 
of love revolved around the ability to resolve the power issue! 
In contrast to symbiotic union, mature love is union under the 
condition of preserving one•s integrity-=:-one•s individual-
ity. Love is an act1ve power in man: a power which breaks 
through the walls which separate man from his fellow men, 
which unites him with others; love makes him overcome the 
sense of isolation and separateness, yet it permits him to be 
himself, to retain his integrity. In love the paradox occurs 
that two beings become one and yet remain two (Fromm, 1956, p. 
17). [Italics Original] 
Love is an exploration of the possibilities of human life. It 
finds its fulfillment in mystery, awe, and an overflowing joy. At 
times, it attains its depth in a tearful understanding. It is an active 
exploration of all that life can be. 
On the other hand, symbiotic attachment --even at its best -- is 
never more than just a matter of 11 keeping each other warm. 11 With the 
symbiotic union, 
••• man indeed succeeds in feeling at home in the world, but 
he pays a tremendous price for this security, that of submis-
sion, dependence, and a blockage to the full development of 
his reason and of his capacity to love. He remains a child 
when he should have become an adult. The ••• ties ••• of 
benign and of malignant ecstasies can disappear only if man-
finds a higher form of feeling at home in the world, ir-nol-
only his intellect develops, but also his capacity to feel 
related without submitting, at home without being imprisoned, 
intimafe witfiout being stifled (rromrn:I96"8,"'p. f)9). [Italics 
f.1ine] 
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Love involves touching without grasping, feeling the power but not 
claiming it, holding but not owning. It demands respect and faith in 
love. "Without respect for and knowledge of the beloved person, love 
deteriorates into domination and possessiveness,. (Fromm, 1947, p. 107). 
One must realize the impossibility of a fulfilling love by control and 
domination. 
When love is experienced in the mode of having it implies con-
fining, imprisoning, or controlling the object one 'loves.• 
It is strangling, deadening, suffocating, killing, not life-
giving. What people call love is mostly a misuse of the word, 
in order to hide the reality of not loving (Fromm, 1973, p. 
33}. [Ital~cs Original] 
Love demands a psychological maturity and a sociological awareness 
of power. With such a valuable experience, if one does not have a 
mature insight, one will try to force it as a matter of will. Yet, the 
nature of love is such that it is alien to the world of force and 
control. However, this is very difficult because in love we are at the 
very core of the essence of our meaning. It demands that people be in 
touch with themselves. 
Love is possible only if two persons communicate with each 
other from the center of their existence, hence if each one of 
them experiences himself from the center of his existence. 
Only in this 'central experience• is human reality, only here 
is aliveness, only here is the basis for love. Love, experi-
enced thus, is a constant challenge; it is not a resting place 
• • • • Two people experience themselves frorn the essence of 
their existence, that they are one with each other by being 
with themselves, rather than by fleeing from themselves. 
There is only one proof for the presence of love: the depth 
of the relationship, and the aliveness and strength in each 
person concerned; this is the fruit by which love is recog-
nized (Fromm, 1956, pp. 86-87). 
Love demands a faith: to disclose myself as who I am and to exper-
ience myself as who I am. It is a faith that will be enough. Rather 
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than having to fashion myself to another•s expectations, I avoid the 
personality market and explore the depths. "What matters in relation to 
love is the faith in one•s own love; in its ability to produce love in 
others, and in its reliability 11 (Fromm, 1956, p. 104). 
Love recognizes that there is another way of life than force and 
control. It is a trust in the power of love. It is the trust that 
love, as if by magic, will awaken love. It is a faith that love will 
take us where we need to go. 
Love is an act of strength~ an openness which leaves one vulner-
able to an attack of power. Any betrayal of love shakes us to the roots 
of our being and challenges our creation of self. Fromm (1956) wrote: 
••• to have faith requires courage, the ability to take a 
risk. To be loved, and to love, one needs ••• the courage 
to judge certain values as of ultimate concern -- and to take 
the jump and stake everything on these values. This courage 
is very different from the ••• slogan •to live dangerously.• 
• • • [That] is rooted in a destructive attitude toward life, 
in the willingness to throw life away because one is incapable 
of loving it. The courage of despair is the opposite of the 
courage of love, just as the faith in power is the opposite of 
the faith in life. 
The practice of faith and courage ••• is to notice where and 
when one loses faith; ••• to recognize how every betrayal of 
faith weakens one, and how increased weakness leads to new 
betrayal, and so on in a vicious circle. Then one will also 
recognize that while one is consciously afraid of not being 
loved, the real, though usually unconscious fear is that of lov-
ing. To love means to commit oneself without guarantee, to give 
oneself completely in the hope that our love will produce love in 
the loved person. Love is an act of faith and whoever is of 
little faith is also of little love (pp. 106-107). 
Yet, some have asked if such a commitment without guarantee is not, 
perhaps, out of date. Kieffer {1977) commented that 
Many modern individuals tend to approach love as a process of 
mutual exchange in which each of the partners attempts to 
derive affective rewards for minimal costs. For many of us, 
this description of love is an accurate portrayal of our abil-
ity to love •••• We fail to arrive at a depth in intimacy 
which would enable us to transcend self and to say with all 
sincerity that 'I am as concerned about you as I am about me.• 
As Fromm has reminded us, most of us who attempt to love are 
incapable of committing ourselves without any guarantees in 
the hope that love will be returned. We say in our actions 
and perhaps in so many words, 'I will be as concerned about 
you as you are about me.• Perhaps we as individuals are so 
much a product of capitalistic society that we cannot tran-
scend the utilitarian •self' of exchange theory (p. 276). 
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This is why Fromm indited the capitalistic assumptions of self and 
exchange theory. 
While a great deal of lip service is paid to the religious 
ideal of love of one's neighbor, our relations are actually 
determined, at their best, by the principle of fairness. 
Fairness meaning not to use fraud and trickery in the exchange 
of commodities and services, and in the exchange of feelings. 
• I give you as much as you give me,• in material goods as well 
as in lovet is the prevalent ethical maxim in capitalistic 
society. It may even be said that the development of fairness 
ethics is the particular ethical contribution of capitalistic 
society •••• 
Fairness ethics lend themselves to confusion with the ethics 
of the Golden Rule. The maxim •to do unto others as you would 
like them to do unto you• can be interpreted as meaning 'be 
fair in your exchange with others.• But actually, it was for-
mulated originally as a more popular version of the Biblical 
'Love thy neighbor as thyself.• Indeed, the Jewish-Christian 
norm of brotherly love is entirely different from fairness 
ethics • • • • The practice of love must be in with recog-
nizing the difference between a1rness an romm, 1956, 
pp. 108-109). [Italics Mine] 
In exchange, affective rewards are being exchanged across the 
boundaries of self: there is no collapse of boundaries; no merging. 
Indeed, the fundamental assumption of exchange theory is the positing of 
separate selves which then trade back and forth. There is no merging or 
overcoming of separateness here: only goods and rewards to be exchanged 
according to a rational calculus. There is no miracle; no human mystery 
of merging and creation: only a predetermined set of societal roles 
rights and obligations. There is no mystery of love and faith; no 
exploration of the depth of the human possibility. The "rewards" of 
love are much different than the rewards of goods or services. Love 
overcomes separateness. The distance between selves is bridged in an 
experience of intimacy. 
The exchange assumptions of the nature of self prevent a full 
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intimacy. By constantly withdrawing to "keep score," individuals have 
difficulty merging. A paragraph after her comments on Fromm, Kieffer 
{1977) wrote: 
It is essentially within the depths of intimacy that the 
greatest rewards are to be found. It is perhaps in the emo-
tional component of depth that we find 1ove and the other 
aspects that are so highly prized by individuals and so diffi~ 
cult to achieve. Within the experience of intimacy, he or she 
may discover once again, at least for a few moments, that 
intimacy is a mystery that defies explanation (p. 276). 
It is also a mystery which defies calculation. Love is a creative, 
generative force which overcomes separateness. The creation of meaning 
through love is totally distinct from the parameters of exchange theory. 
This is why love is so rare: it differs from the prevailing world view 
afforded by science, technology, and exchange theory. It is a different 
paradigm which.demands a re-visioning of society. A love paradigm pro-
vides us with the basis for a necessary re-thinking of societal arrange-
ments. Love requires a compatible social context in which to flourish. 
This is why Fromm's work, of necessity, bridges both the psycho-
logical (individual) and the societal: love requires us tore-explore 
the nature of self and other; it requires us to re-examine the nature of 
social relation; and it demands that we re-formulate society. 
Fromm (1956) concluded The Art of Loving with the following words: 
The discussion of the art of loving cannot be restricted to 
the personal realm of acquiring and developing those char-
acteristics and attitudes which have been described in this 
chapter. It is inseparably connected with the social realm 
• • • • Those who are seriously concerned with love as the 
only rational answer to the problem of human existence must 
arrive at the conclusion that important and radical changes in 
our social structure are necessary if love is to become a 
social and not a highly individualistic marginal phenomenon. 
If man is to be able to love, he must be put in his 
supreme place. The economic machine must serve him, rather 
than he serve it • • • • Society must be organized in such a 
way that man's social, loving nature is not separated from his 
social existence, but becomes one with it (p. 108). 
If it is true, as I have tried to show, that love is the only 
sane and sat1sfactory answer to the problem of human exist-
ence, then any society which excludes, relatively, the devel-
opment of love, must in the long run perish of its own 
contradiction with the basic necessities of human nature. 
Indeed, to speak of love is not 'preaching,' for the simple 
reason that it means to speak of the ultimate and real need in 
every human being. That this need has been obscured does not 
mean that it does not exist. To analyze the nature of love is 
to discover its general absence today and to criticize the 
social conditions which are responsible for this absence. To 
have faith in the possibility of love as a social and not only 
exceptional-individual phenomenon, is a rational faith based 
on the insight into the very nature of man (p. 111). 
We must provide social arrangements and social structures which 
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facilitate and encourage the occurrence of love. We must rethink the 
parameters of exchange theory, science, and technology which effectively 
obscure or prevent love from having any wide impact on society. We must 
come to a new understanding of the social bond which does not render 
love to a separate realm. We must strive for a humanistic image of man 
which are crucial experiences of intimacy and meaning. We must embrace 
the fullness of the movement of life in theories of knowledge and 
society. 
Love is a creative joy which generates a security of meaning. Love 
moves as a human mystery, and experiencing love awakens a celebration in 
life. The experience of its depth gives faith: the willingness to 
stake value in love. Joy and the heart's desire to expand outward 
because of love -- must not be underrated. Jourard commented that in 
our efforts to develop an· accurate epistemology of love, we must be 
careful not to forget that love is a joy in life. In speaking of sexual 
joy and the intimacy of married love, he says some things which also 
apply to the joy found in all love: 
Let us talk about something altogether rare -- a married 
couple who love one another, not in the sober sense of loving 
as Erich Fromm portrays it, but also in the sense of enjoying 
each other, delighting in one another•s company. Each knows 
and cares for the other, responds to the other•s needs, and 
respects the other,•s idiosyncrasies. Neither lover seeks to 
sculpt the other to conform to some idealized image. This is 
love according to Fromm, and, for that matter, it is love even 
according to my own unromantic treatment of the theme. In an 
earlier book I defined love not so much as emotion as action 
undertaken with the aim of fostering happiness and growth in 
the person loved. But there is something grim, even a sense 
of hard work implicit in that conception of love. I would 
like to spice this conception with laughter and wholesome, 
lusty, mischievous, saucy sex. Not sex as mere coupling, but 
sex as an expression of joie-de vivre, of a sharing of the 
good things in life. Sex that is deeply enjoyed ••• the 
kind that makes a well-married couple look at each other from 
time to time and wink or grin or become humble at the remem-
brance of joys past and expectant of those yet to be enjoyed 
(Jourard, 1971, pp. 42-43). 
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Love is a joy whether it be the intimacies of lovers or the close-
ness of friendship. Love is an obligation and a responsibility which is 
serious work. But, we must not forget that it is also play. It merges 
the realms of the serious and the recreational. It returns us to the 
wide-eyed sense of wonder and mystery, as we enter into a 11 Child-like 11 
world of play. 11 0nly as a child will you enter the kingdom of heaven ... 
Joy provides a freedom which cannot be experienced elsewhere. It is 
aliveness: a celebration of life. 
The impetus which draws people toward love is joy. While love is a 
serious exploration of meaning, it is the joy which gives the explora-
tion its depth and its freedom. Joy gives us a fresh birth: it is the 
playful joy which the romantics claim transforms the world. This joy 
can become the basis of creativity and depth. 
Fromm spoke of aliveness and the joy of love as the foundation of 
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all humanistic ethics. In seeking to place love at the center of 
knowledge, we must remember to recreate the experience. Love is a 
mystery which gives us strength and understanding. It is the experience 
of love's joy which reduces our answers to simplicity. 
Here, we come full circle back to the ancient understandings of 
Plato. Asked what the purpose of love might be, his response was that 
it seeks to attain "the Good." When asked what happens when a man 
attains the good, Plato responded, he will be happy. The experience of 
love takes us to the good, and experiencing this good brings us happi-
ness. Love produces an outpouring of joy which releases us into play. 
It is joy which is the basis of humanistic ethics. It is around joy 
that we must conceive of a humanistic theory of action. Science and 
economic cost-benefit calculations separate the world into realms of 
work and play. Love reunites work with re-creation; the sacred with the 
profane. If love has a method, it is happiness. 
Love is a celebration of life. Its kinship with the soul gives us 
the impetus to join the dance. Jourard reminded us that in developing 
an epistemology of love, we must not forget to join the dance: return-
ing to the experience for fresh impetus. Love is like a spring from 
which we draw and come away refreshed. Joy re-creates our spirit. The 
more romantic of us might claim with Bergson (and Plato) that love is 
the life spring: the creative power --the force behind our strivings 
which, when experienced, satisfies our longings for a time and makes us 
whole. The ''power" of love is, in many ways, found in its joy -- a joy 
which we would not want to resist. 
Continuing Jourard's insight, we might use sex as a metaphor for 
understanding power in social relations. This is different than Freud's 
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sexual metaphor. One may masochistically submit to power or sadisti-
cally impose his or her own will. Yet, we can graduate to love only 
when the power is shared; love consists of experiencing the sharing of 
the power. This is precisely Fromm•s point. Maturity is learning to 
move past family ties to which we must submit as a child and not in turn 
needing to force others to submit to a recreation in order to create 
self. 
Learning to love is learning to balance power. Magically, when we 
have moved past exploitation and into sharing the experience, something 
happens: love springs from us. The world transforms. Life becomes an 
intimacy: a relatedness in which we can relax and let go. We can sing, 
dance, laugh, create, and bubble forth into the world. One achieves a 
degree of composure with the power of life. This is the psychological 
insight. Sociologically we may say: The ~agic of love occurs when each 
does not need to keep the power for self but can share it. 
If we explore the epistemology of love as the basis for social 
relation, we find that the effort is advanced by the work of the theolo-
gian Paul Tillich. In Love, Power, and Justice (Tillich, 1954), he 
emphasized a framework which stresses and supplements Fromm•s theory of 
love as overcoming separateness. He added an important understanding. 
He wrote: 
Life is being in actuality and love is the moving power of 
life. In these two sentences the ontological nature of love 
is expressed. They say that being is not actual without the 
love which drives everything that is toward everything else 
that is. In man•s experience of love the nature of life 
becomes manifest. Love is the drive toward the unity of the 
separated (Tillich, 1954, p. 25). 
Tillich (1954) proceeded to argue that conceiving of love as over-
coming separateness implied that relationships, such as symbiotic 
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unions, which dilute individuals into partial persons cannot, by defini-
tion, be love. 
Love is the drive for reunion of the separated. It presup-
poses that there is something to be reunited, something rela-
tively independent that stands upon itself. Sometimes the 
love of complete self-surrender has been praised and called 
the fulfillment of love. But the question is: What kind of 
self-surrender is it and what is it that it surrenders? If a 
self whose power of being is weakened or vanishing surrenders, 
his surrender is worth nothing. • • • The surrender of such 
an emaciated self is not genuine love because it extinguishes 
and does not unite what is estranged. The love of this kind 
is the desire to annihilate one•s responsible and creative 
self for the sake of the participation in another self which 
by the assumed act of love is made responsible for himself and 
oneself. The chaotic self-surrender does not give justice to 
one•s own power of being and to accept the claim for justice 
which is implied in this power. Without this justice there is 
no reunitive love, because there is nothing to unite (Tillich, 
1954, pp. 68-69). [Italics'Original] 
A sense of justice for the integrity of each individual is essen-
tial if love is not to ·be extinguished in its own desire for union. 
love seeks the reunion of the separated. Power seeks fulfillment and 
actualization of being. Justice demands integrity. Without love, there 
is only isolation. Without power, there is no growth. Without justice, 
there is nothing to unite in love. Tillich demanded that we consider 
-~hese three together as part of the same process. 
Martin Buber•s work on the "I 11 and "Thou 11 also is a complementary 
conception of love as overcoming separateness. He wrote: "The princi-
ple of human life is not simple, but twofold • I propose to call 
the first movement •the primal setting at a distance• and the second 
•entering into relation.,• (Buber, 1957, p. 97). 
When "1 11 is too far away from "You," we distance Self and Other, 
objectifying them in such a manner that overcoming separateness becomes 
almost impossible. We need a perspective which allows both "I 11 and 
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"You" to stand out as a distinct, but does not, at the same time, reify 
self in such a manner that reuniting person with person is not possible. 
The fundamental relation of Self and Other must be recognized in any 
conception of "I." Buber (1970) wrote that there are two basic frame-
works or "words" which one can use in formulating conceptions of the 
world: 
The attitude of man is twofold in accordance with the two 
basic words he can speak. • • • One basic word is the word 
pair 1-You. The other basic word is the word pair l-It; but 
this basic word is not changed when He or She takes the place 
of It (p. 53). 
Self can objectify Other and treat He or She as an object, as an 
It. Or Self can treat Other as a You. "There is no I as such but only 
the I of the basic word I- You and the I of the basic word I- It. When a 
man says I, he means one or the other" (Buber, 1970, p. 54). 
"I-You" compares to seeing the world (and Other) as interwoven; as 
two elements in a process of relationship. "I-It" renders all to the 
realm of Self and its object. 
Whoever says You does not have something for his object 
• • • • It borders on other Its; It is only by virtue of 
bordering on others. But where You is aided there is no some-
thing. You has no borders. Whoever says You does not have 
something. But he stands in relation. The basic word 
I-You establishes the world of relation (Buber, 1970, p. 55). 
"You" is not a thing. "1-You" is the realm of relation where there 
are no boundaries between Self and Other. With "1-You," I intermingles 
with You; there is no object but a process of relationship and a 
fluctuating boundary. 
With the conception of Self as "l-It," one treats the world (or 
Other) as an object setting it at a distance. "I-You" is a process; "I-
It", an abtraction -- a separation of one from the other. "The basic 
word !-You can only be spoken with one•s whole being. The basic word 
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l-It can never be spoken with one's whole being" (Buber, 1970, p. 54). 
With 11 l-lt 11 , the world has been objectified. "l-It" is the realm 
of the scientific Cause and Effect; the "Mover .. and its 11 Cbject" as pos-
ited by Aristotelean logic. 11 lt has erected the crucial barrier between 
subject and object; the basic word l-It, the word of separation ..... 
(Buber, 1970, p. 75). 
However, with 11 1-You, .. You cannot be objectified; I and You are 
part of a mutual creat1on of each other and are not fundamentally 
separated: 
The form that confronts me I cannot experience nor describe; I 
can only actualize it .... The concentration and fusion 
into a whole being can never be accomplished by me, can never 
be accomplished without me. I require a You to become; 
becoming I, I say You. All actual life is encounter (Buber, 
1970, p. 62). 
Suber's distinction of the 11 I-You 11 offers a different paradigm to 
Science. It provides a framework where overcoming separateness and love 
can take place. As long as the world and others are frozen as objects, 
such reunion cannot be achieved. 
"Setting at a distance" is essential: for thought, for movement, 
for perception, and for speaking. In order to see and frame in lan-
gauge, we must distance --abstract. This is the nature of thought. 
And yet our abstractions from whole -- from process -- must not be such 
that they are reified and become treated as the thing-dn-itself. "Set-
ting at a distance" must not be allowed to cement into objects; our 
framework of thought must not estrange Self from Other. It is essential 
that we frame our conceptions in a way that we can overcome the separ-
ateness which is implicit in our distancing and thus preserve a dialog 
{Buber, 1957, p. 105). 
Self-Love and Humanistic Psychology 
A discussion of love would be incomplete without focusing upon 
self-love and the humanistic psychology which has embraced it. 
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Humanistic psychology emphasizes growth, aliveness, and the ful-
fillment of the person. Jourard (1971, p. 42) defined love as "action 
undertaken with the aim of fostering happiness and growth in the person 
loved." Humanistic psychology applies this attitude toward the 
happiness and growth of the person: seeking to teach individuals to 
cultivate this nurturing love toward self. It promotes the person's 
capacity to grow and unfold as a fully human potentiality: to be fully 
alive. 
Humanistic psychology maintains that the person is in some way in 
contact with the principles of his or her own fulfillment. Fromm (1947, 
wrote 
Humanistic ethics ••• is formally based on the principle 
that only man himself can determine the criteria for virtue 
••• 'good' is what is good for man and •evil' is what is 
detrimental to man: the sole criterion of ethical value 
being man's welfare (p. 22). 
This idea is at least as old as Spinoza. As related by Fromm 
(1947): 
Spinoza arrives at a concept of virtue: ••• 'To act absol-
utely in conformity with virtue is, in us, nothing but acting, 
living and preserving our being •••• • Preserving one's 
being means to Spinoza to become that which one potentially is 
• • • • By good, consequently, Spinoza understands everthing 
'which we are certain is a means by which we may approach 
nearer and nearer to the model of human nature he set before 
us.• By evil he understands 'everything which we are certain 
hfnders us from reaching that model' (p. 35). [Italics 
Original] 
Fromm (1947) wrote .that 
All ••• have an inherent tendency to actualize their spec-
ific potentialities. The aim of man's life, therefore, is to 
be understood as the unfolding of his powers according to the 
laws or fifs nature •••• To sum u"p, good irlliUmanlStlC -
ethics isthe affirmationof life, the unfolding or manrs 
fo"wers. Virtue is responsiblity towards one 1 s own existence. 
vil constitutes the crippling of mans powers; v1ce 1s lrres-
ponsiblity towards himself (p. 29). [Italics Original] 
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The actualization of self and the realization of life is a common 
theme in humanistic psychology. Life is seen as reaching for its 
potentials; the striving for the creation of self. This attempt may go 
uncultivated when the demands of survival are such that just staying 
alive dominates one•s energy. The person•s effort at self-actualization 
may be so feeble and misguided that its existence is obscured by its 
insanity. Yet, given an opportunity of time or an outlet, humans strive 
to be more. 
Maslow (1962) spoke of ,.self-actualization ... Rogers (1977) empha-
sized a 11 directional tendency .. in self. Fromm (1947, 1968) spoke of 
aliveness and becoming one's self. May (1975) and Allport (1950) 
phrased it as 11 becoming... It is the human desire for fuller being; for 
fulfillment of life. 
Humanistic Psychology insists upon the Self 1 s right to be, grow, 
and develop into what one potentially is. This 11 person-centered 11 
approach to nurturing and growth represents a new and bold development. 
Humanistic psychology maintains a faith that each individual is somehow 
attuned to the larger principle of life. A person can 11 tap 11 this reser-
voir of .. personal knowledge 11 as a basis for action and decision making. 
The knowledge and the striving toward life can be trusted. In the 
social realm, Laing (1964) argued that self is an accurate reflection of 
the pressures, parameters, and opportunities of the social context in 
which a person seeks to create his or her life. Rogers (1977, p. 8) 
spoke of 11 dealing with clients whose lives ••• often seem abnormal, 
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twisted, scarcely human. Yet the directional tendency in them is to be 
trusted." Maslow (1962) formulated the desire to bring to life what the 
self can be as the process of "self-actualization." Rogers (1961) also 
spoke of the movement of self towards actualization: 
The organism has one basic tendency and striving -- to 
actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism. 
Rather than many needs and motives, it seems entirely possible 
that all organic and psychological needs may be described as 
partial aspects of this one fundamental need (p. 487). 
Maslow (1962) wrote that: 
We can certainly now assert that at least a reasonable 
theoretical, and empirical case has been made for the presence 
within the human being of a tendency toward, or a need for 
growing in a direction that can be summarized in general as 
self-actualization, or psychological health •••• That is, the 
human being is so constructed that he presses toward fuller 
and fuller being and this means pressing toward what most 
people would call good values, towards serenity, kindness, 
courage, honesty, love, unselfishness, and goodness (p. 155). 
Harkening back to the Old Testament "I am becoming what I am 
becoming," humanistic psychology posits a potential for an unfolding of 
life. This is not a realized state of being, but a process of becoming. 
There are also echoes of Plato here and a kinship with Christian 
theology. 
Love is Now. It is the recognition of the present that transforms. 
Eastern philosophy, recent Western theology and existential philosophy, 
and the emerging Humanistic Psychology all state this: that in coming 
fully into the present --the Now-- there is a transition. Self is 
transformed in a realization of the present: an emphasis on fuller 
5eing. This is not a passive mediation, but an active present which 
ignites like the light of day and transforms self, personal perception, 
and the world. The Vision is but for tomorrow, the Feeling's here 
today, and Love is just the moment growing on the way. Humanistic 
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psychology contains such an understated epistemology. Within the person 
is hypothesized the possibility of a larger experience. This was Perls 
(1969) emphasis on 11 NoW 11 and the realization of the presence of self. 
Frankl {1965) argued that central to man is the 11 Will to meaning.h 
This is not a drive, but an aspiration in the Bergsonian sense. Man 
aspires to meaning: to make sense out of his existence. Following 
Frankl, we might speak of the actualization of meaning. With conscious-
ness comes the will to meaning; with self-awareness is coupled the 
desire to create a meaningful self-existence. This 11 Will to meaning 11 is 
the central purpose of human beings. 
The desire for fuller life and fuller value demands a measure of 
self-determination to enact the knowledge gleamed from self-awareness. 
This idea of actualizing one's awareness into a meaningful world, is 
crucial to a humanistic conception of man. 
Upon close examination, Rogers• 'fully functioning person• and 
Maslow's •self-actualized person• appear to be the natural 
outcomes of the unobstructed development of the process of 
self-realization. Under ideal conditions of growth, Perls has 
often stated, the human organism can be trusted to regulate 
itself toward optimal integration and interaction with its 
physical and social environment (Tageson, 1982, p. 43). 
This was May's reason for stressing what he terms .. intentionality .. 
the need to give meaning to experience. A person acts because of 
purpose and must be free to discover that purpose and meaning. May 
(1969) wrote of 
••• human beings given motivation by the new possibilities, the 
goals and ideals, which attract and pull them toward the future. 
This does not omit the fact that we are a 11 partially pushed from 
behind and determined by the past, but it unites this force with 
its other half • • • • Purpose, which comes into the process when 
the individual becomes conscious of what he is doing, opens him to 
new and different possibilities in the future and introduces the 
element of personal responsibility and freedom (p. 93). 
215 
This follows Jung's earlier statement that "the mind lives by aims 
as well as causes" (Matson, 1964, p. 208). Human beings are not 
determined by causes or drives but seek for purpose and actualized mean-
ings. Love is care for the growth of that which we love. Humanistic 
psychology applies attitude to personal meaning and purpose. Perhaps 
the ideal of this is expressed in the philosophy of Rogers (1977, p. 15) 
with its emphasis on facilitating, "positive regard," and providing an 
atmosphere of nonpossessive caring and love. 
Self-Love vs. Hedonism 
Many have criticized the humanistic movement as being nothing but a 
new branch of hedonism. However, it is not an operation of the pleasure 
principle. Pleasure is not the basis for value in humanistic ethics. 
Fromm {1947) wrote: 
Pleasure is not the aim of life but it inevitably accompanies 
man's productive activity ••• Goethe, Guyau, Nietzsche, to 
name only some important names, have built their ethical 
theories on the same thought (p. 180). 
He quoted Spinoza: "Happiness is not the reward of virtue, but 
virtue itself" (Fromm, 1947, p. 176). 
Fromm (1947, p. 182) continued: "The concepts of Plato, Aristotle, 
Spinoza, and Spencer have in common the idea ••• that happiness is 
conjunctive with the good." 
Master Eckhart taught that aliveness is conducive to joy ••• 
the distinction between joy and pleasure is crucial. Joy 
is the glow that accompanies being. Pleasure and thrill are 
conducive to sadness after the so-called peak has been 
reached; for the thrill has been experienced and the vessel 
has not grown (Fromm, 1976, p. 102). 
Joy and pleasure are different principles. Pleasure is an end in 
itself: joy is related to fulfilled living and the happiness of a well-
lived life. It is a fundamental part of the healthy personality. We 
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must be very careful to differentiate between happiness and hedonism. 
Hedonism seeks only pleasure for self. Happiness is related to success 
in the art of living and the healthy personality. 
Self-Love and the Healthy Personality 
Following Freud's direction~ traditional psychology has had very 
little to say concerning the healthy person. When pressed, Freud 
defined the healthy individual in terms of the ability to "work and to 
love." His theory itself posited a "genital 11 or healthy phase of devel-
opment. Yet, Freud did not explore this ground. His work concerned how 
people become fixated in previous stages never to arrive at full growth. 
It is the study of pathology and not healthy functioning. It remained 
for humanistic psychology, following Fromm and Maslow in particular, to 
break this ground. In fact, the work of Fromm and Maslow might be sum-
marized as twofold: an exploration of love and an articulation of the 
healthy personality. 
Maslow (1968) studied people who appeared successful in living. 
This is not success in the economic sense, but a healthy, fully func-
tioning personality which could be identified as a model of psycholog-
ical health. In these people, self had come to realization. He termed 
this "sel f-actua 1 i zati on. 11 
Fromm's (1947) work on productiveness in the creation of self was an 
attempt to articulate Freud's hypothesized genital or healthy personal-
ity. He wrote that "If we do not use Freud's term literally [genital 
character] in the context of his libido theory but symbolically, it 
denotes quite accurately the meaning of productiveness" (Fromm, 1947, 
p. 90). [Italics Original] 
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It is from this framework that Fromm was led to discuss spontaneity 
(1941), relatedness (1956), aliveness {1968), and joy {1973). As 
Tageson {1982, p. 43) wrote, "Humanistic psychology seems to have set 
its sights squarely on the understanding of the parameters of healthy 
psychological functioning." Concepts such as self-love or affirmation, 
growth, self-determination, and the creation of a meaningful personal 
·existence are essential for nurturing the self into fulfillment. 
Humanistic psychology moved from an emphasis on pathology to an 
exploration of a model of psychological health. At the same time, 
though, it laid the implications for a new theory of pathology. As a 
theory of well-being developed, it became more and more important to 
explain why everyone did not by nature achieve such health. If the 
"good" is obviously better, then why do so many choose ways of living 
that are non-productive and unfulfilling? Why does not healthy func-
tioning predominate? If aliveness, creativity, growth and a meaningful 
personal existence are better ways of living, then why would anyone 
desire to continue a stagnating, destructive approach to living which is 
literally death in life? The posing of a model of psychological well-
being made the existence of evil problematic. Humanists needed to 
account for the existence of evil. 
Fromm (1947) emphasized the humanist view: 
Life destructive forces in a person occur in a an inverse 
relation to the life-furthering ones. It would seem that the 
degree of destructiveness is proportionate to the degree to 
which the unfolding of a person•s capacity is blocked. 
Destructiveness is the outcome of unlived life (p. 218). 
[Italics Original] 
Ernest Becker made a similar argument. In The Structure of Evil, 
he argued that those positing the 11 good" must explain evil. In review-
ing the history of social thought since the Enlightenment, he noted that 
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we have actually made considerable progress toward an understanding of 
this dynamic. Marx's theory of alienation and Freud's understanding of 
self combined with the work of the early sociologists Ward, Small, and 
Comte provided the basis for an understanding of evil. Becker (1974) 
wrote that if we review a history of this thought, we learn that: 
Recurrent evils like sadism, militant hate, competitive greed, 
narrow pride, calculating self-interest that takes a non-
chalant view of others• lives, mental illness in the extreme 
forms --all stem from constrictions on behavior and from 
shallowness-or meanings; and tnese could be laid in tne lap of 
society, specifically, in the nature and type of education to 
which it submits its young; and to the kinds of choices and 
cognition which its institutions encourage and permit. Man 
could only be ethical if he was strong, and he could only be 
strong if he was given fullest possible cognition, and respon-
sible control over his own powers. The only possible ethics 
was one which took man as a center, and which provided him 
with the conditions that permitted him to try to be moral. 
The antidote to evil was not to impose a crushing sense of 
supernatural sanction, or unthinking obligation, or automatic 
beliefs of any kind-- no matter how 'cheerful' they seem. 
For the first time in history it had become transparently 
clear that the real antidote to evil in society was to supply 
the possiblity of deptn and wholeness or experience. Evil was 
a problem of esfhet1cs --that is, esthetics understood in 
its broad sense as the free creation of human mean1ngs, and 
the acceptance of responsibility for them. It had never been 
so well understood that goodness .and human nature were 
potentially synonymous terms; and evil was a complex reflex 
of the coercion of human powers (p. 168). 
This was the humanistic epistemology of good and evil. God was a 
product of the natural tendency for fulfillment of life. Evil resulted 
from blocked life and the struggle to still live. 
The Emphasis on Self 
Self-love became the keystone of humanistic psychology. It was 
here that one must begin to unravel the puzzle. All too often, we run 
away from self as if self were unimportant. If we begin with the bibli-
cal "~ve your neighbor as yourself," a different conception emerges 
(Holy Bible, Mark 12: 31; Luke 10: 27). 
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Fromm (1947) wrote that there is a relation between the way we love 
ourselves and the way we love others. If we treat ourselves lightly, 
then our love of others is apt to be symbiotic union instead of mature 
love. Fusion under the condition of integrity demands that neither 
partner surrender self as a condition for the union. Self-love is an 
affirmation towards self. It stresses the right of the person to be, 
grow and develop. "You are a child of the universe no less than the 
moon and the stars; you have a right to be here" (.Anonymous). 
The person is central to purpose and meaning. If we blindly sacri-
fice the person for the sake of union, then it is impossible to preserve 
the human as the prime interest of humanism. It is the person who 
loves, who creates, and who bridges towards meaning. We cannot success-
fully compromise the person by granting eminent domain to the relation-
ship and still preserve the possiblity of a full, dynamic union. 
Humanistic psychology approaches the self with an attitude of nurturing 
approval. This is a radical experiment. To treat the self and the per-
son as the central term in our system of meaning implies a faith that we 
are somehow connected to something larger which will work itself out. 
It is an implied sociology, which needs to be articulated. 
The psychotherapy of Rogers (1977, 1961) sought to faciliate the 
realization of self by providing an atmosphere of nonpossessive caring 
and love. Rogers developed this idea of positive regard for the self 
from the influence of Charles Horton Cooley's conception of the 
"looking-glass self" (Tageson, 1982, p. 137). Cooley maintained that we 
create our self-image by looking into the ''mirror" of others; by obtain-
ing their reaction, we create our own image of our self and who we are. 
By providing a nurturing, growth-oriented context which supports the 
right of the person to be, Rogers hoped to achieve maximum personal 
growth. It is a strategy of love applied to social psychology. It 
attempts to create self-love which will then see the person through 
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future trials and circumstances. Rogers was perhaps naive in his under-
standing of social dynamics, but he offered us a first step. 
Attitude toward self and other is part of the same process. Fromm 
(1947) wrote that self~love is the same as love toward others: it 
implies the same kind of attitudes regardless of the object of one's 
1 ove: 
The affirmation of one's own life, happiness, growth, freedom, 
is rooted in one's capacity to love, i.e., in care, respect, 
responsibility, and knowledge. If an individual is able to 
love productively, he loves himself too; if he can love only 
others, he cannot love at all (p. 135). 
Selfishness and self-love, far from being identical, are 
actually opposites. It is true that selfish persons are 
incapable of loving others, but they are not capable of loving 
themselves either (p. 136). 
Nietzsche (1968, p. 99) on The Will to Power (Stanza 785) wrote 
that: "Your neighbor-love is your bad love of yourselves Your 
flee unto your neighbor from yourselves. You cannot stand yourselves 
and you do not love yourselves sufficiently." 
This echoes the biblical "Take the log out of your own eye and then 
you will be able to see clearly to take the speck out of your neighbor's 
eye" (Luke 6: 39-42). 
Nietzsche believed that there is a contradiction between love 
for others and love for oneself; yet his views contain the 
nucleus from which this false dichotomy can be overcome. The 
'love' which he attacks is rooted not in one's own strength, 
but in one's own weakness (Fromm, 1947, p. 130). 
Much of the love throughout history has represented the immature 
"flight from self." For if we do not respect self and personhood, then 
who is the giving for? We merely have unions of partial selves which 
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each feel insufficient and unworthy, and must flee to other for support. 
Self-love teaches that we must begin with our own awarenss in order to 
fully be capable of loving others. Otherwise our love is projection; 
our own self-abuse and the accompanying needliness pollutes our intimate 
relationships. 
Love must move beyond the manipulation which passes for love and 
the debilitating altruism which makes Other a prisoner. The strategy of 
humanistic psychology is to nurture self-love in a way that mature love 
between whole persons can become a possibility. Love demands strength 
and self-knowledge. This self-knowledge and strength can only be 
achieved in an atmosphere which nourishes and supports the self 1 S right 
to be. 
The essence of this view is this: Love is a phenomenon of 
abundance; its premise is the strength of the individual who 
can give. Love is affirmation and productiveness, 1 lt seeketh 
to create what is loved! 1 To love another person is only a 
virtue if its springs from his inner strengtht but it is a 
vice if it is the expression of the basic inability to be 
oneself (Fromm, 1947, p. 131). 
This is the true meaning -- despite other confusions -- of Maslow•s 
(1962) hierarchy of needs. If one is too needy, then their outstretched 
arms are but a gesture polluted by unfinished needs. One tends to mani-
pulate for these needs or be just plain masochistic. It is often 
simpler to take care of one•s own needs rather than manipulatively enter 
into a relationship in the hope that the Other will then fulfill that 
need. It is after one has moved past the immediate priority of these 
survival needs that one can creatively love and reach out. Tageson 
{1982, p. 189) wrote only then can we approach 11 transcendent values of 
beauty, truth, and justice ... "Such values exist, Maslow claimed, 
and are discoverable when we are psychologically free to contemplate the 
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world revealed by experience rather than having to act upon it for our 
own needy purposes" (p. 190). 
Maslow•s hierarchy is a recognition that love normally takes place 
above the level of need because need makes fools of all of us from time 
to time. This does not mean --as some have interpreted --that love is 
a 1 uxury item. It does mean that unless we address our own needs, we 
are forced to selfishly man1pu1ate others to fulfill them. 
The exploration of Self is re1atively new territory. As Watts 
( 1951) has shown, in most primi t 1 ve cultures the concept of "self" as we 
know it does not exist. A concern of the American dream is that we do 
not subsume our freedom into quick conformity -- that the individual is 
important. Ultimately the American dream must mean more than just the 
rights of the individual; it must mean a full exploration of the ful-
fillment of the human potential: life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness. This was Roszak•s {1979) argument. The credo of self invites 
us not to melt back into One (or the dream) too soon without first know-
ing and experiencing self and our own sense of aliveness. 
The concern with self should not be viewed as an end, but as a 
means. The awareness of self provides-- for perhaps the first time in 
history-- the possibility of meeting: of true relationship and love. 
The self-effacing altruism which Nietzsche criticized simply does not 
function as altruism. The "will to be" can be compromised or destroyed 
by obligation, expectation, and the whole process of conformity. Human-
istic psychology teaches that we should take our own lives seriously, 
that we are important and valuable. If life goes on always for some 
other person or some outside cause, then where is this human that we say 
we prize so highly? 
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The nagging doubt and guilt at having become something less than 
ourselves is at the root of the neurosis which permeates our culture 
(May, 1975; Horney, 1937). Sociologically, we must recognize that this 
is no longer the only source of guilt. Obligation toward oneself is no 
more just an internal guilt for an unlived life -- of being less than 
self. With the advent of humanistic psychology, it has also turned into 
an external norm. One now has an externally imposed duty to self as 
duty to self as well as other social obligations. We will return to the 
implications of this later. They imply the need for a humanistic 
sociology. 
For now, we must be concerned with the growing evidence in sociology 
and psychology that one cannot deny one•s dreams --we cannot run away 
from self without consequences. As Fromm {1968) wrote: 
The social order can do almost anything to man. The •almost• 
is important. Even if the social order can do everything to 
man ••• this cannot be done without certain consequences 
which follow from the very conditions of human existence 
(p. 54). 
Freud and all of the psychology which followed is nothing more than 
a compounded body of evidence that if we deny self in one form, it 
reappears in another. The person needs community and social relation-
ship but this cannot be successfully bought at the price of too much 
conformity, obligation, and restriction. If we destroy or maim the 
person for the sake of the community, then who is the community for? 
The human will have vanished. 
The classic argument in favor of societal eminent domain is but a 
freak example of society versus individual difference. We must be very 
careful in imposing and granting eminent domain to society once and for 
all. It is the person who is supposed to be enhanced by society. 
Becker (1968, p. 251) notes that "the idea held up by the Englightenment 
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i tse 1 f • • • is the ideal for overcoming historical alienation: man 
must try to achieve maximum individuality within maximum community." 
[Italics Original] 
This is why Roszak (1979) stressed the historical movement past 
individual freedom and rights. Pluralism means a conception of the 
person and of personal ful fi 11ment: the expression of meaning and 
potential. We can't compromise our selves for the community --this 
the lesson of modern psychology and sociology. 
Yet~ humanistic psychology has placed us in a double-bind as far 
norms are concerned. There is a dichotomy between personal needs for 
is 
as 
closeness and needs for expression/independence. Dowling (1981) in The 
Cinderella Complex: Women's Hidden Fear of Independence, documented 
the pushes and the pulls between the need for security/relatedness and 
the nagging need to be self and under one's own power. She is speaking 
in terms of the "Women's Movement," but this is far from only a woman's 
dilemma. It is accentuated for women because the development of a self 
for women apart from role identities in relation to man or children 
--is a fairly recent issue. The push and pull between duty to self and 
desire for the security of Other is synonymous with the problems 
involved in the creation of self. It is central to being authentically 
human living past role definitions of relatedness and identity. 
If we surrender self for relationship, we cast ourselves as stran-
gers. We cannot fluctuate between trading self for security and then 
fleeing that shelter, without feeling that we are trapped in a maze 
which refuses to reveal our own identity. Any escape from self is only 
a reprieve. We begin to desire the values of self as soon as we have 
warmed ourselves by the fire of "love." As soon as we have been 
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re-valued as humans, the dreams of an unlived life will begin to haunt 
us. Cohen (1967) has accurately depicted this dilemma in the "Stranger 
Song": 
And then leaning on your window sill 
He•11 say one day you caused his will 
to weaken with your love and warmth and shelter, 
And taking from his wallet 
An old schedule of trains, he'll say, 
'I told you when I came I was a stranger,• 
'I told you when I came I was a stranger,• 
But now another stranger seems 
To want you to ignore his dreams 
As though they were the burden of some other 
And while he ta 1 ks his dreams to sleep 
You'll notice there's a highway 
Curling up like smoke above his shoulder 
(n.p.). 
. . . 
There is no exit from our dreams and our values of self. In the 
end, our dreams possess us either as roads that we must take or guilts 
which haunt our familiar security. The Women's Movement, as well as the 
whole movement toward self, offers the opportunity, for perhaps the 
first time in history, to come together as full human beings and explore 
the human potential. That human possibility is love. 
Self and the Social 
The concern with the healthy personality and the actualized self 
pushes humanistic psychology to its discipline boundary. For now we 
must view the shoreline of self. We must consider the social context of 
self and formulate the relation of Self to Other. The self is not a 
"self"-contained unit. Its boundary and very creation is involved with 
other people. Maslow (1962) wrote: 
We are confronted with a difficult paradox when we attempt to 
describe the complex attitude toward the self or ego of the 
growth-oriented, self-actualized person. It is just this per-
son, in whom ego-strength is at its height, who most easily 
forgets or transcends the ego, who can be most problem-
centered, most self-forgetfu1, most spontaneous in his activi~ 
ties • • • In such people, absorption in perceiving, in 
doing, in enjoying, in creating can be very complete, very 
integrated and very pure (p. 37). 
It is precisely the "self•• actualized person who can become 
involved with other people, who can share the boundary of self and 
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create in the moment, who can ••1ose" oneself. It is the unactualized 
person who must cling to ego as if it were made of gold. The actualized 
"self" allows the boundary between Self and Other to become porous: he 
or she can transcend self and participate in another. 
Humanistic psychology originates in the need for self-love. The 
full "self•• can extend and stretch its boundaries -- can move in and 
participate in another•s space without then destroying Other. Love 
allows a shifting, moving boundary between Self and Other without having 
to claim all for self. Self-love includes a reverence for Other and is 
a stance toward life. Humanistic psychology seeks to avoid the debili-
tatiing altruism which turns Other into a prisoner. It also seeks to 
prevent Self from fusing too quickly: of giving up self to merge with 
other. For if we too quickly negate the human in order to fit ourselves 
to relationship, then we will never know the possiblities of life. 
As the poet McWilliams (n.d.) wrote: 
Yes, two halves do make a whole. 
But when two wholes coincide, 
That is beauty. 
That is love. 
(Poster, n.p.) 
Humanistic psychology begins as an attempt to move beyond symbiotic 
relationship to a full human encounter. Seeing the abuses of the self-
effacing altruism and self-denial, humanistic psychology advanced an 
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effort to correct these defects. However, such strategies must be kept 
in context. It began as an attempt to create whole selves because only 
full selves can come together and meet in love. It was not an end in 
itself. If we view the self-love psychology as the climax and the pin-
nacle of the movement, then we miss the point. It was part of a process 
and the implementation of a strategy to love: an attempt to create self 
in a way that would further meeting, greeting, and sharing. It sought 
to create a "self" that wasn•t compromised. Relationship is not founded 
on one person giving away self to another, but on the mutual creation of 
both partners. The flight from self is the key to our inability to 
fully relate. Humanistic psychology sought to create true relationship 
without swindling the individual for the sake of the community. It was 
an exploration of the real human potential which is meeting, relation-
ship, and community: of ways to come together in the fullness of our 
selves. 
Humanistic psychology desired to move beyond the denial of self 
which has characterized history. It sought the true possibility of the 
blossoming of self in relationship. This was the cornerstone of the 
movement: that self need not be negated for relationship or society to 
be possible. Self-denial was deemed not a virtue, but a mechanism which 
prevented fuller love. 
Yet, self-love and the psychological approach met the sociological 
shoreline of other. The embrace of self was not without its problems: 
"the message of duty to self seemed like the perfect alternative. 
Fromm, Rogers, May and Maslow had all effectively criticized the 
restrictive effects of self-denial" (Yankelovich, 1981, p. 242). 
With the doors to self-actualization and human potential open, it 
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often became difficult to distinguish between self-fulfillment and 
hedonism. When were they "following their heart" and when were they 
simply "following their greed?" The duty to self-philosophy had a 
tendency to be reified as a private movement not concerning others. The 
line between effective strategies for a fuller self capable of entering 
into meaningful relationships became confused with the self that merely 
wants to horde. Yankelovich (1981) wrote: 
The self is not confined to private consciousness in the sense 
of feelings and potentials unique to you and somehow impri-
soned within your skull or skin. That is one aspect of self. 
But the self is also part and parcel of the world. 
You are not the sum of your desires. You do not consist of an 
aggregate of needs, and your inner growth is not a matter of 
fulfilling all your potentials. By concentrating day and 
night on your feelings, potentials, needs, wants and desires, 
and by learning to assert them more freely, you do not become 
a freer, more spontaneous, more creative self; you become a 
narrower, more self-centered, more isolated one. You do not 
grow, you shrink. 
The search for self-fulfillment cannot succeed unless its 
seekers discard the assumption of the self as private con-
sciousness. Only when one understands that self must be ful-
filled with the shared meanings of the psychoculture is one 
pursuing self-fulfillment realistically (p. 242). 
We cannot isolate Self from Other; we cannot separate self from 
cultural meanings and resources. No matter how neglected the search for 
self-fulfillment has been, we must not forget to also understand human 
beings in relation. "Love is between an I and a You," Buber wrote. 
"Whoever does not know this with his being, does not know love" 
(Buber, 1957, p. 66). It is the experience between Self and Other which 
is critical. The individual potential is not the human potential 
because it merely cultivates the individual for marketplace success. 
The human potential is the human possibility. 
Perhaps this is no better illustrated than by the "God is inside 
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You" rhetoric. We must be careful to recognize that the individual 
person is not God, even though he or she participates in this larger 
spirit of God. God is contained in humanity: between us in our 
interaction. It is a consciousness that we share. This is why Suber 
was so insistent that love is an ''inbetween" space belonging neither to 
psychology nor to traditional sociology. 
We must understand the play of the spirit between people if we are 
to understand love. 
have been dropped. 
Love is a spirit which shows up when other games 
We must understand that the nature of self is such 
that I and You are a mutual creation. The "self" is socially created in 
the relationship between "Self" and "Other". This is the key of the 
sociological view and the only way we can approach a fuller understand-
ing of love. A humanistic psychology is incomplete without a companion 
humanistic sociology. As Cooley (1902, n.p.) wrote: 11 The individual 
and the group are but two sides of the same coin ... 
Self is fundamentally and inseparably related to Other. This was 
also Mead's social psychology of the formation of the self. Mead argued 
that self was created in a process of the moment: that it was fundamen-
tally social (Mead, 1934). The self is a social process. 
We must reflect back to what we mean when we use the word 11 Self ... 
It does not mean that the Self is se 1 f-suffi ci ent; or a person unto 
oneself who does not need other people. Self is an experiencer -- a 
boundary with the world and others. In many ways, the term "Self" is a 
paradox: "I can only know that much of myself as I am willing to con-
fide in you ... "I know myself most when ,I am in relation with another." 
11 I am most myself when I experience myself through love with another." 
At times, I lose myself in relationships, and I must withdraw to 
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solitude. But too much solitude is loneliness and I also lose myself. 
I can only regain myself when I find a "you" with whom I can share. And 
I can only retain myself when I don't just become that "You." 
What does "self" mean? What is a whole "self"? The answer can 
only be that it means an integrity: not giving up one's identity or 
violating one's 11 Self". Self-love is refusal to compromise aspects of 
self which are crucial to one's own sense of well being. It is allowing 
time and space for development of those aspects of self which provide 
one with a sense of joy and accomplishment. One does not finish the 
creation of self and then become ready for relationship. Self is not an 
accomplishment that can be completed. Self is a process. A whole self 
does not mean that self-creation has now been completed. A whole self 
means a sense of integrity. 
The boundary of Self is Other. And that boundary changes from 
interaction to interaction; from thought to thought; from moment to 
moment. At times we are so close that the boundaries of consciousness 
blur. Consciousness becomes a thing that we share: that we both parti-
cipate in. To understand love, we must understand that boundary between 
Self and Other: where touching, greeting, and meeting become magic. As 
Rilke (1975, n.p.) wrote: "Love consists in this: that two solitudes 
touch, and meet, and greet one another ... 
We know ourselves best when we have comfortably set the boundary 
between our self and the world. Too much self is loneliness. The ideal 
amount is called solitude: time to reflect, remember, and regroup. 
Some accomplishments of self require some amount of isolation: where we 
are forced back on the resources of self to gain new knowledge. Self is 
a balancing act between too much and too little. 
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Our sense of identity is established by communicating and meeting. 
Self is a relatedness toward the world which feels comfortable. If we 
push for our rights too strongly, sometimes we abuse another's inte-
grity. We also lose our power of self-creation. The facility with 
which our wishes are catered too often leads to self-indulgence where we 
attempt to institutionalize the "free lunch''. But to touch and greet 
requires a sense of self: an authenticity which strikes us as "us... It 
is only through such integrity that we can approach true communication 
and relationship. Self and relation are intertwined: a part of the 
same process. We will not be finished with either until death. 
Cooley (1929) formulated the concept of the "looking-glass self ... 
We see ourselves in the mirror of others. It is through interaction and 
relation that we are a~le to attain a sense of who we are. Rogers 
(1961, p. 1977) used this concept of the ''looking-glass self" to develop 
a strategy of love. He attempted to create a social context of "posi-
tive self-regard 11 (Tageson, 1982). Roger's strategy was to positively 
reinforce the creation of self thus teaching self-love and nurturance. 
Yet such a strategy is sociologically naive because except in rare 
instances, we have neither the self or the social context in hand. In 
psychotherapy and institutional settings, positive nurturance can bring 
the person to life. But in normal interaction, the dynamics between 
Self and Other are a much more complicated process. 
In some ways, humanistic psychology creates a false "self." Popu-
lar humanistic psychology spin-offs miss the point. They can only be 
adapted as far as current capitalistic goals allow. Utlimately, we must 
change the system: the way people live their lives, relate and conceive 
of self. Otherwise, techniques of mediation, stress reduction, and 
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self-formation merely funnel back into the main cultural scenarios. 
They dissipate and are only momentary "shots in the arm"; leaving one 
even more "burnt" and alienated from self and others. What is required 
are effective social arrangements, goals and ways of living that are 
brought to bear upon one•s whole life. 
In many ways, the term "self•• has been abused. Freud wrote in the 
time when the approaching industrial society was watching the extended 
family give way to the nuclear family. The individual no longer felt a 
kinship outside of the mobile, self-sufficient unit of husband-wife-
children. Moving past extended family ties that saw one generation 
bound to another was the whole core of Freud's theory of the development 
of self. Popularizing Freud and his version of self as breaking away, 
it now seems that we have come to an ideal version of self as a self-
sufficient unit: a nuclear self --which moves encapsulated without 
relatedness. But Self doesn•t mean that. 
Part of this is confused by the issue of the freedom mythos of the 
American dream. In myth and legend, we have all heard testimony to a 
rare human possiblity: relatedness, of living as a part of all with a 
sense of freedom. This freedom represents a call of the spirit and 
is psychological in nature: the heart•s desire. But it is not an acci-
dent that the humanistic psychology movement sprang upon the cultural 
scene the same time the latest experiement with freedom -- the American 
Counterculture -- flourished. Roszak (1979) was right about what 
historically happened to the counterculture -- it become enculturated in 
the personhood movement of humanistic psychology. However, he was very 
wrong about its possiblities. Routinized, the personhood movement 
implied that others become but a support group for the creation of Self. 
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But self is not fitted to such a conception. The capitalistic ideal of 
the nuclear self must give way to another conception: self in 
relationship. 
We must realize that life is not a possession of Self. It does not 
mean that I have contained myself but that I have experienced life. 
He: 'I can't believe how you make love: You totally give 
yourself. • 
She: 'Well of course, that's the only way it's ever worth 
while.•6 
The human possibility: to flow with the grain and purpose of 
life: to feel related; a part of something larger. To share and 
part·icipate in the birth/creation of Self and Other. To know life • 
. Jhi s is the true freedom. To feel at one with 1 if e. It is not a matter 
of individual freedom but the right of the person to know life's 
fulfillment. Things become muddled if we confuse "freedom from" with 
"freedom to"; if we confuse ego maintenance with satisfaction. As the 
poet Gi bran wrote, "Love is the only freedom." 
The counterculture and humanistic psychology became confused about 
this issue of relatedness in much the same manner that they were con-
fused about the ftmerican dream and its historical movement toward free-
dam: both have taken relatedness for granted. As the counterculture's 
Whole Earth Catalog summarized, you cannot put it together, it is 
together. But such statements miss the point. Releatedness is knowing 
the freedom of being part of all while celebrating that knowledge. 
Melville, the first great American novelist, wrote to Nathaniel 
Hawthorne: 
6oialog from the movie Secrets. 
Whence come you, Hawthorne? By \'lhat right do you drink from 
my flagon of life? Md when I put it to my lips --lo, they 
are yours and not mine. I feel that the Godhead is broken up 
like bread at the Supper, and that we are the pieces. Hence 
this infinite fraternity of feelings (Baird, 1979, p. 222}. 
It was as if Melville was saying, 11 is it a dream or has God been 
dissected into parts, and we the parts, now sailors on the sea of His 
dream?.. The ftmerican dream of self provided the real frontier. 
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Melville•s Captain Ahab sailed the sea of this dream on a quest for 
power and glory. And though he saw 11 infinity in the twinkling of an 
eye 11 he did not explore it. Instead, he set sail alone on a dream of 
self. Unless we explore how far this potential identity for soul-with-
soul actually goes, then we abandon ourselves to self w1th the full pos-
sibilities of life unshared. The vision will remain unexplored. In 
some ways, self does not exist but 1s a "summons to be created. 11 If we 
cast off the grander aspects that we discover in life to self, then 
creativity --the life spring -- is only recreation. Creativity means 
moving past what we though was self and embracing a relatedness with 
other. It means allowing our experience of love and the magical to re-
structure our lives. Recreation is merely the experience we have before 
we return to the regular world. It leaves common reality unaltered and 
intact. 
In true magical experiences of love, the self meets, merges, and 
interplays with other. If we define Self as a fixed unit, then we 
return to the normal world as if nothing had happened. Love becomes 
merely recreational rather than re-shaping and re-structuring our lives 
and social arrangements. We must come together for more than a brief 
recollection of the dream. We must experience ourselves as part of 
another self that is beyond our intents and purposes. Only on the 
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shoreline do we find the dream. Only at the boundary between Self and 
Other do we experience our creation. It is only on this shifting shore 
that we find our freedom. Commitment to something larger: our birth in 
daylight. A celebration in joy and laughter of this quiet relatedness 
is this gentle dream. We only become whole in love. We only glimpse 
the stairway and taste truth out beyond the confines of ourself. 
Each soul is a summons to be created 
And none fulfilled 
Till two can see 
then dancing 
Greet with thee 
We create eternity. 
But meeting is our only door 
Not recreation, something more 
the patterns of our lives 
To meet and greet 
And finally come 
To fulfill the dance 
As One 
(Writer Original). 
There is another way in which we might frame an understanding of 
self-love. This becomes apparent if we consider Neill•s (1960, 1966) 
experiment in freedom at Summerhill. Summerhill was an exploration of 
growth and the abolition of rules. It was the concept of democracy 
applied to an educational setting. Yet through this process of freedom 
and self-expression, one norm developed. It was this: 11 lf someone is 
standing on your toes, it is your responsibility to yell •ouch. 111 In a 
society of freedom, one may not be aware that he/she is treading on 
another. It becomes the self•s responsibility to complain when it 
hurts. This is a version of self-love; the simple articulation that 
self exists and yes, ,.you are stepping on my toes ... Such demonstration 
does not reduce self to a power struggle, but opens the process up to 
dialog. It allows the recognition that freedom and self-exploration 
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involve other. We can never successfully conceive of the development of 
self except in relation to other. 
Self-love is affirmation of self. It is being nice to self in the 
sense of not setting oneself up for needless pain and suffering: an 
affirmation that self deserves more of happiness and less of 
unhappiness. It is an acceptance that one is indeed worthy of the 
blessings of life. 
There is also a sense in which Self can dissipate into something 
smaller and more petty. This is what we might term self-indulgence. 
This is not a part of self-love, but its opposite. Over-indulgence 
destroys self. If we try to actualize all potential experiences, we 
lose our identity and end up like leaves in the wind. What self-
actualization really means is to create a viable self; it is the experi-
ence of self as an integrity and an identity. Self-love is the feeling 
of having funneled one's energies into the construction of a life which 
is authentic and meaningful: to be able to say on one's deathbed "Yes, 
I have lived." 
In relation to the difference between self-love and self-
indulgence, we might ask rhetorically, "Is the self a fleeting passion, 
a series of wants that demand immediate satisfaction; or is the self an 
ongoing integrity -- an identity?" The answer should be obvious. 
Paul Tillich added some clarity to the discussion of self-love and 
self-indulgence. The cutting line is the idea of justice. 
There is a definite sense in which one can speak of justice 
towards oneself, namely in the sense that the deciding centre 
is just towards the elements of which it is the centre. 
Justice towards oneself in this sense decides, e.g., that the 
puritan form of self-control is unjust because it excludes 
elements of the self which have a just claim to be admitted to 
the general balance of strivings. Repression is injustice to 
oneself and it has the consequence of all injustice: it is 
self-destructive because of the resistance of the elements 
excluded. This, however, does not mean that the chaotic 
admittance of all strivintgs to the central decision is a 
demand of the justice towards oneself. It may be highly 
unjust, insofar as it makes a balanced center impossible and 
dissolves the self into a process of disconnected impulses. 
This is the danger of the romantic or open type of self-
control. It can become as unjust towards oneself as the 
puritan or closed type of self control. To be just towards 
oneself means to actualize as many potentialities as possible 
without losing oneself in disruption and chaos. 
This is a warning not to be unjust toward oneself in the 
relation of love. For this is always also an injustice 
towards him who accepts the injustice which we exercise 
towards ourselves. He is prevented from being just because he 
is forced to abuse by being abused (Tillich, 1954, p. 70). 
This cuts both ways. It refers to the puritan types of justice 
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where one surrenders self-identity only to have it resurface in a mani-
pulating altruism. It also refers to the open type of self "control" 
which causes the flurry of the moment "to dissipate any ongoing contin-
uity." This second type of attitude forces us to abuse ourselves in 
just the processes which we believe will bring us self-fulfillment. 
Striving after too many potentials may leave us drained, tired and 
unable to really experience happiness in the attainment of any of them. 
Yankelovich (1981) wrote that we have basically institutionalized two 
types of self-control: one is the self-denial which has characterized 
normative structures throughout the ages. The other is relatively new and 
is the "duty to self" philosophy: that there is plenty of everything and 
one can have anything that they want. He argued that the "abundance of 
everything 11 scenario will not work, but at the same time, it will be 
impossible for selves raised on self-fulfillment to return to self-denial 
as a practical strategy. The revolution of consciousness and the fulfill-
ment of the human potential will have to take the form of advances in 
meanings, community, and the whole nature of the social bond. This will 
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require an ethic of commitment which transcends the narrowness of self but 
at the same time furthers all selves. 
The duty to self ethic itself has taken a peculiar form. For at 
first, it did not appear that the credo "Be yourself" or "Do your own 
thing" is a social norm-- and imposed from the outside. Yet, as 
humanistic psychology became popularized, guilt over not having fully 
lived became institutionalized into a "duty to self" ethic. This led to 
more guilt at not having actualized all of one's potentials; it became 
an additional pressure when in fact it had been designed to free the 
individual: a psychological device (self-actualization) had slipped 
over into the realm of social consequences. It may be hard for some to 
~ecognize that the personhood movement -- which decries expectations, 
norms and the like --has translated into expectations and norms. 
Yankelovich (1981) illustrated this perfectly: 
A psychologist friend told me an anecdote which had amused --
and bemused -- her. A patient in psychotherapy with her, a 
woman in her mid-twenties, complained that she had become ner-
vous and fretful because life had grown so hectic --too many 
big weekends, too many discos, too many late hours, too much 
talk, too much wine, too much pot, too much love-making. 
'Why don't you stop?' asked the therapist mildly. Her 
patient stared blankly for a moment, and then her face lit up, 
dazzled by an illumination. 'You mean I really don't have to 
do what I want to do?' she burst out with amazement. 
Ordinarily we think of norms in opposition to desires 
dictating what we should do (wake-up, work hard, buckle down, 
use moderation), as distinct from what we would like to do. 
It had never occurred to her, my friend admitted, that norms 
could support desires and that people could come to feel it 
was their moral duty to yield to their impulses. Her psycho-
logical thinking had been influenced by Freud, and she had 
come to think of social norms as the outgrowths of the par-
ental do's and don'ts people internalize in early stages of 
development. She made no clear distinction between individual 
conscience and social norms, or rules (pp. 83-84). 
The norm of "duty to self" can send one fleeing from self-identity 
just as self-denial might. If self-actualization is translated into a 
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norm, its original meaning is dissipated. It becomes but another in the 
long list of social obligations. Authenticity, at this level, becomes a 
charade. The power of self-actualization becomes confused with the 
power to assert one•s will over another to get one•s whim. Self-
actualization thus becomes routinized into the normal societal order. 
Now we can understand more fully the inter-relation between self 
and other. De Rougemont wrote that relationship is a process of mutual 
commitment where each self creates the other. Commitment 
••• thus understood sets up the person. For the person is 
manifested like something made, in the widest sense of making 
• • • • Its first condition is a fidelity to something that 
before was not, but now is in process of being created •••• 
It is by this roundabout way through the other that self 
arises into being a person. • • • What denies both the indi-
vidual and his natural egotism is what constructs a person 
(De Rougemont, 1956, p. 307). 
But the cult of self would deny such parameters. Self and other 
must then be reduced to a symbiotic relationship. Others become simply 
pawns in our game, or we in theirs. The denial of the existence of the 
other is essential in such a strategy. Other can be a face in the sun-
set or a star to guide our projections, but can never be allowed to be 
more than an extended appendage of self. Other must become unreal. We 
are reminded of the earlier romanticism. 
When the love in the Manichaean legend had undergone the great 
ordeals of initiation, he is met, you remember, by a •dazzling 
rna i den' who we 1 comes him with the words: 'I am thyself. • 
••• Fidelity is then a mystic narcissism --usually uncon-
scious of course, and imagining itself to be true love for 
the other. 
The love of Tristan and Iseult was the anguish of being two; 
and its culmination was a headlong fall into the limitless-
bossom of Night, there where individual shapes, faces, and 
destinies all vanish • • • • The other has to cease to be the 
other, and therefore to cease to be altogether, in order that 
he or she shall cease to make me suffer and that there may be 
only 'I myself am the world!' But married love is the end of 
anguish, the acceptance of a limited being whom I love because 
he or she is a summons to be created, and that in order to 
witness to our allegiance this being turns with me towards 
day. • •• But few people now seem to be able to distinguish 
between an obsession which is undergone and a destiny that we 
shoulder {De Rougemont, 1956, p. 308). 
De Rougemont (1956) argued it is uncontrolled passion that 
destroys the self. 
It is Eros, passionate love ••• that spread through the 
European world the poison ••• that Nietzsche unjustly lays 
at the door of Christianity. And it is Eros, not Agape, that 
glorified our death instinct and sought to idealize it •••• 
The god Eros is the slave of death because he wishes to ele-
vate life above our finite and limited creature state 
(p. 311}. 
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It is the reckless passion which refuses to recognize the other as 
a person, which inturn, destroys ourselves as a person. This is the 
flight from self. Self is not a fleeting desire, but a created contin-
uity. The inability to recognize the inseparable relationship between 
self and other encourages us to flee in the hope that another will save 
us. Heroes and princesses dies hard. But without ever moving past the 
myth of self, it is not ~ossible to arrive at the actual sel~. Indul-
gence must give way to a faith in an active self which we are creating. 
In some ways, it is only by "virtue of the absurd" --that is, by 
"faith" -- that we maintain and create our chosen integrity. 
On the analogy of faith, passion, born of a fatal desire for 
mystical union, may be regarded as open to being surpassed and 
fulfilled only thanks to the meeting with some other, and the 
admission fo this other•s alien life and ever d1st1nct person, 
which although distinct, holds the promise of unending alli-
ance and begins a real dialog. 
Then dread having been banished by response and nostalgia by 
response, we both cease ••• to suffer, and accept our day-
light. It is then that marriage is possible. We are two in 
contentment. However, ••• married couples are not 
saints • • • • We are unendingly and incessantly in the thick 
of the struggle between nature and grace; unendingly and inces-
santly happy and then happy. But the horizon has not remained 
the same, A fidelity maintained in the Name of what does not 
change as we change will gradually disclose some of its mys-
tery; be:l:2nd trafed,x another hapei ness awaits. A hap pi ness 
resernbTirig the 0 a, but no longer belonging to the 
form of the world, for this new happiness transforms the 
world (De Rougemont, 1956, pp. 322-323). [Italics Original] 
This is the true romance: the creation of self and other. 
If self expands without considering the other, then self is mis-
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understood. If one flees from self, then one must abuse other. There 
is no integrity or continuity from which to meet. Self can only meet 
other if both are allowed to exist. 
If one person simply subsumes another, then there is no distance 
over which to communicate; there is no separateness for love to bridge. 
One person has simply become an appendage of the other. To echo Buber, 
love is between self and other. Without both, there is no dialog and 
there is no love. 
Other is not simply a projection of self. Even though self may be 
ultimately connected to Consciousness itself and intuitively a part of 
all the world, there is a separate other who is also connected with this 
same larger awareness. We can only explore other if we realize that he 
or she is other. Only then are we capable of meeting. Only then can we 
explore the magic of two souls put to purpose. 
It is not a historical accident that "self psychology" and the 
11 Women•s movement" appeared at the same time. This is the mystery which 
the ideal of self and the feminist movement seeks to disclose. It was 
Kant who maintained that humanism is the refusal to treat the other as 
merely a 11means. 11 Other is not a means for the self, but an end. Other 
is separate and real. Only then can we move back and forth across the 
boundary in the experience of love. 
A man gives evidence of his love for a woman by treating 
her as a completely human person, not as if she were spirit of 
the legend -- half-goddess, half-bacchante, a compound of 
dreams and sex • • • • 
Women turn into persons instead of being reflections or means 
•••• A man ••• feels the difficult and serious mystery 
of an independent, alien existence: he realizes that he has 
been desiring only an illusory o~ fleeting aspect of what is 
actually a complete life, and that this aspect has been but a 
projection of his own reverie. The sway of the myth is 
by so much weakened, and although this sway is unlikely ever 
to be entirely abolished without leaving traces in hearts 
drugged by images, hearts such as men harbor today, at least 
it loses its efficacy. The myth no longer determines the per-
son (De Rougemont, 1956, pp. 312-313). 
Such a conception fo the other as person, and not as convenient 
indulgence for self, is accomplished 
••• by becoming accustomed not to separate desire from love. 
For if desire travels swiftly and anywhere, love is slow and 
difficult. Love ••• exacts nothing less than this pledge in 
order to disclose its real nature. • • • Neither the excuse 
nor the alibi can deceive any one who does not wish to be 
deceived because he thinks deception will be to his advantage; 
they are [part] of a romantic rhetoric, and allowable in that 
form, but only become ridiculous if confused with psycholog-
ical truth (De Rougemont, 1956, p. 313). 
Love needs a commitment to 1 ave to revea 1 its secrets. It is a 
commitment to 11 1" and to 11 YOu 11 • CKle will know self with a maturity. 
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Only then can one come to other "whole" and undeceived. There is a twin 
frontier on the human potential exploration. It is self. And it is 
other. It is I. And it is you. 
Synergy 
Humanistic sociology explores the space between self and other 
where both self and other are created. It is here that the frontier of 
love appears: as the boundary moves back and forth from self to the 
other. This boundary is constantly changing and collapsing. It is in 
sharing this flow that love is discovered. 
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Love appears as if by magic: a spirit which shows up when we share 
the space; it is a spirit that plays between our lives. Perhaps a muse 
or perhaps a creation of the pooling of human power, it moves from one 
to the other, belonging to neither. A mystery: shared by both; and 
whence it comes, and where it goes, we do not know. The mystery moves 
from shore to shore. We know the experience, but how do we build a 
world in keeping with this experience? So many ways of framing the con~ 
versation drives love from our midst. love is not a product of science. 
It is by invitation only. 
How do we develop social structures and social arrangements which 
encourage and facilitate the invitation? Our theories tend to become 
plots for our lives: how do we develop a manner of speaking that does 
not violate the fullness of love? How do we create conditions where 
love can come into play? Precisely, how do we court the muse? Human-
istic psychology arrives at this point and stops with the answer of 
pluralism. Each individual is separate; there can be no canopy which 
does not reduce the human spirit. Each individual perspective is 
distinct. We must respect the distance and not try to move beyond it. 
I am I and You are You. 
If by chance we find each other, 
It's beautiful 
If not, it can't be helped 
(Perls, 1969, p. 1). 
I am I and You are You. We move back and forth. Sometimes love 
happens to us. If not, we move on. To attempt more brings us to 
reducing and negating the human. I am I and You are You -- and never 
the twain shall meet; except sometimes, by chance. The conclusion is 
that there is no way to deal with love and humanism except to recognize 
the fundamental pluralism of persons. 
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It was the genius of Ruth Benedict who provided us with a way out of 
this dilemma. With one stroke, she simultaneously solved two major 
philosophical questions that have been outstanding for nearly two 
thousand years; she gives us a cornerstone for humanistic sociology and 
theoretical way through the maze of perspectivism. 
Benedict devoted her entire career arguing for the anthropological 
stance of cultural relativity. Cultural relativity was both foundation 
for anthropological and banner of its academic credibility. Ruth 
Benedict•s lifework was to institute cultural relativity firmly within 
the profession of anthropology. Only in her later years did she begin 
talking publically about another concept. This concept had been 
haunting her for years because at first glance it seemed to undermine 
the core stance of cultural relativity. And yet, it was not the 
opposite of cultural relativity, but the first concept that emerges when 
we move beyond scientific neutrality. The concept she introduced was 
synergy. 
She provided the social disciplines a way of finally moving within 
the structures of the ancient "good" vs. "Truth" debate. Of her 
concept, Maslow (1962) wrote: 
From this po~nt of view, a society or a culture can be either 
growth-fostering or growth-inhibiting. This makes 
theoretically possible a comparative sociology, transcending 
and including cultural relativity. The •better• culture grat-
ifies all basic human needs and permits self-actualization. 
The •poorer' cultures do not (p. 211). 
Benedict found a way of talking of values -- of 11 better" -- without 
negating a scientific framework. The armchair anthropologist and the 
zealous missionary had approached primitive cultures wielding values 
like a sword. Cultural relativity demanded that anthropologists take 
the time to understand what a value meant to the actor involved and to 
appreciate how the act integrated into the cultural way of life and 
rendition of meaning. In her travels and studies, though, Benedict 
245 
found one thought that she simply could not deny: some cultures some 
ways of life -- from any human standpoint, seemed preferable to 
others. Some cultures seemed to make life miserable for all of those 
involved. Other cultures made social arrangements such that the person 
was promoted to joy and fulfillment. These cultures appeared 
"objectively" to be "better" if we take into account that a society 
functions for the human actors in its system. Culture is not just a 
self-perpetuating end-in-itself, but a way of life for a given number of 
~eople. Benedict found herself forced to conclude that in some cultures 
life was --and she was not comfortable with the word -- "good ... 
Benedict had studied the relation between individual character 
types and the social arrangements in which they lived. In some cul-
tures, acts undertaken for the individual good also created a mutual 
good for others. In other systems, personal advancement could only be 
achieved at uthe expense of others." In the former instances, personal-
ity types shared values similar to the values all systems of universal 
ethics recommend. In the later cases, individuals were greedy, selfish, 
and often paranoid. Benedict postulated and offered evidence that the 
component that accounted for this was the degree of convergence between 
the individual good and the good of others. This collaboration of group 
and individual good she called synergy. "Synergy, the old term used in 
medicine and theology to mean combined action ••• greater than the sum 
of their separate actions" (Benedict, 1970, p. 321). 
In the synergistic social arrangement, the person comes out larger 
in social relationships. In the non-synergistic arrangement, the person 
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is reduced for the sake of these relationships. The synergistic society 
manages to promote the individual. The non-synergistic society must 
deplete the person in order to create its system of meaning. 
Actually, Benedict was not the first to bring the concept of syn-
ergy into sociological and anthropological circles. She was re-
introducing the term at a particularly crucial juncture~ but whether she 
was aware of the previous usage is not known. The early sociologist 
Ward {1907) had used the word synergy to mean a creative synthesis. For 
Ward, it was the integrative principle of all social evolution. 
Creative synthesis is a principlB of far-reaching application. 
All the products of natural genesis involve appropriate prin-
ciples • • • There is a principle, operating in every depart-
ment of nature and at every stage of evolution, which is 
conservative, creative, and constructive • • • I have at last 
fixed upon the word synergy as the term best adapted to 
express its twofold character of energy and mutuality, or the 
systematic and organic working together of the antithetical 
forces of nature • • • Synergy 1s a synthesis of work, or 
synthetic work, and this is what is everywhere taking place 
(Ward, 1907, p. 170). [Italics Original] 
Creative synthesis thus brings together seemingly diverse elements, 
arriving at an arrangement for mutual advantage. The influence of 
Hegel•s 11dialectic 11 must be noticed here. There is also a correlation 
with Bergson•s later theories of social evolution. If synergy is a 
better arrangement, then people will aspire to such arrangements if 
given the proper cultural context. To Ward, synergy is 11 the balancing 
of forces .. (Chugerman, 1939, p. 151). 
The human race began as an undifferentiated group, the horder 
containing all the elements of the most developed society. At 
length, a process of integration began, according to the prin-
ciple by which all organization takes place, vix., synergy 
(Ward, 1907, p. 203}. 
Everything in nature goes through the stages of thesis, anti-
thesis, and synthesis --conflict, assimilation, decay, and 
rebirth. Taking the two words synthesis and energy, he coined 
the word synergy to denote the universal teamwork of natural 
forces ••• To describe the use of synergy by the human mind, 
Ward borrowed the term creative synthesis from Wundt 
(Chugerman, 1965, p. 104). [Italics Original] 
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To Ward, synergy is the process that advances human evolution. It 
is likely, however, that the world filtered through modern medicine 
before it reached Ruth Benedict's ear. 
In medicine, synergy means substances that when acting together 
p·roduce a result greater than the sum of their individual actions. The 
textbook example is the interaction between codeine and aspirin. Taken 
together, they enhance each other and produce a result greater than 
could have been predicted by simply adding together their individual 
actions. There is an interaction bonus so that 1 + 1 = more than 2. 
The sum of their combined action is greater than the sum of their indi-
vidual actions. 
Benedict dealt with synergy in terms of cultural arrangements but 
the application of the concept can be applied to smaller social arrange-
ments. Indeed, if we apply the concept to interpersonal relations, it 
supplies an accurate operational definition of love. 
Benedict's only published insights on synergy involved the relation 
between the macro-societal and the individual; however, they throw a 
light on the problem of relation and the conceptualization of love. She 
had sought for years to develop, as Harris (1970) put it, a concept that 
would organize anthropological data around humanistic values. 
Benedict had spent her life destroying ethnocentrism. To bridge 
the topic of "the good" culture meant to open oneself to charges of 
value-bias. Benedict•s lectures at Bryn Mawr on synergy never were pub-
lished in original form. The only copy was lost when Maslow became con-
vinced that he was a poor custodian because the elderly Benedict would 
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outlive him. He sent the manuscript back to her --shortly before her 
final heart attack. The synergy papers never turned up (Harris, 1970). 
It remained for Maslow to later publish excerpts that had been hand 
transcribed by another professor {Benedict, 1970). We only have scat ... 
tered hints of the fullness of her views: the reproduced parts from the 
original lectures and recollections from various private conversations. 
Why she did not publish them in her lifetime will probably remain a mys-
tery. As Harris (1970) noted, one could certainly understand her 
hesitancy, for she had come upon the concept that emerges after cultural 
relativity; the concept that surpasses scientific neutrality. She 
probably knew that in her time she would be misunderstood. 
Maybe she was afraid. Among the professionals of anthropol-
ogy, anything but neutral categories might have been attacked 
as 'unscientific' -- the sin of sins • • • • When she died in 
1948 from overworking a damaged heart, she had still not done 
the book beyond Patterns, the one committing herself to a 
notion of social good and evil ••• {Harris, 1970, p. 51). 
Such fear would have been justified. 
The new weapon at hand was the dream of a science of man, to 
be as pure and objective as physics. Unproved moral asser-
tions looked like ethnocentric evil, but cultural relativism 
looked like a scientific ethic (Harris, 1970, p. 51). 
Her work as an anthropologist had been interpreted as proof of 
cultural relativity; however, this was missing the crucial insight that 
she felt she was discovering. As Harris (1970) told the story: 
Benedict was deeply distressed by this interpretation of her 
work. To Maslow ••• she confessed an unstylish doubt about 
relativism • • • She showed him the huge sheets of newsprint 
on which she was listing the cultural characteristics of eight 
eight primitive peoples. She had them divided in two groups. 
When she talked of the first four --the Dobu, the Chukehee, 
the Ojibwa, and the Kwakiutl -- her lean frame would shudder. 
When she talked of the others -- the Zuni, the Arapesh, the 
Dakota and one of the Eskimo groups -- her cameo face came 
alive with pleasure. She was hunting for concepts that would 
explain her inner sense of what made a culture 'nice.' 
In the end, Benedict came up with the concept of synergy 
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• • • • The deeply humanistic idea of synergy sounded senti-
mental and unscientific, of course, and Benedict never risked 
publishing it in professional journals • • • • The beauty of 
synergy haunted Maslow for years • • • • It offered anthro-
pology a chance to build a humanistic study of comparative 
culturet to escape narrow scientism •••• Maslow believes 
that synergy offers the first viable, post Marxian theory of 
the good society (pp. 51-52). 
With science no longer the sacred calf that it was in Benedict's 
time, we can now explore her insights. They must be pieced together 
from the sketchy lectures reprinted by Maslow and from Maslow's (1971) 
own writings. 
Benedict wrote: 
In a study of personality and culture, therefore, we have to 
ask, is there any sociological condition common to all these 
typical social structures that correlates with character types? 
• • • Is there any sociological condition that correlates with 
strong aggression and any that correlate with low aggression? 
• • • From all comparative material the conclusion that 
emerges is that societies where non-aggression is conspicuous 
have social orders in which the individual by the same act and 
at the same time serves his own advantage and that of the 
group. The problem is one of social engineering and depends 
upon how large the areas of mutual advantage are in any soci-
ety. Non-aggression occurs not because people are unselfish 
and pursue social obligations above personal desire, but when 
social arrangements makes these two identical (Maslow, 1971, 
p. 40). 
The synergetic culture equates the "individual good" with the 
"societal good." Such a·social arrangement enhances the functioning of 
a culture: creating a lifestyle or culture ethos enhances those social 
arrangements that we call "good. 11 
When social arrangements equate individual good and societal good, 
life appears to be full, joyful, and-- we must conclude-- good. When 
so.cial arrangements make life a zero-sum game, one can only succeed at 
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the expense of others. In such cultures, life is fearful, aggressive, 
and generally not as good. 
Some cultures nourish the person: 
People are apt to wait patiently for his growth in wisdom and 
discretion. The whole course of his experience has inculcated 
in him a faith in the rewards of acting with his fellows. He 
sees life as an area of mutual advantage where by joint 
activity he attains his own personal desires • • • • Our 
theories of human nature must be wide enough to include the 
kind of behavior that occurs in such sociological settings 
(Benedict, 1970, p. 55). 
Other cultures define the situation differently. Just as the cul-
tures whose arrangements emphasize synergy become self-fulfilling 
prophecies, so cultures that conceive of life as a competitive struggle 
enact such a world. In many ways, synergy is a matter of definition of 
the situation. We set a tone and create a world around it. If we con-
ceive of self too narrowly, then mutual enhancement is apt to go 
unnoticed as a crucial aspect of self. We create instead a battleground 
of self vs. other and self vs. group. 
Benedict's argument was such cultural arrangements are always unsuc-
cessful. When self is subverted to a meaningless conformity to society, 
polluting side-effects are the result. If society serves self, then 
self serves society and we create a synergistic culture. The "Good" 
society furthers the lives of the persons in that society. Otherwise, 
one cannot help but ask: then who is the society for? The answer to 
that question invariably appears as crime, violence, unhappiness, and a 
less than satisfying life. 
Benedict wrote that the conditions of aggression appear the same 
everywhere. 
I believe we are misled by mere scale and too easily believe 
that we are faced by a condition civilizations have not met 
before. Small-scale or large, the fundamental condition of 
peace is federation for mutual advantage (Benedict, 1970, 
p. 55) • 
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Other cultures have felt similar strains. This is true even if we 
apply it to the Second World War when she wrote: 
The state may seek its own advantage at the expense of its 
citizens •••• We are wrong to think dictators are a new 
invention. Some African states have dictators who could give 
pointers to Hitler ••• (Benedict, 1970, p. 74). 
From the micro to the macro level of society, the balancing of the 
individual and societal good predicts the movement to synergy; it is a 
commitment to a creative possibility. Synergy is, first of all, a 
commitment. Only then does synergy become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
In this way, synergy is much like the 11 Prisoner's Dilemma" game.? It 
requires a commitment to see the process through. This type of 
commitment seems to occur by realizing the interrelation of self with 
other; people transcend narrow self-interest to mutual advantage only by 
understanding the larger parameters of the situation. 
In Unselfishness: The Role of the Vicarious Affects in Moral 
Philosophy and Social Theory, Rescher (1975) showed how the 
?mall group experimental game, the "Prisoner's Dilemma," relates to 
synergy. In a mock setting, two people are both accused of committing a 
crime together. The experimenter seeks to get them to 11 confess." If 
both subjects "confess," they are immediately "executed." If only one 
of the prisoners confesses, then both are still executed. The only way 
out of the experimental dilemma is if both prisoners refuse to inform on 
the other. Then, eventually, they will both be set free. 
7I am grateful to Dr. Arthur Warmoth of the Sonoma State University 
Humanistic Psychology department for this insight. 
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It is obvious that action in such a dilemma for individual advan-
tage will not necessarily make the right choice unless one understands 
the higher order parameters of the situation. ~ly by understanding the 
nature of the situation --that the fates of self and other are inter-
wined -- is there a way out. Synergy is a similar process. It requires 
greater understanding of the interrelation between self and other. In 
order to achieve synergy, there must be a commitment to synergy itself. 
Both self and other must be committed to the process and understand it 
is the only available option. 
If self is reified and viewed as separate from other, the indivi-
dual might seek advantage by making the other expendable. It the indi-
vidual good is placed in preference to the societal good, then the 
societal arrangements on which the person depends may fail. If the 
societal good is given eminent domain over the person, then society is 
not for the people who live in it. Society will pay the price in crime, 
aggression, and general malfunctioning. 
This was Fromm•s insight on intimacy. If we do not have two full 
integrities, then it is impossible for the individual to experience 
love. The only practical and available way of achieving a relationship 
of love is for the individual to allow fullness of both self and other 
to exist. Any negation of either self or other prohibits an exploration 
of love. The only way out is a commitment to synergy. 
Love is not a product of self. It is not just an attitude with 
which one faces the world. Such attitudes are like moods: they come 
and go; and without response, they soon dissipate. Love is not the 
gift of other -- crucial as other is to the process. If self just goes 
along for the ride, then other will soon recognize the burden for what 
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it is. Love demands a meeting of self and other. Love is a mutual com-
mitment and invitation to create in love. It is a commitment to 
synergy: a commitment to forego other ways of relationship and hold out 
for synergy until the prison walls crumble at our feet. 
It is only be recognition of the existential dilemma between self 
and other that the individual can be convinced to commit to synergy. 
Self cannot obtain what it wants through any other process. Forcing and 
the scientific power will simply never bring us the heart's desire. 
Love demands both a self and other, because love takes place between 
"I" and "you." If other is simply an enlarged appendage of self, there 
is no place that love can occur. Love requires a space in which to 
enter: it is an exploration of the mystery of boundary between "I" and 
"You." No other strategy will suffice. It is either commitment to syn-
ergy or to something less than love. 
There are many games self and other can play: power, status, trad-
ing, dependence • • Only by moving past the prison of aloneness of 
both self and other is love and freedom possible. Synergy is a commit-
ment that both hold out for love and not pull out of the process for more 
expedient rewards. 
This is the dilemma of self; it is also the dilemma of the societal 
good versus individual good. Expedient granting of eminent domain to 
none or the other simply will not work in the long run. Synergy's prime 
condition is a commitment to more. It is a small wonder that when love 
fails, one feels they have been condemned to death. Love is "social": 
it requires two (or more) to do its miracle. 
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Sociological Th~ories of Relationshie 
If we outline the ways that people can relate, several possibilities 
emerge. Sociology has analyzed several of these possibilities under its 
major schools of thought. The prime types of relationship have been 
amply studied with one exception. That exception is love and synergy. 
Such relationships are gaps in sociological understanding. 
Traditionally, sociology has articulated three different 
possibilities. One possibility is to simply put the relationship above 
self. "We" definitions are given eminent domain over 11 1" definitions. 
The relationship is given priority over the participants. The 
preservation and functioning of the society -- the societal good is 
seen as more important than the individual. The person too readily 
compromises self for the sake of relation. Examples of such 
arrangements abound: from business relations at the office to intimate 
dyads that compromise integrity for union. This pattern of social 
arrangement has been amply explored and articulated by the sociological 
perspective of functionalism. 
Functionalism begins with the biological analogy that the body is 
more than just a composite of organs and bones. Society is thus 
.. greater than the sum of its parts. 11 However, functionalism is not 
synergy; it quickly forgets individual elements and moves exclusively to 
consider society as all important. The whole individual is reduced to a 
11 role" in society. 
By reducing people to roles for the sake of relationship, function-
alism afford us not synergy but its opposite. Bernard (1972, p. 42) 
speaks of the way a woman 11 dwindles 11 into being a wife. Adjustments are 
certainly necessary in marriage, but there is a sense that the person is 
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too quickly 11 dwindled 11 into the role. Personhood is lopped-off; self is 
reduced to a role-like version: a wife , a mother, etc. We forget that 
the relationship is to enhance the person; it becomes all too easy to 
whittle the human down to size to fit ourselves to a preconceived idea of 
relationship. This functionist relationship of persons as role-players 
is one of the typical ways of relating in society; it sacrifices the ind-
ividual for the group. The individual is viewed secondary to the needs 
of society. This is a symbiotic possibility, but it is not synergy. 
Another possible way of relating one person to another is through 
domination and exploitation. This social arrangement pattern has been 
analyzed in sociology by Conflict Theory; it is the symbiosis of maso-
chism and sadism. It is simply the possibility of getting what one wants 
not by creativity but by simple force. It foregoes the possibility of 
true intimacy for the expediency of a power game. Here 1 + 1 = less than 
2. In fact, 1 + 1 = 1: the one who wins. 
The third approach to relationship that sociology has explored is 
separate individuals who trade interpersonal rewards and punishments, 
and goods and services; this is the socoiology of exchange theory. At 
first glance, the notion of reciprocity might be mistaken for synergy. 
But as Fromm has argued in the final pages of The Art of Loving, synergy 
is vastly different from the idea of fair exchange: 11 The practice of 
love must begin with recognizing the difference between fairness and 
lovell (Fromm, 1956, p. 109). 
The fundamental assumption of exchange theory somehow usually goes 
unnoticed; it premises separate individuals who exchange across their 
boundaries. Separateness is never overcome; we have a perpetual society 
of strangers. In exchange theory, self is never transcended by a 11 We, 11 
but remains intact and separated. 
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Exchange arrangements never explore the creative possibility of 
giving. The idea that giving -- which should be a cost is a creative 
act that actually enhances the giver makes little sense in exchange 
theory unless it is viewed as an investment or altruistic mechanism for 
enhancing self-esteem. Love implies a different form of relation. In 
love. self and other do not remain separate entities who merely trade 
interpersonal products. 
In exhange theory literature, the notion of the "free fight" is 
negated. Yet from an intimacy perspective, one might well define love as 
a free gift. Exchange trades involve constantly keeping score: a 
rational calculus of costs vs. benefits that must be periodically 
audited. The norm of reciprocity maintains that 11 if I give to you, then 
you must give to me. 11 It is a trading obligation. Yet one might con-
ceive of another process (karma?) where a person gives and things just 
come back on their own accord. Value among intimates tends to come to 
the top; among strangers, we must be constantly street-wise. 
George Simmell had the habit of illustrating a point with precisely 
the right example. In asking what are the effects on a relationship when 
it is converted to a calculus of units of exchange, he is inquired into 
the nature of money. Money is a method of keeping score: of balancing 
rewards with costs. The example he used to illustrate the effects of 
keeping score clearly showed the quantum leap between an intimacy per-
spective and an exchange perspective. His example is the difference 
difference between an intimate relationship and prostitution. In 
prostitution, intimacy is structured within the parameters of 
exchange. Love is a product and one is given a bill at the door. One 
never transcends the calculus of separateness. 
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Exchange never deals with the question.of meaning. A fair exchange 
never approaches the fundamental need to transcend individual 
separateness; trading never gives us security or the intimacy of merging 
boundaries. The exchange perspective may give an accurate picture of 
when a relationship is not working -- when persons are withdrawing from 
relation to become separate individuals. But it can never give 
understanding of the nature and dynamics of intimacy. Intimacy is not 
economic. We devised those systems for strangers. 
Synergy or love is the fourth possible way of creating social 
relationship. This possibility has remained unexplored in sociology and 
forms the new ground for a humanistic sociology. The dynamics of 
magical synthesis have not been articulated. It is now possible to 
begin to speak meaningfully about synergy. How is it facilitated? What 
prevents its occurrence? What prerequisites encourage it? How do we 
move from "I" to "We" without losing one or the other? 
We have seen that the normal sociologically articulated types of 
interaction foreshadow the possibility of love and synergy: the idea of 
1 + 1 =more than 2 is circumscribed. In functionalism, "I" and "you" 
are lost to a "We." In the arrangements described by conflict theory, a 
"We" is gained only by "I" dominating "You" or "You" dominating "I". 
There is no "I" and "You," but only an enlarged "I" or "You" that 
pretends to be "We." In exchange theory, a "We" never happens; it is 
only a code word for a mutually satisfying trade. "I" and "You" remain 
distinct. "We" is not explored. 
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Synergy and its Pretenders 
Laissez-faire Approaches. Most attempts at sociological theory 
quickly obscure self to a partial aspect in trying to reach too soon for 
a larger conceptual reality. Humanistic psychology seeks to ensure the 
fundamental aspects of synergy --self and other-- remain intact; and 
ensure that love is possible. Although love does not allow one to force 
its emergence, there is a very real sense that one can prevent it from 
occurring. Most sociological theories structure love in a way that there 
is not sufficient space in which it can occur. Humanistic psychology 
declares sociology the culprit and develops its own theory of society 
that is equivalent to "laissez faire. 11 
It is unfortunate that most of the literature on synergy has fol-
lowed Maslow's approach. Maslow•s idea of enacting synergy was largely 
one of laissez faire and pluralism. In opening up existing social struc-
tures that prevent synergy, humanistic approaches have emphasized anarch-
istic, non-structuring arrangements in hopes it will facilitate synergy. 
There is certainly a need for freedom if synergy is to occur. There 
is certainly the need to provide space within social structures and 
arrangements for a creative synthesis to happen. Pluralism is central to 
understanding self and other --but more is needed. We must open up 
destructive social structures, yet we must provide new social forms or 
pluralism simply degenerates into non-freedom. We must create, re-think, 
and articulate social forms that facilitate the person. Simply foregoing 
destructive forms will not be enough. 
Maslow's (1971) approach emphasized the mistake that most of human-
istic psychology (and psychology in general) make in relation to the 
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sociological. We cannot just blame society. We cannot cast the roman-
tic, free person against a dialectic of the chained person in society. 
For society is what we do: it is a re-enactment that involves our part-
icipation. If we should take the most extreme and adventurous mystics, 
romantics, and artists and give then a new kingdom, we would not have 
escaped from the social and its problems: they would re-create society 
-, n a day. 
Society means expectations, norms, and values. Society means try-
ing to re-create what matters; it means a method toward a purpose. We 
cannot give up goals, planning, and thinking. Society means self-
conscious action. It is our reflection upon now and envisioning the 
future that creates the social. 
It was "random, blundering acts" that William Graham Sumner set 
against the social. It is the spontaneous, creative act that humanistic 
psychology sets against society. But we must realize that what human-
istic psychology values is not the self (as it would claim), but the "I" 
in George Herbert Mead's sense. The "I" is the creative, spontaneous 
aspect of self. The times when I feel it is "I" who is doing. The "I" 
is alive. It is what we call the human. But the "I" can also reflect 
upon itself and in doing so casts itself in the role of object: to the 
realm of "me." It is this "me" that is sociological. The "I" cannot be 
permanently separated from the "me." Such is the fallacy of humanistic 
psychology. Finding a way of looking at "me" that allows "I": this is 
the task of humanistic sociology. 
We could recast this argument in different terms. We could talk 
about reification: how do we make a statement or emphasize a value 
without in turn setting in motion a social process that ceases to see? 
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Or we could speak of institutionalization: how do we generate a means 
of action without turning it into method and technique that demand rules 
for its operation? We could use Bergson's distinction: how do we 
follow an aspiration of the heart without converting it into social 
pressure when it is not working? 
We must retain the social and realize this is where are arguments 
must come to grips with life. We cannot successfully embrace the 
creative and spontaneous while abdicating the social. Laissez-faire 
approaches to synergy will not work. 
In fact, after the initial shot-in-the-arm, they contain an 
underlying authoritarianism and conservativism. If we simply relegate 
synergy to a social process, then it will appear by chance, but its 
occurrence is probably no more likely. Group process itself contains a 
11 COo1ing-out" mechanism that humanistic psychology has seemingly failed 
to notice. We are left with functionalism and its pseudo-synergy. The 
group pressured toward conformity. The issue is how to create full 
human beings within society. Only then can synergy happen. 
Agreement and Compromise. Synergy cannot be achieved through com-
promise. If consensus arises through an actual change of mind, synergy 
might at times appear to be similar to agreement. However, it is much 
different. If two individuals both compromise, then it is unlikely that 
1 + 1 will equal more than 2 because both persons have been reduced. 
Synergy is a pooled knowledge involving a bonus. 
Dreikurs (1946) offers insight into the humanistic power of influ-
ence and process of synergy • 
• improvement cannot be accomplished without acceptance 
Acceptance is not identical with agreement. If we 
accepted only when we fully approved, there would remain 
very little for us to accept • • • • Acceptance includes more 
than concord. It is the expression of a positive attitude 
towards something or someone, regardless of existing short-
comings and deficiencies. Our ability to influence requires 
a friendly and understanding attitude (p. 104). 
Synergy is something different than compromise. And it doesn't 
always necessarily mean agreement. One might compare synergy with 
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cooper-ation, but perhaps a better word would be to call it an inter-
play. Perhaps much of the literature that functionalism has embraced as 
cooperation might be separated and better understood as synergy. 
Functionalism: Synergy as a Norm. In many ways, functionalism is 
the metaphor that life is a party. It is business as usual. Everyone 
tries to cooperate. The obligation is to "have a good time." But we 
must ask in a very real sense: to what extent can synergy be a norm? 
If we are obligated to have a good time; if we are obligated to 
cooperate, have we not somewhat lessened synergy to compromise? Does 1 
+ 1 = more than 2 or have we not made it into 1-1/2 or 1-1/4, or less? 
Functionalism uses many metaphors that would remind us of synergy; yet, 
we need only take a few criticisms of conflict theorists seriously to 
see functionalism means reduction of the human: synergy by prescrip-
tion; or synergy fitted to a predetermined mold can hardly be synergy. 
This is a plight that all attempts at humanistic sociology must be 
interfaced with. When we describe an ideal relationship, it has a 
tendency to be translated into a norm. As Krishna noted, even Max 
Weber's ideal-type construct tends to become an ideal in the hands of 
the layman. When we postulate an ideal relationship, the role-player 
can manipulate toward it. This is also the problem of Mead's "I" and 
"me." 
If we reflect upon Mead's distinction, we note the 11 ! 11 is the spon-
taneous, the alive, the creative, the active part of self. It is not 
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reflective, but actively moving. It feels alive. It is when self feels 
empowered by life. This 11 !" part of self is precisely the component of 
self that is valued by humanistic psychology. In fact, often it seems 
humanistic psychology mistakes the total self for only the "I." 
The "me", on the other hand is the reflective part of self it 
treats self as object: picturing what happened to "me... When one 
reflects upon 11 1" that turns it into a "me." Jhe role player is the 
"me." The most glorious parts of the past and most promising parts of 
the future slip away when translated as "me's." It is the "I" that we 
crave. 
Here is the problem of reification, of institutionalization, and 
society in a nutshell: the problem of the "I" and the "me." It is 
nowhere more apparent than when we conceive of synergy. 1 + 1 = more 
than 2 implies that 11 1" +another "I" =more than 2. A 11 me" plus another 
''me" waul d probably equa 1 1 ess than 2. In fact, does not synergy mean 
that both persons in a relationship experience themselves predominately 
as I's? 
If we translate synergy to norm as functionalism does, then it is 
obligated. We can strive toward a commitment and an ideal. But is 
synergy enforceable as a norm? Role theory has something to say here. 
Often roles are defined as a series of rights and obligations. One per-
son's right is another person's obligation and vice versa. Synergy can-
not be a right and an obligation in such a sense because we're not 
talking about a zero-sum game. I cannot get a right only at the expense 
of your obligation. Synergy means more for both. 
Functionalism's mandated cooperation destroys synergy. Individual 
creativity is eroded by such a group process. Synergy can't be required 
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or it only parodies itself; it loses its creative force. 
One can also allude here to Goffman's dramaturgy which has often 
been called a microfunctionalism. Goffman spoke of a standard social 
process that is very similar to what has been termed synergy. It is the 
-ritual of "saving face." 11 Saving face" is commitment on the part of both 
participants that both will "come out ahead." It is on one level a com-
mitment to synergy; yet, as a social process, it becomes a norm and loses 
much of its power. 11 Saving face 11 is more often a ritual than true syner-
gistic process. But normatively, it appears at least verbally to do a 
very good job of translating synergy to a norm. It must be concluded 
that it is the process of institutionalizing synergy into a norm that is 
awry. 
Synergy cannot thus be a norm and subject to the typical dynamics of 
social control. Here we may have a way of weaving B. F. Skinner's odd 
statement that 11 love is the use of positive reinforcement" into the 
fabric of humanism. However, if such a conception is taken seriously, 
it totally changes the idea of what "control .. is. Authentic rewards are 
opportunities; they are inviting; they are creative alternatives and 
meaningful interactions. They resemble the humanistic power. It is 
here that one might begin to re-vision society and what it would look 
like without obligation, social pressure, and the rest of negative re-
inforcement. A positive social control would be a series of invitations 
to synergy. Synergy cannot be forced as a norm can be -- it cannot be 
required. It takes two or more in freedom for its commitment; the key 
to synergy is a commitment to this value. In some ways, it seems that a 
full commitment to freedom is all that is necessary for synergy to do 
its magic. 
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Synergy provides us with an operational definition of love and a 
strategy we can explore. The primary ingredient appears to be that we 
will fully commit ourselves to synergy as opposed to withdrawing into 
other games and expediencies. But other dynamics need to be explored and 
articulated: we need to separate out the differences between synergy and 
cooperation; we need to explore the conditions and societal arrangements 
that make synergy likely; and we need to understand how we can 
re-structure society around humanistic values. 
Humanistic psychology has taken the first step: the prerequisite to 
synergy i~ the fully functioning person. We cannot diminish the person 
and achieve a synergetic society. Beyond this initial understanding lies 
new articulations and exploratons. 
CHAPTER V 
RE-VISIONING SOCIETY ~- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The concept of synergy gives us a reasonable framework for re-
visioning society and beginning the work of humanistic sociology without 
losing intellectual respectability. Synergy is related to love -- it is 
the experience in which all participants are enhanced. It is a valid 
conceptualization of a humanistic process. Although precise formula-
tions for synergy are lacking at this time -- 1983 America -- the 
exploration of synergy does show a hopeful direction. It is clear there 
are a number of approaches to achieve synergy that cannot work: we can-
not have synergy by compromise. We cannot have synergy by norm. We 
cannot have synergy by reducing the human or by subjecting one person's 
will to another's. The forceful version of power will not bring us 
closer to our goal. Yet conceptions of synergy do suggest possible 
avenues of research and exploration. 
Throughout this dissertation, a case has been made concerning the 
nature of the social disciplines. To embrace humanistic values requires 
an approach much different than what has typically been mistaken for 
academic respectability. The social disciplines are an attempt to 
envision a world and create it in that ideal image. It has been demon-
strated that the physical sciences, while claiming to explore the truth, 
have actually functioned in much this same manner. The self-fulfilling 
prophecy of science has been reified far past any practical necessity 
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for doing so. Synergy provides the opportunity for visualizing a dif-
ferent level of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Humanistic psychology has laid the groundwork by exploring the 
nature of the healthy personality. The fully functioning human being 
operates by a different criteria than the tightly manipulative, fearful 
person. At base level, we cannot have synergy by compromising or 
reducing the healthy person to some lesser role. At this level, human-
istic sociology must take seriously the contributions of humanistic 
psychology. 
Although it does not articulate it, humanistic psychology implies 
another type of social world exists. When a person is fully function-
ing, things work themselves out and 11 accrue" to the individual "as if by 
magic ... This implies a different theater of the social than sociology 
has thus far imaged. 
Kant made the criticial distinction (which has been noted several 
times) between noumenon and phenomenon. Noumenon is reality-in-itself. 
Phenomenon is the appearance or the expression. As was briefly explored 
in the 11 Science" section, this is the same distinction that Castenada•s 
Don Juan makes and illustrates as the core of the magician•s vision. 
Don Juan calls noumenon the Nagual and phenomenon the Tonal. The tonal 
is everything that can be named, placed on the table, etc. It is treat-
ing the world as an object. The Nagual is everything else -- it is the 
creative force where 11 power hovers." 
One should not neglect the fact that Mead (1934) makes this very 
same distinction in talking about the self and refers to it as the "I" 
and the 11 me." After the self is creative and spontaneous, reflecting on 
that act turns the act of an 11 111 into a 11 me 11 -- an object. 
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Kant's distinction could have held the key to a different vision of 
reality instead of merely reinstating science. As Bosworth (1977) 
noted, the word "phenomenon'' has two possible root meanings: one is the 
traditional interpretation: ''to appear" which places us in the scienti-
fic reality and the world of appearances. The other possible reading is 
"to show." To treat reality as ''shown" would have opened up the realm 
~f the magician; it would have suggested that reality is framed -- and 
pointed out; it would have launched Western thought into developing a 
totally different epistemology. However, in Kant's time, such was too 
threatening. Science had only recently succeeded in putting the shadow 
of the magician to sleep. Embracing a world that is in essence "shown" 
would have released the old insecurities. And yet, from the late twen-
tieth century, this is precisely what is needed: a world view and epis-
temology that embraces the magician, the artist, and the lover. Perhaps 
this is nowhere better demonstrated that in Jung's discussion of syncro-
nicity. If love can be operationalized as synergy, then syncronicity 
can be treated as an academic canopy for discussing magic. 
It is amazing that J. B. Rhine's work on extra-sensory perception 
has been so totally shunned by the scientific community. It represents 
perhaps some of the most rigorous, tightly controlled scientific experi-
ments ever done. Yet, they are an anomaly to the scientific world view; 
and science as it is today cannot afford to accept them. There is 
something much different going on in the world than just the things 
explained by science. 
Jung (1973) originally posited syncronicity as an alternative to 
cause and effect explanations; it is the idea of meaningful coincidences 
and chance happenings. Throughout our lives, we go through relatively 
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few major life transitions: a death here, a marriage there, and pos-
sibly a major career change. We are "outside" our patterns so seldom we 
have little opportunity to examine the forces and the very winds that 
blow our lives. The causes of transitions in our lives may not be see-
able. They are experienced so infrequently that we have not been able 
to build a full sociology around a cause and effect model. Syncronicity 
offers the possibility for a different method of exploration. 
We would be quite mistaken if we think that syncronicity can ever 
be diagrammed on the blackboard. Syncronicity posits that the life 
force will not be explain~d by our science, and despite Jung•s stated 
allegiance to the umbrella of science, I would suggest that the idea of 
syncronicity poses the possibility of not only an acausal, but an 
ascientific understanding. 
We must be prepared to admit that between the unconsciousness of 
the dream and the reality of day-to-day existence, there is another 
world different in all its subtle shades and hues. We cannot attempt 
full explanation of this. Final causes will not be the culmination of 
our efforts in social science. True "scientific" discoveries have not 
taken place because of our established methods (Phillips, 1973) and we 
-must be suspicious of methods that promise such final conclusions. 
In introducing syncronicity, Jung (1973) wrote it was amazing how 
the individual fates and the dramas of individual actors were all inter-
woven into one world. Somehow destiny stretched out before us separate, 
but connected. Connections that could not in any way be casually influ-
enced often became meaningful beyond anything coincidence could suggest. 
A method different from causation must be articulated if we are to do 
more than just allude to such occurrences. 
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We cannot grasp the life force and coerce it into revealing its 
secrets just as syncronicity cannot be forced. Syncronicity takes place 
at the very edge of our lives, beyond the boundary of self and our 
understanding. We can be aware of syncronicity, but we cannot make it 
happen. Similarly, syncronicity cannot be "followed." We cannot wait 
for it to happen because it occurs concurrently with our actions. The 
necessities of our Aristotelean logic which we have taken to be the very 
basis of thought itself (Wharf, 1956) make it most difficult to talk 
about syncronicity. we are forever wanting to declare it a mysterious 
"black box," circumscribe 1t, and deal with it in a cause and effect 
manner. Such an approach is not only absurd, but dangerous. We are 
dealing with what the occult might refer to as the "cosmic trigger" 
(Wilson) --the detonating device behind the evolutionary time bomb. 
This is perhaps why David Hume introduced the idea of the "secret 
springs." 
As previously noted, the classic Western way of dealing with the 
"secret springs" was Kant•s distinction of noumenon and phenomenon; 
noumenon can only be grasped intuitively while phenomena can be studied 
scientifically. Phenomena can be used as approximations of noumena. 
However, as Meeker (1977) pointed out, if we are making approximations 
of the truth, we are interested in getting closer and closer. It is as 
if we were on the road to Canterbury and each night we ask "how far is 
it to Canterbury?" We are assuming our journey is taking us closer to 
our destination. Syncronicity would suggest that Canterbury is in our 
very midst. We must find a different mode of movement than a journey 
toward it. 
Syncronicity cannot be captured, territorized, or capitalized upon; 
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it cannot be dealt with heroically; it is not a matter of stealing fire 
from the gods. The scientific task of charting the unknown does not fit 
syncronicity. Freud•s mandate of "where id was let ego be" is responded 
to by Jung•s notion of syncronicity. It is not knowable in a rational, 
causal manner; it can be recognized and lived with. We can take it into 
account in envisioning society. But it cannot be reduced. Syncronicity 
cannot be "claimed" by a science of man. 
We cannot afford to reduce man to the small reified image that nor-
mally passes for human in most social theories. The task of sociology 
is to consider the creature who is dancing on the very hands of time 
itself. 
Humanistic psychology has embraced this larger version of human 
nature. Yet, we have not managed a sociological articulation of the 
fully human and the social structures and processes that enhance such 
creativity precisely because we have held out for a scientific under-
standing. Syncronicity and "magic" provides such an ascientific under-
standing. Yet the respectable sociologist has been frightened to use 
such words. It must be recognized here that humanistic psychology has 
been reticent to fully advance into this area. Still, we must fully 
fully recognize that syncronicity is the latent assumptions of human 
psychology --that if one gets "{n tune" with one•s self, one will find 
relation, meaning, and opportunity. This implies a much different con-
ception of the social than we have pretended. Such is not psychological 
reductionism, but positing the social to be of a particular nature, but 
not exploring or articulating that nature. 
It will be remembered that Castenacta•s Don Juan claimed that all 
one needed for "power" was ''impeccability" --the ability to be at the 
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right place at the right time. Syncronistically, then, everything would 
fall into place. We must note here the connections with religious 
theories of realization. The word "impeccability" means literally "sin-
less." Religious postulates become insights of a much different order 
than normally attributed. 
This all implies a dramaturgy of a totally different origin and 
nature. 
magical: 
The magician frames, shows. The self-realized person is 
not just in charisma, but in the world that s/he creates 
lives in. In terms of opportunities, the self-actualized person lives 
in a different world: a new world with a self-fulfilling prophecy that 
creates another reality. The lover creates a different reality because 
something else is being shown, acted upon, and envisioned. And this new 
world comes into being. The artist springs from creativity and points 
out a deeper, better world. Sociologically, they bring us into a dif-
ferent theater and the dynamics of this drama must be articulated under 
a different canopy than science. The magician's art --framing, show-
ing, celebrating a particular view -- provides us with our first step in 
articulating this reality and this epistemology. Syncronicity provides 
us with a way of spinning our anomaly with science into a different 
reality. 
The magician as a social change strategy will not probably be fully 
articulated in our lifetime. But is is an idea whose time has come and 
we can begin sketching the dimensions here. Magic is by its very nature 
private and limited. It takes plate behind "closed doors" away from the 
larger reality. As Suttles {1970) noted, even the magic of friendship 
in a bureaucracy is private: it takes care of organizational problems 
that cannot be dealt with rationally. In fact, we spin a work "behind 
the back" of the rational world that we postulate; and this informal, 
friendship/love-oriented world actually keeps our articulated, formal 
world functioning. 
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Magic can never be brought onto the conference table -- it is off 
the table. It is private, outside the room. We can bring testimony of 
its presence and importance to our lives to the table-- this is the 
task of humanistic sociology. We can seek to articulate social theories 
that respect its dynamics. But we can never bring magic itself onto the 
table nor chart its flow on the blackboard. 
Simmel (1902) spoke of the dynamics of the dyad and the triad. The 
dyad which is the basis for most of the intimacy that occurs in society 
is founded on the "secret." Its intimacy occurs precisely because it is 
not public; because it is private and away from the world. With the 
triad, we have the addition of a third party -- an audience that makes 
the dyad self-reflective. It is with the triad that we have the step to 
society proper. The dyad itself is not really social in so many typical 
senses. 
I argued in my master•s thesis {Ou Bois, 1975) that society and its 
processes could only be viewed with the step to the triad. With the 
dyad, so much of what we conceive as elementary social processes simply 
cannot be viewed or do not exist. 
Social reality has no meaning in a dyad. Reality is either agreed 
upon or we are at a hiatus. There is only minimal negotiation of real-
ity because there is no judge of reality aside from each person; there 
is no social pressure or judge. "When it comes down to just two, I 
ain•t no crazier than you." Reality is democractized. If two disagree, 
we have a tie. Social reality is simply suspended. 
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Social power is also not evidenced in a dyad. Power distinctions 
are usually quite evident to both parties. The principle of least 
interest says that in a dyad the person who has power maintains that 
power by the virtue of threatening to go elsewhere, thus terminating the 
relationship. Such power discrepancy (as an ongoing source of acknow-
ledgement and basis for communication) would simply be too blatant. In 
dyads, power discrepancies are acknowledged and deference given. But 
for daily interaction, social power is not an issue. It is a given. It 
is only with the triad that social power becomes an ongoing, active 
dynamic. 
The dyad is a special case. The intimate spaces spin a different 
reality through differe~t processes. They are private and away from the 
world. Carpenter (1970) noted that if we increase the size of an 
audience, we often dissipate and destroy the message of intimacy. Mass-
produced intimacy is simply pseudo-intimacy. Love and magic normally 
are private. Moving them to a public space ch~nges their nature. To 
re-vision society, respecting the nature of love and the magical, we 
must realize this. 
Magic is not only private, it is limited. An old Zen story said 
that before one is 11 enlightened they chop wood and carry water ... After 
one is enlightened they also 11 Chop wood and carry water ... Magic is not 
a free lunch. It can only do so much. It leaves the rest of the world 
intact. The magician or the lover can only show, visit, point out. The 
magic cannot be tied to a technological wheel. It loses much of its 
power and changes its nature if we try. 
Since magic is limited and private, it can shake us to our very 
roots as the rest of the world goes untouched. We can go through the 
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most profound changes --we fall in love, we lose a loved one, we have a 
realization to the depth of our being -- and yet the world outside, even 
our next door neighbor and the passerby on the street, remain the same. 
Love is essentially private. The world goes on much the same way as 
before; it sells us wedding rings, coffins, and sends us sympathy cards. 
As a line from a fairy tale that I once wrote says: 11 If magic could 
change the world or last for more than a little while, then the smallest 
child playing in the forest would have changed it long ag0 11 (Author, 
n.p). What about the changes that lovers would have brought? The magi-
cian, the lover can only go so far. This is the nature of love and 
magic. Otherwise, long ago the world would have been made much 
different. 
Love and magic wait and seek and hide in our private regions. 
There they play and spin their own world. But the public forum can only 
view them as phenomena, as tonal, as an object as a 11 me" in Mead•s 
sense. The creative, the 11 111 , the creative power of the nagual and the 
experiences of the secret springs are by nature private. The magician 
seeks to visit, to testify, and to point out. 
Each man or woman can do little to change the world. Life is 
short. Time is long. Even the most profound historical actors seldom 
leave behind changes that last more than a few hundred years. What is a 
few hundred years? Or a few thousand? In folklore, the magician knows 
that 11 nothing can make a difference. 11 Mortal humanity can do little to 
change time. But one must still act. One creates the day. Magic takes 
place in the present -- in the now. 
This is where humanistic psychology emphasizes process models. It 
is in the now that we experience enlightenment, realization, and it is 
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in the now that we live. Here we must make a further distinction that 
illustrates and further elaborates why humanistic psychologists have 
found sociology so foreign and not articulated a humanistic sociology. 
Carpenter {1970) discussed the difference between art and artifact. 
In Western culture, we have a tendency to value artifact and de-value 
art. It is the finished painting, not the swirl of the brush touching 
canvas that is important. This is not the case in many primitive cul-
tures; the play -- the art -- is what is important. It is the process 
of creating that is valued. The finished product is only an afterlife 
of what was a creative process. It is only artifact. Many natives will 
spend months or even years carving a figure only to discard it upon the 
ground when finished. Natives were originally greatly amused that the 
white man would pay money for such artifacts. But in our culture -- and 
the whole scientific ethos it is artifact that is valued and the pro-
cess of creating art which is tolerated but not cultivated. In primi-
tive culture, play was important. In our society, we seek to capitalize 
upon the smallest creative insight and turn it into product. The artist 
becomes distrustful of all that is practical and the line between the 
sacred and the profane is ignored. The slightest flurry of magic while 
ignored by the academic community is readily marketed by the accompany-
ing technological economy. At the same time that magic is formally 
ignored, it is being dissipated by the artifact-technological mentality. 
The actual creativity, magic and process is relegated to an insignifi-
cant role because it does not fit our cultural framework. 
Science has sought sources of power that were all purpose and with-
out limits. Magic does not fit that view. Not only does magic change 
and dissipate when routinized in the public sector, but magic requires 
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participation of the aduience. It is not a matter of "prove it to me," 
but the audience entering into willing participation. This is the 
"Ancient Mariner's" "willing suspension of disbelief." Magic only goes 
so far. The magician may show the audience anything, but if they do not 
choose to look and see --to willingly enter into dialog --they see 
nothing. 
This is what every lover knows; this is what the true magician 
knows. And this is why historically magic was no match for science. 
Science could offer power to self; magic depended upon the participation 
of self and some "other" --be it person, cosmos, animal, or nature. 
Science offered a brief reprieve from relatedness --from the mortality 
of a closed circle. Science promised power in abstraction; that, theo-
retically, was all powerful and knew no limits. Magic was more subtle. 
Science and its power could become "ego's" tool --a rational approach. 
Magic combined the rational and the irrational, demanding one recognize 
the boundary of other and establish relatedness. 
The magician requires participation of other, be it the "whenever 
two or more are gathered" of religion or the more familiar example of 
the stage magician needing an audience. Without the audience's atten-
tion, there is no magic. The magician shows, points out, refrarnes. The 
scientist awaits appearances. Magic takes you there, creates a vision, 
another world. As one author wrote, "the function of poetry is to 
invoke the muse" (Graves, 1952, p. 7). The magician invites one into an 
experience. 
The scientist can be separated from his world; his truth remains 
without an audience. The art of the magician requires an audience. 
Without the co-participation of other, there is no show. Indeed, there 
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is no magic. Magic awaits participation. Otherwise, we see nothing. 
There is nothing to see, for nothing happens. 
In many ways, culture is a shelter against the "world." Magic 
beckons all the time. Culture prevents it from shattering the walls of 
our constructed lives. The Nagual. The Noumenon. The Creative Power. 
The Life Force. They are there all the time. Our cultural description 
of reality protects us from chaos and the intensity of the fire. As 
long as we keep the walls of our self-fulfilling prophecies intact, 
magic has no power; it cannot touch us. 
This is akin to the humanistic power. Van Den Berg (1961) 
illuminated this discussion. He wrote: 
When Jesus Christ came to Nazareth, He 'could there do no 
mighty work.' Jesus was not surprised about His lack of 
power, not about nature in Nazareth, which, like a modern 
landscape, left Him no opening for His supernatural inter-
ference; but 'He marvelled because of their unbelief.' Our 
belief is the condition of the miracle. Without our belief, 
apparently, no miracle can happen; the miracle is present in 
our belief, it is the habitual state of things. 
Actually, it is strange that the Evangelist was so 
honest. He says that Jesus, who is God, could do there no 
mighty work, although he is omnipotent. Does this mean his 
power can be compared with the power of the hypnotist, who 
makes a whole audience shudder with cold while actually it is 
rather warm? The hypnotist can only do this because the audi-
ence believes in him. Why does Mark make this comparison so 
easy? ••• 
It could only have been his honesty that made him write 
this. Mark was an honest man. He was honest and because of 
his honesty he stayed out of trouble; while we stare at one of 
the most amazing texts in the Bible, he writes on as if there 
were nothing wrong. 
And there was nothing wrong; that can be the only explan-
ation for the serenity of Mark's words. The reality of the 
miracle was so beyond all question -- for those who believed, 
as well as for those who did not --that this text could not 
be misunderstood. 
It is as if today someone says, 'Last year I was in Spain 
and I was very thirsty; I asked everybody I met for water, but 
nobody understood. I couldn't make them understand.' No one 
would, as a result of this story doubt the reality of words as 
a means to convey understanding. For the thirsty man the 
means was unsound because he did not speak Spanish •••• 
The Spaniards must have looked at him with bewildered expres-
sions. So, more or less, must the people of Nazareth have 
looked. They did not understand Jesus; that was their dis-
belief, and that is why nothing happened. The reality of the 
miracle is not affected by it (Van Den Berg, 1961, p. 204). 
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To create a reality, an experience, we must understand and enter 
into a self-fulfilling prophecy-- a reciprocal dialog. Without 
participation, there is no miracle. No magic. We are safe from the 
poet's spell; the touch of a hand no longer transforms the world; to 
look into your eyes no longer makes my soul flow; a word no longer 
changes my world. We see nothing; only the random appearances of 
sciences remain. 
Castenada's Don Juan discusses magicians flying through the tops of 
trees and how this would scare the life out of the Indians who saw it. 
But the white men were not frightened: "They see nothing." The truth 
of such a story makes no difference. Metaphorically, it illustrates the 
nature of magic. Unless we are open to the possibility, it can be in 
our very midst and we see nothing. Our culture is a buffer from other 
realities. Unfortunately, our current scientific culture has done more 
than keep us safe. It has blinded us to love and the magical. 
Outside these safe cultural regions lies possible insanity. As 
Becker (1968) saw the problem of the artist so well: no one feels they 
have the authority to offer up new cultural meanings. From the wings of 
vision, self falls needing support from other. Yankelovich (1981) 
noted, one cannot be the artist for one's own life; it requires other. 
There is not enough self-confidence and self-affirmation in anyone to 
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sustain vision without context. The magician requires other; the artist 
requires an audience. Otherwise, it is a vacuum of self and the magic 
dwindles when unnoticed. 
By oneself, a vision may be a poem; but it begs to be celebrated in 
life. We must not mistake the strength of the cry (for relatedness) or 
the convincingness of the new vision for a self-containment that does 
not need other. As Becker noted, not even our greatest, most compelling 
artists and thinkers have been able to sustain themselves. One need 
only read their biographies to confirm this. This is why the counter-
culture•s culmination into humanistic psychology•s 11 Self as your own 
artwork 11 was doomed to failure. Self without a meaningful, partici-
pating audience is left to fluctuate between vision and doubt; between 
heights and folly. To create new meanings and enact them in life 
requires co-participation. To create culture is not an individual act; 
it is a co-production. 
Love and magic are invitations. They require participation to come 
into full being. The lover•s art like the magician•s art may go 
unnoticed. Unless love is an opportunity taken, it is but a light in 
the window at night, a possibility that could have met the light of day. 
Without participation, the lover may appear like a fool or an idiot. 
The paranoid Dobuan will never trust the generous Zuni. The con artist 
delights in the willing 11 do-gooder ... Love is never more than an oppor-
tunity until it is explored. 
Love is a pooling of lives. 11 111 and 11 YOU 11 become 11 We. 11 While 
there remains an I and a you, we have substantially changed. I and you 
are not quite the same either. 
The lover, the magician, the artist returns from vision to a larger 
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world essentially unchanged. Perhaps this is why so many magicians in 
folklore say that "magic makes no difference." Magic only goes sd far 
-- and yet from the private spaces, the world has been transformed 
totally. 
The magician points out an experience and beckons us to join. 
Magic is shown. The scientist opts to find the truth. The magician 
realizes there are many truths --that indeed there is truth everywhere. 
Magicians throughout folklore emphasize that "all is the same 11 --that 
"it makes no di~ference". There are innumerable perspectives on every-
thing. Omar Khayham expressed it that "to each must come the time to 
decide between truth and wisdom. 11 
Becker (1973) wrote that we live in a world filled with an over-
abundance of truth. There are truths and truth systems everywhere we 
look. But it is Omar Khayham's insight that must serve us well. For it 
is the magician that returns us to wisdom. The magical incantation may 
be no more than the proper words at the right time: the proper truth at 
the proper time. The spell/truth that is capable of restoring us to 
magical vision where we tap our creativity is what the magician seeks. 
Under such an epistemology, truth is not an abstraction that can be 
built into a system of truth; that is not its nature. A humanistic 
epistemology emphasizes that truth is an experience. The magician 
invites us to participate. Truth is an experience that suggests a feel-
ing; the words that initiate it may differ; but it is this experience we 
allude to when using the word "truth." 
This "truth" may well be very similar to what most have called 
love. It is an experience of source, of meaning. This is why Norman 
Brown said that "the truth is either new or not at all." The words that 
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return us to wholeness must always be new -- fresh. They must re-awaken 
an experience of awe and wonder. What worked the last time will not 
work the next. The spell must be woven afresh. It must hit us where we 
are in our lives at the time. But it is the experience that we wish to 
enter. It is not a new experience. We have had it before. This is 
what Henry Miller referred to when he advised "remember to remember." 
We must go again to that place where mystery and awe make us feel a part 
and in tune. Perhaps this is why it was written in the Bible that "only 
as a little child will you enter the kingdom of heaven." We must go 
fresh with child-like eyes. 
The humanistic vision is based on such peak experience. Its ver-
sion of truth is based on the love and magic that we have known in our 
lifetimes. It is this experience the magician wishes to put us in 
contact with again. One set of words may be no better than another for 
re-creating this experience. It varies from person to person. Some 
sets of words will not work, but many others depend on the time and the 
place. Particular truths make no difference. 
The magician•s "trick" is phenomenological in nature. It is fram-
ing, bracketing. The story is told that Don Juan visited Castenada•s 
office at one time. In the office were stone busts of the great figures 
in Western thought: Freud, Marx, etc. Don Juan picked up a bust of 
Husserl, rubbed its head and said, "Now this is a power object." The 
implication is clear. Husserl was the philosopher who stressed bracket-
ing-- that reality is bracketed; i.e., framed. The magician knows in 
the end all realities are the same. One view is just one view and there 
are many views. "Nothing matters ... It all is "the same. 11 
Yet it is precisely here that humanism can take its major departure 
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and claim its humanistic epistemology. Past power, one may move to 
knowledge. If reality is shown, bracketed -- then there is no way to 
claim one frame is more true than another. All is equal. There is no 
way to say that one view is more true than another. It is a matter of 
-~hoice. One view is simply preferred-- i.e., valued. What is shown--
what is framed -- depends on which is valued. What is shown then makes 
all the difference in the world. 
of knowledge. What is valuable? 
Values are then the prime discussion 
Where does the heart lie? What paths 
are worth taking? Where does the heart feel good? Where does happiness 
abound? 
If humanistic sociology has a methodology, then perhaps it is 
happiness. Love is difficult to define, but at its best it borders and 
includes happiness. Magic without joy is too threatening for us to ever 
allow ourselves under its spell. If we were to seek to operationalize 
happiness, could love and magic be far behind? 
There is another limit to magic. It is our mortality and fundamen-
tal inability of the human being to make a permanent dent in time. The 
human life span compared to geological time is small indeed. We seek to 
deny death and claim our own heroism. Yet we know the absurdity of such 
denial. 
In life, most of us have come to realize there are no final solu-
tions. We cannot make a large contribution to changing the world. The 
heroism fades. We realize we are just living and the larger world goes 
on without us. Our mark in time will not be great, but our experience 
of life can be full. As we mature, we leave behind the "change the 
world" conversation. We begin living. The childish heroism is replaced 
by a recognition of our own mortality and needs. We enter into life and 
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spend little time filing notes with the "change the world" conversation~ 
Yet it is precisely with those who have realized that change the world 
strategies are limited and the heart of life belongs to the living who 
have the crucial contribution to make to an effective articulation of a 
viable "change the world" strategy. 
Sociological and Psychological Reflections: 
The Art of Writing Home 
It was David Hume who reminded us that philosophy can never replace 
living. Serious things have since been loathe to forgive him for such 
an insight. But we must remember that sociology and psychology are not 
life; they are reflections upon it. They are what Gregory Bateson 
referred to as the meta-conversation. A conversation above or across 
life: who we are and what we might be doing, and where we are going. 
The human animal has been huddled by the fire for a long time. From 
time to time we reflect on this experience of living. From time to time 
we leave the familiar fire on new explorations. Later we return to dis-
cuss our journeys, insights and new destinations. 
Legend tells that when Lao Tzu became enlightened, he packed his 
things and headed out of China. The Emperor, hearing the wisest of his 
subects was leaving, immediately sent word to stop him at the border. 
He was not allowed to leave the country until he first wrote down what 
he knew. The Tao The King was thus written at "gunpoint." Those who 
have been actively involved in living have not usually appeared in the 
philosophical literature except as footnotes or brief references. A 
full articulation does not seem possible or at least those with the 
knowledge have better things to do. We should remember there are four 
gospels and numerous gnostic contenders, but nowhere do we hear of a 
11 Gospe1 According to Jesus. 11 
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For the most part, those who have experienced the magical vision of 
love have not sought to write about it or leave behind a detailed map. 
They have simply entered into life. From time to time, we receive 
11 postcards 11 or brief clues to their journey. But their attention is 
occupied with the present: they have passed through the door and into 
1 i fe. 
Psychology and sociology represent the peculiar attempt to have a 
conversation at the crossroads. They are in the realm of what might be 
classified as 11 Writing home. 11 They are a reflection upon life and the 
human experience. It is through such a conception of the behavioral 
disciplines as 11 wr1ting home 11 that we might understand their intrinsic 
nature. 
One cannot spend all of their time writing home and expect to have 
an experience. The activity of writing home can never replace living. 
One may send accounts, maps or even tickets home, but the experience 
itself cannot be tucked in an envelop and mailed home to the larger 
reality. The experience of love will always remain separate from the 
wider public sphere. 
The intimate experiences where we find value cannot be brought in 
full essence to the public conference table. We cannot lay them on the 
table, dissect them, and expect them to retain their nature and dynam-
ics. They take place in the private spaces away from the public conver-
sation and understandings. Yet, if we seek a full understanding of 
life, it is these private spaces of love and the magical that we wish to 
bring to bear upon our public construction of the world. We wish to 
envision a society in keeping with their nature. 
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Sociology and psychology cannot replace living. Yet it is the pri-
vate experience of love and the magical that we find most crucial to a 
public articulation of a humanistic effort. How do we construct a world 
view that respects the nature of love and the magical? How do we 
envision society in such a way that people are transported to the 
magical experience? How do we construct social structures and forms 
that serve as resources in the construction of meaningful lives? This 
is the task of humanistic sociology. This work has focused upon an 
articulation of some of the groundwork necessary to prepare the way for 
a rendition of sociology as art. This articulation is crucial, because 
we cannot just move into the world without also writing home: for we 
bump into the world reassembled in another place. We need the canopy of 
-a public conversation which recognizes and encourages love and the magi-
cal. The professional task of writing home is essential to support the 
artistic exploration of living. Without a public awareness, the indi-
vidual artist is left to flounder alone. 
There are two possible paths that can be taken when one realizes a 
new reality and vision. One is to bring this experience back to the 
public forum and enter into dialog with "what is.'' This is the tradi-
tional approach of our rationalism: to bring all the world to the "con-
ference table" and get everyone to agree on how the world is. Yet, we 
must realize that will never thoroughly happen. Individual efforts may 
well be dissipated by public testimony. The group reality may serve as 
a ''cooling-out" mechanism for the individual vision. Some ideas are too 
new for public disclosure; some pale when placed in public display and 
subjected to public scrutiny while undergoing a fragile birth; some may 
be routinized by the public marketplace if presented before they are 
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full grown. Our public conceptions must respect such dynamics. We must 
recognize the existence of a world outside our public conversation at 
the conference table. Our effort at writing home must allude to the 
other experience. 
The other path which one might follow is to simply leave the larger 
reality: find one or two or a few who share the same vision and weave 
one's way away from the larger reality. This is the effort of the coun-
terculture exploration. By itself, it will never be complete: it needs 
the support of the public conversation. It needs to be encouraged by a 
larger world that supports the private exploration of viable alterna-
tives. It needs to find viable resources available to construct mean-
ingful options. The formal effort of "writing home'' must always be 
coupled with the individual exploration. We cannot escape this world 
for the next; and yet we cannot abandon our vision for a dialog with the 
past. Mankind is in a state of becoming. Sociology and psychology 
represent reflection in the mind's eye upon our journey. We cannot 
desert our explorations to return to writing home full time. Yet we 
cannot desert the past for the future or the present has no continuity 
or chance of becoming a viable new direction. Sociology is at this 
crossroad. 
This public conversation is at the heart of our social construc-
tions. The public question of how to re-create the values and the 
peaks, and how to improve upon the unhappy is central to create new 
social forms. A politician travels through a land of poverty, hunger 
and despair and returns with a new political platform. Lovers experi-
ence a touching and the depths of their souls and seek to make a public 
statement of their state: to find a way to daily re-enact the joy of 
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their delight. A mother gives birth and seeks new patterns of "do's" 
and "don'ts" that somehow make this life better than the last. We seek 
new forms which some make our struggle for survival less harsh and more 
related to our needs for relatedness. 
Out public conversations echo our ways to find new social forms to 
re-create the meaningful. All our thought-devices-- all our predilec-
tions toward the future -- are attempts to institute a way into the 
future. They are artificial, man-made forms to construct a way into a 
new reality. For envi si oni ng and making the future, these· .social forms 
. ' 
are the main resources that we bring to creating a new situation. The 
artist needs paints which will flow with the water of life; and he needs 
a palette that he can carry. Our palettes do not need to contain all of 
the great art works of the past and the future such would be unman-
ageable and impossible; they need only contain the paints. 
Questions and directions for humanistic sociology abound, but they 
need to contain different parameters than those of scientific sociology. 
In this dissertation, I ·have sought to sketch the parameters of this new 
effort. Along the way, I have suggested some possibilities for explor-
ation. Some of the fundamental new efforts that need to be addressed 
include: (1) we need to come up with new economic theories and modes 
which bridge the sacred and the profane; which bring the ethic of fair-
n~ss into dialog with the paradigm of love. (2) We need to develop new 
theories of social control and take seriously the documented insight 
that reward is more effective than punishment. The primary human moti-
vation seems to be for meaning. If we take the concept of reward and 
positive reinforcement seriously, then it is not just the converse of 
converse of negative reinforcement: it is the availability of 
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meaningful alternatives and directions. It is a creative effort which 
follows the fundamental human impetus towards love and self-fulfillment 
and seeks to provide resources and opportunity for such direction. 
(3) We need to respect the internal dynamics of love and the magical and 
seek ways which convert the.humanistic power into a path of action. We 
need to develop the art of courtship, invitation, and gaining the 
attention of those we would wish to introduce to another world. (4) We 
need to provide resources and opportunities for the person as artist and 
life as artwork. This moves past the mere provision of support networks 
into the full conception of society as a series for human fulfillment. 
(5) We need to bridge "1 11 and "You" into a "We" and explore the depths 
of such operation. (6) Using synergy as our parameter, we need modes of 
relating which retain the full person in fundamental and fulfilling 
interaction. 
Such tasks are merely the beginning. The hard work is becoming 
literate with the dynamics of our social constructions. We must seek 
ways which retain our original directions. We must follow that 
direction's own subtle nuances and mannerisms. In our visions, another 
world awaits. 
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